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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Windsor,
that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) is unconstitutional.1
DOMA defined marriage as solely between one man and one woman for
every purpose under federal law.2 Consequently, it required that same-sex
couples who are legally married under state law be denied both federal
recognition of their marriages and a host of federal benefits (and burdens)
that apply to heterosexual married couples. DOMA had been challenged in
federal courts across the country as a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that it violated the Spending Clause, Equal
Protection under the Fifth Amendment, and federalism under the Tenth
Amendment.3 The First and Second U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal, had
previously concluded that DOMA violates Equal Protection, affirming
district court grants of summary judgment.4 Windsor was decided as this
1. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013); Jeremy W. Peters,
Cold, Wet Wait for Tickets to Supreme Court’s Same-sex Marriage Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Late Edition, Mar. 26, 2013, at 14; see also The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No.
104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining marriage for purposes of federal law); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (2006) (providing that no state is required to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in another state).
3. See, e.g., Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376-77 (D. Mass.
2010) (contending an Equal Protection challenge against DOMA, as embodied in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Mass.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235-36 (D. Mass. 2010)
(challenging DOMA under the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment), aff’d, 682
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (asserting DOMA violates Equal Protection), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012), aff’d, 12-307, 2013 WL 3196928 (June 26, 2013).
4. See Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
2012), cert. denied, No. 12-97 (June 27, 2013); Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188.
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article went to press. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court
determined that in passing DOMA and banning same-sex couples married
under state law from receiving any federal marriage benefits, Congress had
interfered with the rights of states to define marriage and thereby, had
violated the rights of Windsor and other couples to Equal Protection. At
press time, the Court still had not yet formally determined the fate of
several other certiorari petitions seeking review of DOMA-related issues,
although some might argue that Windsor is practically determinative.5 And
on the same day that it decided Windsor, the Supreme Court also decided a
case challenging a state’s right to limit the term “marriage” to heterosexual
couples.6
This article focuses on the issues raised by DOMA and the federal
recognition of state-approved same-sex marriages. While the Supreme
Court invalidated DOMA, its decision in Windsor reserved judgment on
some key questions that DOMA raised. For example, the Court stated that
"by history and tradition" the states controlled marriage, but it did not
define that control itself as a constitutional restriction. The Court also
expressly acknowledged that the federal government can sometimes
deviate from the states on marriage when federal policy is as at issue.
While indicating the instances were limited, the Court did not identify the
5. See United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013). The Windsor
plaintiff argued that the denial of a federal marital estate tax deduction (allowing one to
give an unlimited amount to a spouse free from estate and gift taxes) on the ground that
she was married to a person of the same-sex, violated her Equal Protection rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 175-76; see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Mass., No. 1215 (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter HHS v. Mass. Cert. Pet.], available at
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0015.pet.aa.pdf
(filing
for
certiorari with Gill); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bipartisan Legal Advisory Grp.
of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill, No. 12-13 (U.S. June 29, 2012),
[hereinafter
BLAG
v.
Gill
Cert.
Pet.]
available
at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/06-292012-gill-v-opm-blag-certiorari-petition.pdf (challenging the finding of an Equal
Protection violation in Gill); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1,
Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Golinsky, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012) [hereinafter OPM v.
Golinsky
Cert.
Pet.]
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0016.pet.aa.pdf (seeking to
bypass the Court of Appeals); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1,
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 12-231 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter
Pedersen
v.
OPM
Cert.
Pet.],
available
at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/pedersen-v-opm/pedersen-plaintiffs-certpetition-08-21-12.pdf; Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, Office of
Pers. Mgmt. v. Pedersen, No. 12-302 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012) [hereinafter OPM v.
Pedersen
Cert.
Pet.],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2012/2pet/7pet/2012-0302.pet.aa.pdf.
6. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 12-144 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (holding that given the
state official’s refusal to defend the statute before the Supreme Court, the Court has no
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the California revision of the state constitution to ban
same-sex marriage, and the lower federal court decision invalidating the revision
stands).
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line between state and federal power. In support of its claim that DOMA
made same-sex couples second-class citizens in violation of Equal
Protection, the majority did list several benefits that same-sex couples were
denied. But it did no serious examination of the purposes of these
underlying statutes to find what the federal policy vindicated by those
statutes was, nor did counsel for either side. The Court also did not settle
the debate over the purpose of marriage in the United States—whether it is
primarily to support procreation as DOMA defenders argued or whether
government support of marriage is to facilitate the formation of consensual
family relationships irrespective of procreation as the DOMA challengers
claimed. Indeed, the word "procreation" did not even appear in the
majority opinion, probably because it relied solely upon DOMA's scope to
invalidate the statute. And finally, and relatedly, the Court expressly

declined to say whether the federal government was required to grant
uniform benefits to same-sex couples and heterosexual couples as a
matter of Equal Protection if states recognizing such marriages did not
distinguish the two groups of couples. Thus, we are left to ask whether
procreation is a legitimate basis for the distribution of some federal
benefits? Is biological difference a legitimate basis for distinguishing
funding among the married? If so, can heterosexuality alone be a marker
for procreation or biological difference? Would a regime for same-sex
couples that does not use the term "marriage," but provides federal benefits
satisfy Equal Protection? Do the benefits provided have to be exactly
equal? Do same-sex couples have a constitutional right to have their
marriages called "marriage" at the federal level if their respective state uses
that term? And if some differentiation in the treatment of marriage is
allowed either on the basis of procreational status or otherwise, what
standard of review applies to denials of marriage-related benefits to samesex couples?7
While all litigation is partisan, the political battle over same-sex
marriage has made the legal cases quite so. While the Department of
Justice once defended DOMA, President Barack Obama has now ordered
them to cease doing so, asserting that he believes that DOMA is
7. See United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 slip op. at 14-15 (U.S. June 26,
2013) (stating that states control marriage under history and tradition but that the
federal government can effect federal policy through marriage rules); id. at 22-25
(mentioning benefits denied to same-sex couples as evidence of second-class status
marital status under DOMA); id. at 16 (referring again to "history and tradition"); id. at
17 (declaring that it is unnecessary to decide whether federal benefits must be uniform
as state benefits are for same-sex couples and heterosexual couples); id. at 20 (noting
that DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York state seeks to protect); see id. at
17-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for conveniently ignoring the
question of the standard of scrutiny or any discussion of substantive due process); id. at
8-10 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court should not decide whether or not
procreation or consent is the basis of marriage).
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unconstitutional.8 Before that, the Obama Administration abandoned one
of the key reasons that Congress put forth for passing DOMA: that it is
related to a federal interest in responsible procreation.9 Although Congress
passed DOMA by a wide margin, members are now backpedaling wildly
from the legislation.10 Commentators on all sides have imposed pressure to
achieve their desired outcomes.11 Law professors, historians, and advocacy
groups, have all chimed in with amicus briefs for their favored sides.12
There is a pressing need for a sound historical record on past federal
inroads into marriage and for proposals that recognize both the long history
of discrimination against gay and lesbian Americans and Congress’ right to
8. However, the Administration has said it will still enforce DOMA. See Letter
from Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives
(Feb.
23,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
The Republican
members of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives
(“BLAG”) then intervened. Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 12-14, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
786 (2012) [hereinafter “BLAG Windsor Merits Brief”].
9. In 2010, in a reply brief in Smelt v. County of Orange, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") first indicated the retreat. It stated, “[T]he government does not
contend that there are legitimate government interests in creating a legal structure that
promotes the raising of children by both of their biological parents or that the
government’s interest in 'responsible procreation' justifies Congress’s decision to define
marriage as a union between one man and one woman.” It said further,a “[T]he United
States does not believe that DOMA is rationally related to any legitimate government
interests in procreation and child-rearing and is therefore not relying upon any such
interests to defend DOMA’s constitutionality.” Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendant United States of America Motion to Dismiss at 6-7, Smelt v. Cnty of
Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 959 (2006). The
brief was filed on August 17, 2009. This abandonment of the procreation support
position was continued in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388
(discussing the government’s abandonment of Congress’s justifications for DOMA),
aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
Notably, Justice Kagan was Solicitor General at the time that the government filed its
brief in Smelt. Compare Obama Said to Pick Solicitor General for the Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2010, at 1, with Lyle Denniston, Kagan, DOMA and Recusal,
SCOTUSblog, (Nov. 2, 2012, 4:59 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/kagan-domaand-recusal/ (suggesting that the Solicitor General must have been involved in the
decision to abandon argument that procreation is not key to marriage policy).
10. See Mass. v. HHS, 682 F.3d at 6 (noting the “strong majorities” in both houses
when DOMA was passed and that President Clinton signed it); Brief of 172 Members
of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the Merits, Windsor, 133
S. Ct. at 786; Peter Baker, Now in Defense of Gay Marriage, Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2013, at 1.
11. The Obama Administration’s initial defense of DOMA upset same-sex
marriage advocates; the abandonment of the procreation argument angered
conservatives. Compare Frank Rich, 40 Years Later, Still Second-Class Americans,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at 8, with Ed Whelan, The Massachusetts DOMA Rulings—
Some Commentary on Gill v. OPM, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 9, 2010, 12:10 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/230892/massachusetts-doma-rulingssome-commentary-i-gill-v-opm-i/ed-whelan.
12. For a listing of briefs filed in the key cases see website of the Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders (“GLAD”) at http://www.glad.org/doma/documents/.
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set priorities in public funding decisions, including those related to
marriage.
This article seeks to contribute to those ends. Part II considers the
historical origins of American notions that some matters are “local” issues,
including marriage. It argues that the notions arise out of (1) the American
colonial experience, (2) the notion that "the people" (not merely states) rule
in a democracy, and (3) conflict of laws theory. I point out that conflict of
laws theory has historically differentiated between the law governing the
validity of a marriage and that governing the incidents that flowed from
that marriage.
Part III offers five cases in which the federal government has deviated
from state or local laws on the validity of a marriage: (1) the recognition of
marriages according to slave custom for purposes of providing military
pensions to the families of black soldiers during the Civil War; (2) the
federal government’s authorization and oversight of marriages among exslaves during and after the Civil War; (3) the treatment of polygamy in
Utah Territory; (4) the treatment of polygamy and fraudulent marriages in
immigration; and (5) the treatment of American Indian marriages. Items 1
and 2—the federal recognition of slave marriages and federal oversight of
the marrying of ex-slaves—have either been not mentioned or
mischaracterized in DOMA litigation. They are extremely important to
understanding the extent and limits of federal power. The government’s
efforts to end polygamy in Utah are often couched as tale of moral
judgment or religious intolerance. I will demonstrate that the Supremacy
Clause played a significant role in the government's actions, although other
factors also contributed. Part III then discusses cases in which Congress
recognized the validity of the marriage, but applied different incidents than
state or local law would have advised. I offer but two of many examples:
(1) the decision to give married women a legal share of land in Oregon
Territory, separate from their husbands under the Oregon Donation Law of
1850 and (2) Congress’ decision to abandon deference to state marital
property rules in the income tax controversy over community property
states versus separate property states in the 1930s and 1940s. To this
writer’s knowledge, the Oregon Donation law has not been discussed in
DOMA cases and the income tax history that I discuss has been referenced
peripherally and for other points.
Part IV summarizes the findings with respect to what history says about
the federal law of marriage. I argue that federal conflict of law rules are
likely a key source of the history and tradition of deference to local (not
merely state) law on marriage that the Supreme Court identified in
Windsor. These rules join with limited federal constitutional powers to
produce the pattern of deference. Traditionally, under those conflict of law
rules, the validity of a marriage has been governed by local law (not merely
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state law), subject to serious public policy concerns. However, the
incidents that a government chooses to attach to a marriage have not been
consistently subject to such a rule of deference. Federal deviations from
state and local determinations of validity or with respect to what incidents
should flow from a marriage have historically fallen into three categories.
Congress has deviated (1) to vindicate Constitutional interests; (2) to
vindicate statutory, rule, or treaty interests; and (3) to vindicate nonconstitutional, non-statutory interests. In these decisions, Congress has
also considered the role of the majority of the states and the common law’s
traditional approach. The central question for courts is, then, what is the
purpose of Congress' deviation.
Part V recognizes that there are really three DOMAs. One DOMA
bundled all of marriages’ benefits making them impervious to same-sex
couples married under state law. That DOMA is now dead. Another
DOMA collapsed into the underlying statutes that it defined. That DOMA
may very well still live, at least in part. And the third DOMA was merely
an exercise of the right of the federal government to define its own terms.
This DOMA as a restrictive definition applicable to all marriage benefits is
effectively dead, but it may survive in effect in individual instances in
which the second DOMA also survives. Then, focusing on the second
"unbundled" DOMA, Part V argues that if there is legitimate authority for
the approach of DOMA as a substantive statute, that authority must be
found in the underlying statutes; there too one must look for evidence of
purpose. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts did this analysis
in DOMA litigation nor did the parties signal in any serious way that such
an analysis was necessary. The section makes its point by examples,
discussing four groups of statutes and their relationship to procreation: the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), the Social Security
statutes, income tax treatment of marital income, and the estate and gift tax
marital deduction at issue in Windsor. This section provides evidence that
some federal statutes seek to respond to the unique biological imbalance in
the heterosexual couple and a unique history of discrimination through
marriage policy. It concludes that the first three of these sets of statutes do
indeed evidence a defensible federal interest in procreation support. The
marital deduction at issue in Windsor, however, cannot be justified on any
ground reasonably related to procreation.
Part VI then proposes a framework for analyzing DOMA. I suggest that
the Supreme Court should borrow from the division in conflict of law rules
between the validity of a marriage and its incidents. Under the proposal,
federal benefits that directly affect the right to be a marital family (e.g.,
"family rights") should be assessed by looking to state law designations of
who is married. Denials of this class of federal benefits should be subject
to intermediate scrutiny for purposes of federal Equal Protection review.
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On the other hand, I propose that benefits that do not directly affect the
family relationship that is marriage, should be guided by spending priorities
set in federal law. These benefits are akin to the "incidents" of a marriage
in conflict of laws theory. I also call these rights “branch” rights. Denials
of these rights should be subject to a rational basis test, not merely because
they are incidents, but also because, as I will show, although they have
suffered rank family discrimination by way of the denial of marriage,
same-sex couples have not historically suffered by way of the denial of
marriage rank economic discrimination of the type that has traditionally
been covered by Equal Protection. Of course, in cases of plenary power,
federal law must control even when family rights are affected and a rational
basis test should apply.
I argue that the federal government is not required to use the term
"marriage" for same-sex couples or any couples simply because a state
does. Indeed, employing the broader principle of looking to state law for
designations of "family," the federal government could reasonably base the
extension of federal benefits beyond same-sex marriages to other forms of
state and local recognition of committed same-sex families such as civil
unions, domestic partnerships and possibly in some cases, unique contracts
designed to replicate the legal relationships that follow from marriage.
In Part VII, I return to the three DOMAs. The first DOMA, the one that
bundled all federal statutes together would, under the proposal, be
subjected to intermediate scrutiny and should be seen as violating Equal
Protection because it prevented same-sex couples from having family rights
that their state intended to confer through marriage. The second
"unbundled DOMA," the one that collapses into the statutes that it defines,
may violate Equal Protection in some cases but not in others. The
applicable level of scrutiny for Equal Protection purposes should depend
upon the nature of the rights affected in the statute at issue, that is whether
the denial of the right burdens the state-conferred right to be a marital
family. The third "definitional DOMA" mimics the other two. If
applicable to all marital rights, it is too broad but it might be defended in
individual cases of benefits.
In Part VIII, I apply these notions to the Windsor case. I conclude that
the Court correctly held that she should receive the marital deduction and a
tax refund. However, I argue that if state embrace of the marriage is the
basis of the federal recognition, it is reasonable for the federal government
to require that a state clearly signal its intention to grant a comparable tax
refund in all such cases when the case involves, as Windsor's does,
retroactive recognition of a marriage that was entered into at a time when
the state had not embraced it.13
13

For a discussion of the “standing” concern, see infra note 351.
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And finally in Part IX, I conclude that Congress has the right to create
"lanes of interest" with respect to federal marriage policy, given that
families and groups of families and individuals have varying interests and
compete for a limited purse of federal benefits. Such an approach allows
Congress appropriate freedom to differentiate a wide range of interests and
allows it to specifically consider these interests in deciding how federal
dollars will support families. Because the heterosexual couple is unique
both in its biological imbalance and in the long history of gender
discrimination against women through heterosexual marriage, Congress
should be free to decide, independent of the states, whether natural
procreation should guide federal spending to support families or should
otherwise be treated uniquely. Indeed, a procreation-based policy can likely
only survive if such lanes exist. I do not say whether such a procreationbased policy is wise or unwise, but rather that it is permissible. The
question for the courts is whether the distinction Congress draws is based
upon procreation, a permissible aim, or whether it is really merely a means
of sexual orientation discrimination. If Congress can exclude unmarried
couples based on procreational status then it seems permissible but not
necessary that "heterosexual marriage" be a lane. Congress could also
adopt other designations and sub designations for different types of
families. I believe that Congress also has the right to differentiate among
different types of procreation in its spending. The job of the Court is to
recognize and require remedies for the long history of family
discrimination against same-sex couples, but also to recognize that it is
Congress that has the constitutional right to set the priorities for
expenditures from the public purse.
II. AMERICAN NOTIONS OF “LOCAL” MATTERS
This Part investigates how notions that some matters are to be locally
determined may have emerged. I explain that local deference was afforded
not only to states, but also to U.S. Territories, a fact that indicates that
conflict of laws played a major role.
A. Origins
Three ideas likely shaped the early nation’s notions of what matters
should be “local.” First is the experience of the states as English colonies.
Second is the notion that the people should have some input on the laws
that most directly affected them. Third is the body of conflict of law rules
that determined when the law of a foreign jurisdiction would apply in a
forum state.
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1. The Colonial Experience
When the Framers were drafting the Constitution, they had in mind their
experiences as English subjects and later as English and British colonists.14
They would have known that, though a monarchy, England certainly
recognized the need for some local governance.15 In the feudal age,
English kings had a system of feudal councils. These councils ultimately
evolved into the English and later British Parliament.16 The Magna Carta
reflected notions that the people should have some rights to decide issues
affecting them.17 In his discussion of English approaches, Blackstone also
spoke of subordinate magistrates who act in “an inferior secondary sphere”
regarding matters affecting only defined issues and groups of persons.18 He
referenced local issues as “depending entirely upon the domestic
Constitution of their respective franchises.”19
With the American colonies, the Crown gave the colonists authority to
establish rules relating to education, criminal and civil laws, marriage,
probate and inheritance, local courts, and other matters.20 Such freedom
14. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the
difference between British crown and Presidency), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 45
(James Madison) (referencing the feudal system).
15. See generally ROBERT C. RITCHIE, THE DUKE’S PROVINCE: A STUDY OF NEW
YORK POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1664-1691, 34-36 (1977) (discussing the basic structure
of the local government).
16. See J.R. MADICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327,
158-59 (2010); see also Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1432, 1436 (1987) (noting that colonists understood English/British law to reveal
sovereignty rights in “people” that superseded the King).
17. See J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 23-24 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the power
struggle between the English Monarchy and the people that developed their rights);
A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 4 (rev. ed. 1998)
(explaining that the Magna Carta was a source of inspiration for American colonists).
On Subordinate
18. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *327-28.
Magistrates, he refers to “mayors and aldermen, or other magistrates of particular
corporations” as having mere private jurisdiction affecting “strictly municipal rights,
depending entirely upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises” and
also speaking of a view that “the people should choose their own magistrates,”
although all rules had to be consistent with the crown’s dictates. Id.
19. Cf. id. at *337.
20. For example, the 1629 Charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company expressly
provided for a council of Governor and other local officials to be chosen from among
free men on the plantation. This “assembly” had the authority to establish local laws.
PROJECT,
The
Charter
of
Massachusetts
Bay:
1629,
AVALON
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mass03.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
Minutes of the Massachusetts Bay Company reflect such rules related to matters we
now deem typically local: criminal and civil law, local courts, probate and intestate
succession, and rules for marriage. See id. (granting authority to govern). The Charter
of Carolina (Charles II) granted “full and absolute power . . . for the good and happy
government of the said province . . . according to their best discretion, of and with the
advice, assent and approbation of the freemen of the said province . . . .” It allowed for
the creation of “penalties, imprisonment or any other punishment;” the establishment of
“subordinate officers and judges, justices, magistrates;” the power to amend laws or
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may have been a practical necessity both because of distance and because
of the need to give incentive to adventurism in a faraway land. Still, the
royal charters had one key proviso. Any laws adopted had to be consistent
with the laws and interests of the Crown.21
As the colonies began to pass local laws, they also began to develop
unique personas and a sense of their own sovereignty. Their rules
expanded to regulate admiralty and trade.22 When their leaders gathered to
write the Articles of Confederation in 1777 and to ratify it in 1781, they
styled themselves the “United States of America,” a clear hint to the notion
that those joined together were independent “states,” not mere subjects of a
king.23
2. The Notion That the People Rule
Notions that all governmental power derived from the people likely also
would have affected American views of what issues were “local.” Again,
for colonists the Magna Carta would have stood as a prime early example
of the notion.24 The writings of many early political thinkers, including
John Locke and Rousseau, propounded notions that people should have
some say over matters directly affecting their lives.25 And the notion that
pardon offenses, and also to determine the “actions, suits and causes” obtaining in such
courts, civil, criminal or otherwise. Charter of Carolina – March 24, 1663, AVALON
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc01.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
The 1606 Charter of Virginia provided for a local council of thirteen in Virginia but
also a “Council of Virginia” in England. The English council was to “have the superior
Managing and Direction, only of and for all Matters that shall or may concern the
Government, as well of the said several Colonies.” The First Charter of Virginia;
April 10, 1606, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va01.asp
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013). The Charter gave colonists the power to mine precious
metals and keep the profits and to coin money. The second Charter in 1609 created a
local council and the power to “have full and absolute Power and Authority to correct,
punish, pardon, govern, and rule” English subjects who arrived there, to establish
“Orders, Ordinances, Constitutions, Directions, and Instructions,” affecting civil,
criminal, “marine” and other matters. The Second Charter of Virginia; May 23, 1609,
AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/va02.asp (last visited Mar.
5, 2013).
21. E.g., Charter of Carolina, supra note 20; The Charter of Massachusetts Bay,
supra note 20; The First Charter of Virginia, supra, note 20.
22. See Amar, supra note 16, at 1447-48 (noting states negotiated with foreign
nations long before the Constitution); see generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 11
(Alexander Hamilton) (urging common Navy and admiralty jurisdiction for the new
nation).
23. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. I, para. 1.
24. See HOWARD, supra note 17.
25. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 9 (1690), available at
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81s/complete.html (explaining that political
rights emerged from the natural law that gives men the right to “order their actions”);
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 21-22 (G.D.H. Cole trans. 1913)
(1762),
available
at
http://mongolianmind.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/Rousseau_contrat-social-1221.pdf (declaring that nature gives
man absolute power over himself). See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Karl
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the people, not a monarch, control was central to the very core of the
American enterprise.26 These principles ultimately made their way into the
American Constitution. Article IV, Section 4 ensured each state a
republican form of government.27 The Tenth Amendment expressly
reserves powers not granted to the federal government to the states “or to
the people.”28 Indeed, the Constitution’s Preamble began, “We the
People.”29
The Framers also left hints of the types of matters that might usually be
considered “local.” These too reflect the notion of the people having
control of that which immediately affects them. In addressing the concern
that the people under the new government might owe more allegiance to
the federal government than to the states, Hamilton made specific reference
to “the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice” as a state role.
Hamilton also dismissed fears of a transfer of primary allegiance from state
to federal arguing that the state would regulate “those personal interests and
familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more
immediately awake.”30 James Madison described the constitutional design
as allocating “the great and aggregate interests . . . to the national, the local
and particular to the State legislatures.”31 Hamilton also stated that “the
variety of more minute interests, which [would] necessarily fall under the
superintendence of the local administrations . . . cannot be particularized,
without [delving into tedium not worth the time of instruction].”32 This
dichotomy of “particular and limited” versus “general and broad” is also
reflected in the fact that the early founders commonly referred to the
federal government as the “general government.”33
Schuhmann et al. ed., Bristol 2003) (1651).
26. Accord BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 9 (1998).
27. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
29. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
33. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 14, 41, 43, 45 (James Madison). Madison used the term
“general government” in the debates of the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g.,
PROJECT,
Madison
Debates
–
August
18,
1787,
AVALON
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_818.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013)
(discussing enumerated powers of the general government). Hamilton used it as well.
E.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 17, 27, 28 (Alexander Hamilton); Variant Texts of the Plan
Presented by Alexander Hamilton to the Federal Convention – Text. B, AVALON
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextb.asp (last visited Mar. 5,
2013). The Supreme Court has also used the term. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886); McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435
(1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Chisolm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2512 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the term as reference to federal government).
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3. Conflict of Laws Theory
The theory of conflict of laws also must have informed early American
notions of what matters were “local.” Rules of “comity”—or voluntary
recognition of a foreign jurisdiction’s laws as a sign of respect for that
jurisdiction’s sovereignty—have long been a part of the law of nations. In
his famous article, The Comity Doctrine, Hessel Ytema traced the doctrine
back to Dutch jurists in the latter part of the Seventeenth Century and
specifically, theorist Ulrik Huber.34
According to Professor Kurt
Nadelman, the English courts formally embraced of the notion of conflict
of laws in Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Robinson v. Bland.35
The early American bar would certainly have known of Mansfield’s
opinion and of the doctrine.36 Nadelman notes that at least by 1788, the
domestic doctrine of international comity was referenced by a Pennsylvania
state court considering whether to enforce a debt.37 He adds that in 1797
the preface to the United States Supreme Court opinion in Emory v.
Grenough quoted Huber extensively, although the court dismissed the case
for failure of plaintiff to plead diversity of jurisdiction.38 The doctrine was
solidified in American Jurisprudence by Justice Joseph Story’s famous
1834 treatise on Conflict of Laws.39
Rules of comity were subject to one major exception. Such rules were
suspended when following the foreign rule would violate a sovereign’s
public policy.40
Under the common law, marriage was considered a contract, but it had
34. Hessel Ytema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH L. REV. 9-32 (1966). See also
Kurt H. Nadelman, The Comity Doctrine: An Introduction, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1961)
(noting at the introduction to Michigan Law Review the memorial reprinting of
Ytema’s article and discussing the importance of Ytema’s work).
35. See Nadelman, supra note 34, at 2; Robinson v. Bland, 6 Eng. Rep. 129 (King’s
Bench 1760). In Robinson, a plaintiff sued an intestate’s estate on alleged contracts
entered into in England to repay funds advanced for gambling in France. The Court
found that the agreements were governed by English, not French law and were
unenforceable.
36. Accord Nadelman, supra note 34, at 2.
37. Camp v. Lockwood, 1 Dall. 393, 401 (Phila. Co. 1788) (distinguishing case
from the law of nations, and declining to enforce a Connecticut debt that Connecticut
deemed plaintiff had forfeited as an enemy of the United States, citing the states'
unique relationship and their common interest in the War); see also Nadelman, supra
note 34, at 2.
38. Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 368, 369 n.(a) (1797); Nadelman, supra
note 34, at 2. Nadelman also notes that Samuel Livermore launched an attack on the
general American acceptance of the doctrine in 1829. See id. at 3-4.
39. JOSEPH STORY & MELVIN MADISON BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES (1834). See e.g., Kurt H. Nadelmann, Joseph Story’s Contributions to
American Conflicts Law, A Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230, 230-32 (1961).
40. See STORY, supra note 39, at 8 (showing that nations apply foreign laws
pursuant to own public policy); see also id. at 207.
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special rules.41 While the place where the marriage was celebrated
generally controlled the validity of the marriage, rules applying “the
incidents of marriage” were subject to more variations. Often the domicile
–or the jurisdiction with the closest contact—controlled these “incidents.”42
The distinction between “validity” and “incidents” of marriage was
significant enough that Joseph Story devoted separate chapters to “validity”
on the one hand and “incidents” on the other.43 Story did not live in a time
of broad governmental programs providing economic support to marriage.
Instead, in his day, government supported marriages by placing its power
on the side of the husband as against the wife and children and on the side
of preferred races and classes. Thus, he described the “incidents" of
marriage as the (1) rights and disabilities of a wife and (2) the obligations
of a husband.44 Under the common law the domicile of a wife was
considered that of her husband irrespective of her travels or the law of the
place of celebration.45 Sometimes states used public policy grounds to balk
at recognizing foreign law on issues such as capacity to be married (in
particular, age limits) and divorce.46
On the other hand, there is little evidence that the subject matter of
marriage was understood at the time to be so uniquely local that federal

41. E.g., Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, Consistory Court of London (1811) reprinted in
Beale at 41-43 (referring to marriage as a contract); JOSEPH STORY & MELVIN MADISON
BIGELOW, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (Bigelow, ed. 1884). The Bigelow
edition is a reprint of the Third Edition of Story’s work. Id. at iii.
42. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, n. 10 (1933) (applying Georgia
law to refuse to require a father to provide maintenance to child and noting, “Without
denying the validity of marriage in another state, the privileges flowing from the
marriage may be subject to the local law”); Headen v. Pope, 252 F.2d 739, 742-43 (3d
Cir. 1958). Despite fact that marriage occurred in Maryland, Pennsylvania was the
domicile and the state primarily concerned with the legal incidents of this union,
including the support of wife after husband died. See also discussion of Lutwak v.
United States, infra at p. 146. Compare Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260 (Sup. Ct. Mass.
1813) (upholding Vermont divorce as entitled to full faith and credit and determining
that in considering the relationship of the parties to each other and their conduct
including divorce, one looks to the law of the domicile which was Vermont, not the law
where the marriage was originally contracted which was Massachusetts).
43. See STORY, supra note 39, at 184-226 (discussing marriage); see also id. at
227-274 (discussing incidents to marriage, e.g., property rights etc.).
44. See id. at 233 (dividing chapter on incidents into (1) disabilities and powers of
wife and (2) rights of husband).
45. See id.
46. E.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 1961) (finding
that New Jersey did not have to recognize common law marriage because it was against
the state’s public policy); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 67-68 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1957) (stating that recognizing underage marriage in another state would be
against New Jersey public policy); see 15 Johns. 121, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (noting
that even if Vermont would recognize a divorce procured by fraud and without notice
to all parties, New York would not); STORY, supra note 39, at 275-314 (discussing
recognition of foreign divorces).
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power could not touch it to the same degree as it could other local issues.47
The federal government’s approach to slavery, often shuttered away in a
closet during historical discussions of domestic relations law, offers quite
important insights into the federal approach to local domestic relations. At
the time of the Constitution’s signing, slavery in America was considered
local in several senses. First, slaves were treated as under the jurisdiction
of households; indeed, each time they were sold, their last names were
changed to that of the new masters as a brand of ownership.48 Second, state
laws determined slave holder/slave rights. Third, unlike other servants,
slaves were not only persons but also legally property. Fourth, as property
under the law, slaves could be made the subject of contract, intestate
succession, wills, trusts or dower. At the same time, because of objections
on public policy grounds, nations and American states that did not endorse
slavery often did not afford comity on that subject to jurisdictions that
did.49
According to Story, early Courts saw the full faith and credit clause as a
compliment to conflict of laws doctrine. It did not alter general conflict of
law rules.50
B. The Local Powers of U.S. Territories
In dealing with U.S. Territories, the Americans appear to have adopted
the English approach of allowing local sovereignty so long as federal
interests were not jeopardized. The approach was also consistent with
conflict of law rules.
Usually, Congress would pass an “organic statute” that organized the
territory along republican (representative majority rule) lines. Each

47. See generally Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of
Federal Family Law and the Invention of State’s Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761
(2005) (reviewing prior federal interventions into allegedly traditional state areas and
arguing that state's rights is a recent invention); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the
Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998) (rejecting "localism" theories
that argue family law always as the province of states); Judith Resnik, Categorical
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001)
(demonstrating that areas traditionally seen as local have long been subject to federal
rulemaking).
48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 527 (1857) (Campbell, J.,
concurring) (insisting that a slave is part of a master’s “family” both “in name and in
fact”), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
49. See STORY, supra note 39, at 153-54.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”); STORY, supra note 39, at 802-03
(explaining that the clause is thought not to alter the general principle that in procedural
matters lex loci was to govern); id. at 831-32 (stating that the clause does not alter
jurisdictional rules).
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territory was allowed to establish its own laws with respect to marriage and
other traditionally local issues, consistent with the laws of the United
States.51 This restriction seems to parallel England’s requirement of the
colonies.52 The statutes also prohibited the territory from distributing its
own land.53
Today, we think it indisputable that Congress has plenary power in the
territories. In fact, however, the notion of whether plenary power extended
to the right to decide traditionally local concerns in the territories was hotly
debated in earlier times, despite modern expressions that downplay the
debate.54
III. INSTANCES OF FEDERAL DEVIATION FROM LOCAL MARRIAGE LAW
There are only a few instances in which the federal government (1)
deviated from state marriage law to recognize a marriage that the state in
which the marriage took place rejected; or (2) refused to recognize a
marriage that a state or territory accepted. This section considers those
early cases.
A. Deviation to Recognize Marriages That a State or Local Government
Rejected as Invalid
Apart from American Indian cases, there are only two instances in which
the federal government ignored the states and recognized marriages that the
states refused to recognize. Both involved the nation’s battle over slavery.

51. E.g., An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of
Colorado, ch. 59, § 6, 12 Stat. 172, 174 (1861); An Act to Establish a Territorial
Government for Utah, ch. 51, § 6, 9 Stat. 453, 454 (1850). Cf. Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S.
682, 684 (1891) (remarking that polygamy aside, Utah territorial legislature has (had)
plenary power as would a state over local issues of inheritance).
52. See discussion supra p. 116.
53. Id.
54. See, for example, the discussion of efforts to affect marriage in Utah territory.
Infra at p. 741, 743 (Congress arguing about whether marriage is a local, territorial, or
federal issue). In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court, held that the
constitutional provision giving Congress’s plenary power over federal territories was
limited to lands ceded by the Crown and did not include such power over territory later
obtained through expansion and conquest. The Court also narrowly read the scope of
congressional powers over territories to apply only to the most needful legislation that
had to be executed in acquiring and holding territories for the benefit of the states. 60
U.S. (19 How.) at 393. Excluded from that power were domestic relations matters, like
slavery. Later, cases began to reject the notion that plenary power over the territories is
limited. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890) (“The power of Congress over the Territories of the
United States is general and plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire
the Territory itself.”); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 267-68 (1901).
Downes asserted that Dred Scott’s logic was contrary even to the prevailing
understanding of congressional power at the time. Downes, 182 U.S. at 250. However,
the evidence suggests that there was indeed vigorous debate on the subject.
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First, the federal government recognized “slavery custom” marriages for
the purpose of dispensing black Civil War military pension claims.
Second, the federal government authorized military officers and others to
perform marriages among ex-slaves during the Civil War and afterward,
when rebel states refused to perform them.
1. The Slave Marriage Statutes: Context
Some background is necessary to understand the authority for and
purpose of these actions. When news of the Civil War spread, slaves
escaped and headed toward Union lines, often offering themselves as
scouts and information brokers. In May of 1861, General Benjamin Butler
refused to return a group of slaves to their owners, adopting the position
that slaves of rebels were “contraband” and could be applied to work for
the Union Army.55 On August 6, 1861, Congress passed the first of several
Confiscation Acts. The Act allowed the army to confiscate rebel
“property,” expressly including, slaves.56
The Confiscation Act was strategically important because slavery was
the economic backbone of the Southern economy. Southern states, facing
pressure to give it up before the War, had demanded compensation.57
Those whites who owned few or no slaves benefitted from the social status
that it bestowed.58 Indeed, by purchasing a slave or two and using free or
cheap land grants to build a plantation a poor white person could rise.
Manufacturing northern states benefitted too, relying upon products
produced from slave labor.59
By the time of Dred Scott in 1857, slaves were the most valuable form of

55. The term was apparently coined and status first designated by Gen. Benjamin
Butler. Slaves Contraband of War, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1861, at 4. By June 12, 1861,
Prof. Theophilus Parsons at Harvard Law School had opined that Butler’s claim had
merit in a state of war. Slaves as Contraband of War: Professor Parsons’ Opinions—
Four Ways of Dealing with the Subject, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1861, at 2.
56. An Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, § 1,
12 Stat. 319, 319 (1861).
57. E.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGR. 338 (1789) (statement of Mr. Jackson) (asking who
will compensate Virginia if slavery ended); 2 ANNALS OF CONGR. 1204 (1790)
(statement of Sen. Gerry (Mass.)) (saying he has calculated slavery as worth ten million
dollars); CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 38 (1859) (statement of Rep. Moore
(AL)) (noting that ending African slavery would result in an economic loss of property
to the South exceeding in value two billion dollars).
58. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. App. 94 (1856) (statement of Sen. A.G.
Brown (MS)) (opining that non-slaveholding southern whites “may have no pecuniary
interest in slavery but they have a social interest at stake that is worth more to them
than all the wealth that is in the Indies").
59. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 483-84 (1856) (statement of Sen.
Henry Clay (KY)) (discussing how the North is dependent upon slavery too and upon
the Southern agricultural production).
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personal property in some southern states.60 Land, which often was given
for free under bounty statutes, was useless in the agricultural south without
labor to work it.61 Owners exploited slaves not only for themselves but
also rented their slaves to others.62 A second Confiscation Act followed on
July 17, 1862, establishing the penalty for treason against the United States
as jail time and the freeing of the guilty party’s slaves.63
The number of slaves escaping to Union lines swelled as the War
continued.64 Often, they arrived in families and groups of loved ones.65
Slaves were not allowed to marry legally, and since they did not constitute
a separate political entity under law, their customs during slavery were
disregarded. Legal marriage would have given a slave father and husband
power over his wife and children, and that would have been contrary to the
slaveholder’s rights. As abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison noted, by
usurping the black male’s right of patrimony in the prevailing paternalistic

60. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 524 (speaking of value in Louisiana); see
also, Gimon v. Baldwin, 38 Ala. 60, 60 (1861) (valuing a male slave at $1500); Drake
v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382, 383-84 (1857) (estimating $2800 for two Negro men).
61. For more on bounty statutes see, for example, note 237.
62. The value lay not only in the slave itself but in the rental value. Bryan v.
Walton, 33 Ga. Supp. 11, 11 (1864) (valuing Negro female slave Patience, about 28
years old, and her six children, ages fourteen to six at the aggregate value of $9000, and
with a “hire” value of $3000); Evans v. Lipscomb, 31 Ga. 71, 76 (1860) (listing prices
of slaves of various genders and ages).
63. An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treasons and Rebellion, to Seize
and Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195, § 2, 12 Stat.
589, 590 (1862).
64. Contraband Statistics, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1861, at 3 (noting that more than
100 slaves a day escaped Missouri for Kansas, and contrary to the desires of federal
army generals, they were not returned). Letter from Maj. Gen. John Peck to Maj. Gen.
John Dix, Dec. 7, 1862 in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 474
(1887), available at http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (“To-day an
old contraband came in from a plantation just this side of Franklin to get his liberty.”);
Letter from Brig. Gen. George Crook to Brig. Gen. James Garfield, May 27, 1863, in
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION
AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XXIII, pt. II, 366 (1890), available at
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (noting large numbers of
contraband women). This Four series multivolume set includes, among other records,
officer reports on the numbers of escaped slaves flowing into union camps. See also,
Negro Slaves as Contraband of War, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1861, at 2.
65. See, e.g., Letter from Maj. Gen. John Dix to E.M. Stanton, Sec. of War, Sept.
12, 1862, in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 391 (1887), available at
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (noting some 2000 men,
women, and children were held at Old Point Comfort in Virginia); Letter from Maj.
Gen. John Dix to E.M. Stanton, Sec. of War, Dec. 13, 1862, in THE WAR OF THE
REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XVIII, 480-81 (1887), available at
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html (suggesting soldier abuse and
noting the need to remove “contraband” women and children from camps for their
safety).
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society, slave holders asserted ownership to all slave children and could
thereby control slave families and communities into multiple generations.66
When a husband died, his wife could inherit his slaves and, if she remained
single, could also assert this privilege. With the consent of owners, some
slaves could enter into a form of marriage with other slaves, sometimes
referenced by legal authorities as contubernium.67 But contubernium
marriage did not give the rights of legal marriage.68 Because slaves were
property, an owner could break up a slave family for sale when economic
interests or punishment needs so dictated. He or she could insist that a
slave, his wife, daughter, or son perform sexual services.69 The evidence
66. In 1835 Garrison noted in his newspaper, The Liberator:
The . . . disuse of legal marriage is necessary to sustain the slave holder’s right
of property in the children. The laws give to the owner of a woman a property
in her children, whether the father be bond or free, black or white. The father
may be a slave to the same planter, or to another; he may be a colored or a
white free man of the neighborhood; he may be the owner of the mother
himself or his hopeful son. The law is the same in every case; the children of a
colored female follow the condition of their mother. This claim on children as
property must be legally maintained or slavery could not be perpetuated or
“entailed” on successive generations . . . .
No the code of laws must not contradict itself. It must not take away by one
enactment what it secures by another. But a legal marriage constitutes the
father of the children, the slave holder of these children during their minority.
He has the legal right to command them, to keep them with him, to educate
them, to require their service, and toil for his benefit and their own. No other
man can possess any right or authority over them . . . . If a man slave were the
legal father and slave holder of his own children, he could reject the claims of
the white man who is the owner of their mother. He could prevent his working
them, punishing them, or selling them. He could pronounce his own children
free from all control but his own and that of his mother. She too would have
with her husband a joint legal authority over her children; and in the event of
his decease, the law would still sustain his prerogatives and secure guardians to
her offspring.
William Lloyd Garrison, The Liberator, Oct. 31 1835, at 1.
67. The term appears to have been borrowed from Roman slave marriage laws.
E.g., WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO
MODERN LAW 232 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2004) (1938) (discussing Roman
contubernium).
68. E.g., Malinda v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 719, 723-24 (1854) (indicating that slave
marriage called “contubernium” afforded no inheritance rights for children).
69. E.g., discussion infra p. 744 (in polygamy discussion, Congressman claiming
hypocrisy and noting “unlimited concubinage” practices of slaveholders). EUGENE
GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL, 414 (1974) (suggesting that three quarters of blacks in
the U.S. have some white ancestry; the percentage of mulattos in the South was twice
as high as that in the North and that in 1850 an estimated thirty-seven percent of the
Negro population in the South was half white). See also Rachel L. Swarns, Meet Your
Cousin, the First Lady: A Family Story, Long Hidden, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/us/dna-gives-new-insights-into-michelle-obamasroots.html (noting the recent discovery of Michelle Obama’s multiracial DNA, the
prevalence of rape and sexual coercion in slavery); Richard Steckel, Slavery, Marriage
and the Family, 11 J. FAM. HIST. 251_(1980) (using multiple regression analysis to
estimate instances of mulatto children during slavery and patterns); DAVID BERRY
GASPAR & DARLENE CLARK HINE, MORE THAN CHATTLE: BLACK WOMEN AND
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on plantations was clear from the number of “mulattos” being born on
slave plantations. Slaves had no legal rights of their own under the law,
and slave fathers and husbands had no legal right to defend their families
against harm. Indeed, some posit that so-called contubernium marriages
were supported by some slave holders in part because such relationships
provided a means of controlling of slaves through threats of family
separation or physical harm to a loved one.70 The denial of marriage rights
during slavery, coupled with the economic disadvantages of broad scale
race discrimination and segregation after it, barred black male ex-slaves
from a host of other rights the prevailing patriarchal culture required in
order to protect oneself and one’s family. And such denials rendered black
female slaves breeders for a system that deprived them and the children to
whom they gave birth of the legal and physical protections that marriage
provided to white women and children.71 It is no surprise that the federal
government concluded that marriage rights and promises of family stability
would be a key means of recruitment for the U.S. military.
In September 1862, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation in preliminary form. By its terms, it became effective one
hundred days later, on January 1, 1863. Notably, the final version of the
Proclamation stated that the action was compelled by military necessity and
expressly authorized the enlistment of black soldiers. These key items
were not in the Proclamation’s preliminary version.72 The Proclamation
only purported to free those slaves in the states that were still in rebellion.73
SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS (1996). There were certainly interracial couples who
wanted to be married, but allowing legal marriage between whites and blacks, much
less between slave and free, would have threatened a racially based slave system.
70. Accord JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
NEGRO AMERICANS 154 (4th ed. 1974); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE ENDURING VISION: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 356 (2008).
71. One finds in the reports of the abuse of black women and girls during slavery
the same biases against recognizing female injury as one finds in the stories of other
women victimized when rape, sexual abuse, and separation from children were
employed as physical and psychological weapons of terror. Slave narratives offer a
more personal account, but even those sometimes arrive through multiple hearsay
levels. See JEAN FAGAN YELLIN, HARRIET JACOBS, A LIFE (2005) (explaining the story
of a female slave’s life). Adult black men and children were also
subjected to sexual
slavery. WILMA KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA,
24, 61, 64-65, 108-110, 199, n.165 (1997); Thomas A. Foster, The Sexual Abuse of
Black Men Under American Slavery, 20 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 445-464 (2011) (discussing
abuse of black men and the forcing of black men to sexually abuse black women).
72. Compare Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Sept. 22, 1862, NAT’L
ARCHIVES
&
RECS.
ADMIN.,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals_iv/sections/transcript_preliminar
y_emancipation.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013), with The Emancipation
Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN.,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/tran
script.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
73. The Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1863, is available online at Library of
Congress website at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/almgall.html.
In the
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It left slavery in place in the states that stayed loyal or had already
submitted to Union control.74 Those enlistments would be compelled
later.75
Some have attempted to distinguish such Civil War statutes relating to
marriage with the suggestion that these actions occurred when or because
there was no state government in place.76 But by no stretch of the
imagination were the Union Army and Freedmen’s Bureau just filling in to
help out the exhausted rebelling states while they took a “little breather”
from governance. Indeed, the legislative bodies of the Confederate states
met and strategized during the War, they coined their own money and
passed laws on various subjects.77 Southern leaders were continuing to
command soldiers. Whites continued to marry and the local laws
recognized their marriages.78 And the reason these marriages took place in
intervening time, states in rebellion could indicate surrender by having their
representatives show up in Congress on January 1.
74. Id. Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri, though slaveholding, did not
secede.
75. See discussion infra p. 729.
76. Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae Historians, American Historical
Association, Peter W. Bardaglio et al. in Support of Respondents Affirmance of the
Judgment Below at 35-36, Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 [hereinafter
"Windsor
Historians'
Amici
Brief"]
available
at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/201111-03-gill-v-opm-amici-historians.pdf (describing these slave marriages as occurring
when Confederate governments “collapsed,” arguing there were “no state governments
in the occupied South” and stating that when the state governments were reconstituted
the federal government “ceded its authority” backthto them and they “resumed their
jurisdiction over marriage law” subject to the 14 Amendment). See Golinsky v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (federal
government has only legislated in domestic relations when there has been a failure or
absence of state government); Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406
(S.D.N.Y.) (citing Golinsky for both points), aff’d, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 12307, 2013 WL 3196928 (June 26, 2013).
77. See, e.g., STATUTES OF GEORGIA PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1864,
available on Hein Online, 1864 5 1864; ACTS OF THE CALLED SESSION AND OF THE
FOURTH ANNUAL REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF ALABAMA,
available on Hein Online, 1864 4; SC STATUTES AT LARGE (1861), available on Hein
Online, 1864; 1861 1 1861. Slaveholding states refused to recognize the Emancipation
Proclamation as immediate law. E.g., Hall v. Keese (The Emancipation Cases), 31
Tex. 504, 514 (1868) (calling the Emancipation a war measure, although slavery, in
fact, continued undisturbed until Union General Granger entered Texas and ordered
Negros free); Weaver v. Lapsley 42 Ala. 601, 614 (1868) (describing Emancipation as
merely a “war-measure” that was not law until enforced by force of arms). One might
distinguish these cases on the theory that the states had withdrawn from the union and
no longer existed; however, that theory is a stretch as well because the alleged point of
the War from Lincoln’s perspective was to save the union, and so the right to secede
was never conceded by the Northern states. It must be then that War Powers—not the
absence of state government—was the situation that gave rise to the action. It would be
odd indeed to allow the federal government to define state authority as “absent” merely
because it disagreed with the position an acting state government had taken.
78. See J. David Hacker et al., The Effect of the Civil War on Southern Marriage
Patterns, 76 J. S. HIST. 39, 44 (2010). The biggest obstacle to wartime marriages for
whites was finding eligible mates given the large numbers of Southern white males
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federal space is because the federal government had commandeered it in
War, not because the states were hospitable. The federal government was
in direct conflict with state governments when it recognized these
marriages and decided what incidents would flow from them.
2. Recognition of Existing Marriages According to Slave Custom for Black
Civil War Military Pension Purposes When States Would Not Recognize
Them79
One example of Congress’ stepping out to touch domestic relations
matters was its decision to accept slave marriages as valid for military
pension purposes. The approach was adopted to encourage black men to
join the military and to ease the burden of the War on Union soldiers and
their families.
Congress had long recognized military pensions as a recruitment tool.
Three days before the second Confiscation Act, on July 14, 1862, but
before the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was signed in
September of that year, Congress passed an act regarding pensions for
disabled union soldiers and the dependents of soldiers dying in battle for
the Union.80 The act expressly denied a pension to any dependent who had
aided in the rebellion or in any way manifested sympathy with its cause.81
To secure the enlistment of blacks, Congress adopted several
approaches. On July 17, 1862 (before the Emancipation Proclamation),
Congress provided that if male slaves from rebelling states escaped and
joined the Union Army, they could gain freedom for their mothers, wives,
and children but only if the slave and those family members to be freed
were slaves of rebels.82 Of course, slaves were not allowed to marry but
the law was silent on recognizing marriages performed according to slave
custom. They were allowed monthly pay and rations but at a lesser rate
killed in the Civil War. Id.
79. Counsel for BLAG specifically referenced the slave military pension statute in
oral argument. Windsor Sup. Ct. Trans. at 73 (regarding authority for DOMA, stating
that there was a reason Congress specifically wanted to provide benefits for spouses of
freed
slaves
who
fought
for
the
Union)
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307. See also supra note 12 (noting that earlier drafts were shared with parties and
amici). The Law Professors brief lists the July 4, 1864 and March 3,1865 Acts with
other statutes as examples that Congress can affect marriage, but it does not discuss
their context. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondent
Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 (referencing two acts regarding slaves or ex
slaves as evidence that Congress can touch upon marriage).
80. An Act to Grant Pensions, ch. 166, § 2, 12 Stat. 566, 567 (1862) (providing
pension to surviving spouses, but if there was no spouse, then to the child until the
child reached age sixteen).
81. Id. § 4, 12 Stat. at 568.
82. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 13, 12 Stat. 597, 599. The Act did not affect
slaves held in so-called “loyal” states. Id.
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than non-blacks.83 The Act also expressly authorized the President to enlist
blacks in the military specifically in low-level service positions.84
The Emancipation Proclamation allowed ex-slaves to enlist without such
slaveholder consent, provided they could reach Union Army lines. On
October 26, 1863, the War Department expressly declared that the
“exigencies of war” required that “colored” troops in the slaveholding
states—Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee—that did not secede, as well
as blacks of any status in any rebelling states, be enlisted into the army.
Under the new law, slaves in the three loyal states could be forcibly
enlisted by their slaveholders. To compensate for property loss, in 1864,
Congress authorized up to $300 to be paid to slave holders in each state
that had a representative in Congress (i.e., not the rebel states) for the
delivery of each age-eligible slave to the Union army. State commissions
were to decide the value of the slave. Although Congress referred to these
black men as “volunteers,” in fact, the slaves in loyal states had no choice
and were only free upon enlistment.85 The families of these drafted slaves
from loyal states were not set free.86 Congress also specifically provided
that black soldiers would be segregated as “Colored Troops.”87
In July of 1864, Congress decided to recognize marriages that slaves had
entered into according to slave custom, if states refused to recognize them
or refused to allow black marriages. It did this solely for the purpose of
making black soldiers’ families eligible for military pensions.88 While
abolitionists cheered these Acts, the coalition that made them possible
included those war wearied who wanted the government to use more blacks
to fight in the Army.89
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch.13, § 24, 13 Stat. 6, 11. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 626-631 (1864). But see id. at 629 (comments of Sen. Cole) (voting
“no” because he could not justify giving compensation to the slave holder but not to the
slave who served). The $300 was a heavily discounted value for a military eligible
black male slave, justifiable, no doubt in light of the uncertainty of what war would
bring. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
86. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. at 629 (comments of Sen. Grinnell)
(reluctantly voting yes, but stating that his support had been contingent upon the entire
family being given freedom, which was not reflected in the final bill).
87. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch.13, § 24, 13 Stat. 6, 11.
88. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” ch, 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387, 389
(1864) (supplementing the 1862 pension act).
89. In 1862, Horace Greeley, Editor of the New York Tribune and a noted
abolitionist, recognized the nation's war weariness and encouraged Lincoln to recruit
blacks for the War. He said “We must have scouts, guides, spies, cooks, teamsters,
diggers and choppers from the Blacks of the South, whether we allow them to fight for
us or not, or we shall be baffled and repelled.” Letter from Horace Greeley to the
President, Aug. 19, 1862. In his famous response to Greeley, Lincoln made it clear that
his goal was to save the Union and that if he could have saved it by continuing slavery
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The first pension law allowed only the free wives of “colored soldiers”
(or their descendants) or children who were also free to apply for pensions
based on living as married couples during slavery.90 In other words, once
again, Congress did not end the enslavement of families in the so-called
“loyal” states. On March 3, 1865, Congress finally addressed slave
families. It declared that “to encourage enlistments” and military
“efficiency,” the “wife and children, if any he have" of any person
mustered on military rolls would be “forever free, any law, usage, custom,
or whatever, to the contrary notwithstanding."91 The accepted evidence of
the marriage and of children was that couple had cohabitated together as
husband and wife or that they participated in some sort of ceremony
indicating marriage “whether such marriage was or was not recognized or
authorized by law.”92
On June 6, 1866, after the War ended, Congress extended the slave
marriage recognition to black sailors, in addition to soldiers, and extended
the application rights to include “pensions, bounty and back pay” just as
white soldiers already had, but not in equal amounts. Evidence of the
marriage required was that satisfactory to the Commissioner of Pensions
that the parties had habitually lived together as husband and wife. A
he would have done so. A Letter from President Lincoln; Reply to Horace Greeley.
Slavery and the Union The Restoration of the Union the Paramount Object, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 1862), http://www.nytimes.com/1862/08/24/news/letter-presidentlincoln-reply-horace-greeley-slavery-union-restoration-union.html.
Accord Robert
Fabrikant, Lincoln Legal Acolytes, A Comment On Professor Akhil Reed Amar’s The
American Constitution: A Biography (2005), and Judge Frank J. Williams’ “Doing
Less” and “Doing More”: The President and the Proclamation—Legally, Militarily,
and Politically, in the Emancipation Proclamation, Three Views (2006), 49 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 169, 178 (2007) (explaining Lincoln’s goal to strip the South of key
military assets).
90. The language of the original Military Pension Act provided that the widow and
children of a soldier who died in the line of duty:
shall be entitled to receive the pensions now provided by law, without other
proof of marriage than that the parties had habitually recognized each other as
man and wife, and lived together as such for a definite period next preceding
the soldier’s enlistment, not less than two years, to be shown by the affidavits
of credible witnesses: Provided, however, That such widow and children are
free persons: Provided, further, That if such parties resided in any State in
which their marriage may have been legally solemnized, the usual evidence
shall be required.
An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions,” Approved July
Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two, ch. 247, § 14, 13 Stat. 387, 389 (1864)
(emphasis modified). See also In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, in 4 DECISIONS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 358,
362-63 (George Baber ed. 1891). The Crain decision offers an elaborate discussion of
the history of Congress’s Acts with respect to black and slave marriages not recognized
in the Southern states.
91. A Resolution to Encourage Enlistments and to Provide for the Efficiency of the
Military Forces of the United States, 13 Stat. 571 (1865).
92. Id.

CARTER 5/17/2013

730

8/10/2013 2:38:40 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

child’s recognition depended upon a husband asserting that they were his
own.93
On June 15, 1866, it further extended the rights of black soldiers to
bounty and provided additional security to their heirs. It provided that the
soldiers would be presumed free despite the absence of any notation on
muster rolls and once again set forth how their marriages would be
proven.94 It recognized a ceremony “deemed by them to be obligatory” and
their living together as husband and wife, and it extended protections to
children “born of any such marriage.”95 The next day Congress approved
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution for
submission to the states for ratification.96
Legislation on June 6, 1866 and March 3, 1873 used different language
regarding proof of marriage as a basis of benefits. The proof had to be
proof of cohabitation and a ceremony “satisfactory to the Commissioner of
Pensions.”97 The latter act allowed a black soldier’s wife or heirs to file
claims for “arrears” of pensions, bounties and allowances, and declared that
the children of the slave marriages were lawful children and heirs for
purposes of federal law. American Indian soldiers were also included.98
The pension statutes reveal that all support for procreation flowed from
the male’s status and from heterosexual marriage. The earliest slave
marriage pension statute simply used the term "children" in referencing a
soldier's dependents.99 In the 1865 statute giving freedom to dependents,
the language provided that children "born of that marriage" would be
presumed to be those of the soldier whether or not the parents were still

93. An Act Supplementary to the Several Acts Relating to Pensions, ch. 106, § 15,
14 Stat. 56, 58 (1866). Given the realities of slave life it is likely that many men
stepped into fatherhood for children who were not biologically theirs and that many
children rebuked for being the children of owners had no fathers through whom they
could claim support. See supra note 70.
94. A Resolution Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions,
Bounties and Allowances to Their Heirs, 14 Stat. 357 (1866).
95. Id.
96. Compare Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, 14 Stat 358-59 (1866) (passed June 16, 1866), with A Resolution
Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions, Bounties and Allowances to
Their Heirs (passed June 15, 1866).
97. An Act Supplementary to the Several Acts Relating to Pensions, ch. 106, § 14,
14 Stat. 56, 58 (1866) (emphasis added).
98. In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, supra note 90. See also An Act to
Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Laws Relating to Pensions, ch. 234, § 11, 17 Stat.
566, 570 (1873) (providing benefits and referencing “Colored or Indian soldiers”).
99. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” 13 Stat. at 389 (requiring, in
section 14, marriage, but not specifying when or how children must be born to qualify
as a soldier's children for pension purposes).
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married at the time of enlistment.100 By 1866, the pension statutes
protected only children “born of the marriage.” This tightening of the
language reinforced the government's view that marriage should be the
primary source of dependent benefits and adult female support.
At the same time, Congress knew full well that black slave women did
not possess the basic legal right to control of their own bodies and that in
many cases the biological fathers of their children would be white men.
Those men would not or, if they wanted to, could not, legally marry the
mothers or openly claim the children.101 Women's future and that of their
children was, therefore tied to black men whose earning power was, in turn,
crippled by racial injustice. A widow's pension ended if she remarried (and
presumably gained a new source of support).102 Similarly, when in 1873
the laws provided for an additional two dollars per month for a widow with
children, they also provided that additional amount ended when the
children became sixteen.103 These approaches to spousal support are
reflected in the structure of Social Security spousal benefits today.104
Certainly, the slave marriage pension statutes did not recognize slave
marriages for all purposes, not even for all federal purposes. Congress
followed state law in doling out other federal benefits. It did not grant
pensions in the case of interracial marriages if the relevant states or
localities banned them.105 But the reason may not have been mere
deference to individual state law. The action would not have been popular
with the public since the majority of states in the union banned interracial
marriage, and given the likely disruption that would follow upon such a
policy, Congress could not justify it on military necessity grounds.106
Moreover, race discrimination was not inconsistent with federal policy as it
was made by the very same people who made up the states. The U.S.
continued to racially segregate blacks in the military for another hundred
years.107 In so doing, it greatly restricted advancement opportunities for
100. A Resolution to Encourage Enlistments and to Provide for the Efficiency of the
Military Forces of the United States, 13 Stat. at 571.
101. E.g., A Resolution Respecting Bounties to Colored Soldiers and the Pensions,
Bounties and Allowances to Their Heirs, 14 Stat. at 358 (using "born of the marriage").
102. An Act Supplementary to an Act Entitled “An Act to Grant Pensions Approved
July Fourteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Two,” ch, 247, § 7, 13 Stat. at 388.
103. An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Laws Relating to Pensions, ch.
234, § 9, 17 Stat. at 570.
104. See discussion infra at p. 773.
105. E.g., In re Ann Cahal, in 9 DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR IN
CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 127, 127-28 (John W. Bixler ed. 1898) (rejecting
the widow’s claim because her husband was white, although he was claimed to be
black, and expressing that interracial marriage was contrary to Mississippi law).
106. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (declaring state restraints on interracial
marriage unconstitutional).
107. E.g., John W. Finney, Segregated Units Ended By The Services, WASH. POST,
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black men because they could never command companies that had white
troops, and that race discrimination, in turn, made them less able to support
families financially through marriage.
In one sense, the federal Civil War pension statutes and their supporting
legislation were broad in that they recognized marriages that states did not.
Indeed, it was very clear that if a state allowed blacks to marry, the couple
could not use the standards for marriage set forth in these statutes.108 But
the statutes were also narrow in that they deviated for particular federal
purposes, when following state law did not serve federal interests.
In fact, many years later, the Department of Interior stressed that the
federal statutes were understood to be contrary to state law. The
justification was that they were required to meet “the peculiar conditions of
those who, having been held to “involuntary servitude” were thereby
denied marital rights under State law.”109 But in fact, they were clearly
closely tied to military recruitment.
The Department of Interior also rejected any characterization of the slave
pension statutes as statutes establishing new marriage laws.
It is obvious from the language of the section that Congress did not
intend to enact a law of marriage for persons of color—neither to supply
the lack of any State or local statute on the subject, nor to make a
general law affecting marital rights, beyond claims for pension. An
intention to regulate marital rights in general, if entertained by Congress,
might well be held as an encroachment upon the authority of the State
which, having marital laws of its own might properly assert exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject.
While not interfering with local
enactments, Congress intended, by section 4805, to establish grounds for
title to pension in behalf of certain persons—the widows and children of
colored and Indian soldiers and sailors for whom no provision had
theretofore been made in the pension system.110

The source of the power to recognize slave marriages as qualifying
marriages for federal pension purposes (and to recognize the children of
former slaves as legitimate dependents) had to lie in Congress’ War Powers
under the Constitution, both directly and under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.111 The Thirteenth Amendment freeing the slaves and the
Oct. 31, 1954, at M6.
108. E.g., In re Fanny Curtis, in 2 DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 159, 161 (George Baber ed. 1889) (finding that
the Act was not intended to validate cohabitation of free black couples who had not
been slaves and could be married where they resided).
109. In re Minor Children of Joseph Crain, supra note 90, at 361.
110. Id. at 362.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress inter alia, the power “[t]o declare
War,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o
make Rules for the Government of Regulation of the land and naval Forces”).
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Fourteenth Amendment declaring them citizens of the United States later
added additional authorization for the federal government to assume the
work of transitioning blacks out of the law of servitude against the will of
rebel governments.
3. Secretary of War Marriage Directives During the Civil War and
Reconstruction
The Civil War pension statutes recognized the existing customary slave
marriages. There is yet another example of federal forays into marriage
from the Civil War period. The U.S. Secretary of War authorized military
officers, local clergymen, and others to perform marriages for black
soldiers and so called “contraband.” Of course, military officers were
already performing marriages for white military men.112 The newly
authorized marriages occurred in areas of military occupation, but often
within the boundaries of rebel states. Unlike U.S. bases today, Civil War
military encampments were not preexisting federal properties, but were
often established on commandeered lands.
The earliest official record of “contraband” marriages appears to be from
October 11, 1861, in a report of marriages performed by Rev. Lewis C.
Lockwood at Camp Hamilton, Virginia. Lockwood married 32 couples.113
On March 28, 1864, John Eaton, then Superintendent of contrabands for
Department of Tennessee and Arkansas, issued Special Order 15 ordering
Union Army clergy to “‘solemnize the rite of marriage among
Freedmen.’”114 And again the report notes that “Special Order 176, issued
by the Department of the Gulf (July 4, 1864), ordered clergy in that
Department ‘to unite in marriage, free of charge, such colored soldiers as
may be recommended to them . . . with the women whom such soldiers
may select to be their wives.’”115
By the Act of March 3, 1865, weeks before the South’s surrender,
Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands (the “Freedmen’s Bureau”).116 At the time, both houses of Congress
112. War obligations, it seemed, led military men to want to marry. Military
Matrimony, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1861, at 4.
113. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., MARRIAGE RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF
THE COMMISSIONER, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS OF THE BUREAU OF REFUGEES,
FREEDMEN AND ABANDONED LANDS, 1861-1869, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL
ARCHIVES
FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU
SUMMARY],
available
at
http://www.archives.gov/research/microfilm/m1875.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch.
90, § 1, 13 Stat. 507, 507 (1865) (committing the supervision and management of all
abandoned lands, refugees, and freedman to the newly formed bureau); see also The
Surrender: Full Details of the Great Event From an Eyewitness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
1865, at 1.
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had adopted the Thirteenth Amendment (with rebel states not represented),
but it had not been ratified.117 The Freedmen’s Bureau was another federal
foray into traditionally local activity, one compelled by the expansiveness
of the effort to organize the slaves into communities.118 The original
authorization provided for blacks to have access to forty acres of land for
farming at a small rent and later, if available, for the Bureau to make the
land available for purchase.119 As blacks had been excluded from many of
the free land grants previously offered to whites,120 this provision was a
comparably modest way to provide a way for them to start their own
farms.121 The promise faltered under protest when the claimed original
owners returned and challenged the Act.122 Nevertheless, the Bureau
helped blacks and whites to establish schools and financial institutions for
ex-slaves.123 It had been a felony to teach a slave to read and write in many
slaveholding states.124 The Bureau tried to track vigilante groups' terrorism
117. The Amendment was passed by the Senate on April 8, 1864, by the House on
January 31, 1865, and adopted on December 6, 1865. See 13th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution:
Abolition
of
Slavery
(1865),
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=40 (last visited Mar. 26,
2013).
118. Letter of the Freedmen’s Aid Societies to President Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1863)
(“[T]he question is too large for anything short of government authority.”).
119. An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, § 1, 13
Stat. at 508. In General Order No. 110, President Andrew Johnson ordered lands
abandoned in War to be turned over to the Bureau. The Freedmen’s Bureau: Important
Official Order by the President, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1865, at 1; see also William H.
Burkes, The Freedmen’s Bureau, Politics, and Stability Operations During
Reconstruction in the South 42 (Dec. 6, 2009) (unpublished Slave holder of Military
Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA501927 (noting that access to land
for farming was also granted to loyal white refugees); W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The
Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1901, at 354, 357, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois.htm (stating former male
slaves had the opportunity to lease and eventually own abandoned property).
120. See discussion infra p. 753; see also infra pp. 751-52 (discussing restrictions to
“white men only” or American Indians with white male fathers in Utah and Oregon
land grant laws).
121. See infra p 147-48 (discussing restrictions in the Oregon Land Donation Law).
122. Freedmen’s Affairs, First Official Report of General Howard, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1865 at 3 (stating some distribution had occurred but most had been
suspended after persons claimed a right to those lands). President Johnson, he began to
back away from the promises and vetoed reauthorization of the bill. His veto was
immediately overridden. Washington News: The President’s Message Vetoing the
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1866, at 1.
123. See Martin Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Negro Schooling in South
Carolina, 57 S.C. HIST. MAG. 56, 67 (1956) (stating the Bureau performed many vital
tasks including providing resources to schools and funding building repairs); see also
NATIONAL ARCHIVES FREEDMEN’S BUREAU SUMMARY, supra note 113, at 1 (stating
that the Bureau established hospitals, supervised tenements for the homeless, and
operated employment offices).
124. See, e.g., An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other
Slaves in this Province, 1740, reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 397, 413 (David J. McCord ed., 1840), available at
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of blacks after the War, including lynchings.125
Bureau officers issued marriage licenses and certificates and registered
the marriages.126 “On June 24, 1865, John W. Sprague, Assistant
Commissioner for Arkansas, whose jurisdiction covered both the States of
Arkansas and Missouri (June 1865 until January 1866), issued Circular
Number 3 instructing his subordinates ‘to keep and preserve a record of
marriages of freed people, and by whom the ceremony was performed.’”127
Sprague sent regular reports to Washington of the marriages performed.128
In August of 1865, General Edict No. 8 set up a system for marriages
affecting Florida, South Carolina, and Georgia.129 The edict addressed who
was eligible to be married, how marriages were to be performed, the rights
and obligations of husbands and wives, and the rights of children and
divorce. It addressed the difficult topic of those who had been separated by
forced sale during slavery, had married a second person, but now wanted to
be reunited with the first. It even provided forms for marriage
certificates.130
The Freedmen’s Bureau was reauthorized and its authority expanded by
subsequent Acts. However, criticisms that the job was too costly,
complaints that the now freed blacks should be required to stand on their
own and continuing racism combined to end its work.131 The Bureau
finally succumbed to politics three years after the end of the War in
http://archive.org/details/statutesatlargeo07edit (imposing a money penalty for teaching
a slave how to write).
125. See generally Freedmen’s Bureau Records Relating to Murders and Outrages,
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU ONLINE, http://freedmensbureau.com/outrages.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2013) (reflecting murders, lynchings, and questionable rape accusations against
black men and young boys).
126. NATIONAL ARCHIVES FREEDMEN’S BUREAU SUMMARY, supra note 113, at 5.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id.
129. See Marriage Rules: General Order No. 8, August 11, 1865, HIST. ST.
AUGUSTINE, http://www.drbronsontours.com/bronsongeneralrufussaxtongeneralordersn
o8august111865.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (acknowledging the Bureau’s
commitment to protect the “sacred institution of marriage”).
130. Id.; see also Rules for Marriage in the State of South Carolina, FREEDMEN’S
BUREAU ONLINE, http://freedmensbureau.com/southcarolina/marriagerules.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2013) (stating that each couple shall be issued a marriage certificate by
the minister who marries them).
131. See Du Bois, supra note 119, at 364 (postulating that a permanent Freedmen’s
Bureau might well have solved persistent and perplexing “negro” problems); see also
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1307 (1865) (statement of Mr. Powell) (objecting
to the original bill stating, “this bill will involve an expense of millions upon millions
of dollars”); The Situation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1866, at 4 (stating that an institution
charged with “educat[ing] the negro into fitness for freedom” would inevitably grow
into permanence—a result which should be carefully guarded against); A Word for the
Freedmen and the Freedmen’s Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1866, at 4 (objecting to
those pleading for Bureau’s work to continue, arguing that the scope of its task is too
monumental).
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1868.132 The ex-slaves, largely illiterate and poverty stricken, surrounded
by racial tensions, and with their families scattered were left to find their
own way with the help of what private philanthropists would and could
give and little protection from state authorities. In this void, the Southern
states' leadership engrained racial oppression in the notorious “black
codes,” laws applicable only to blacks that attempted to recreate the
economically and socially valuable structure that slavery had once secured
for whites.133
It is very clear that when Congress provided for the federal licensing of
marriages for the ex-slaves, it intended for their marital rights to be
recognized in all of the states. Moreover, its actions did not facilitate state
action, but rather operated directly contrary to the will of those in the
Confederacy and others who rejected the notion of affording blacks the
right to marry.134 This extraordinary step flowed from its War Powers and,
again, from the Constitutional Amendments relating to the newly freed
slaves.
B. Deviating to Reject a Class of Marriages Deemed Valid Under State or
Local Law
1. Prohibiting Polygamous Marriages in the Territory of Utah
DOMA defenders have often cited the U.S. treatment of polygamy in
Utah as an example of federal inroads into marriage and an example that
the federal government’s use of marriage rules to express moral
viewpoints. Those critical of the comparison have sought to distinguish the
Utah case in a variety of ways: that the case involved a territory and
plenary power, that polygamy affects families differently than same-sex
marriage, etc.135 Prior writers on both sides have failed to grasp the
132. See The End of the Freedmen’s Bureau, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1868, at 4
(claiming that the exigency which gave rise to the Bureau ceased to exist and thus the
Bureau became a drain on national resources).
133. See W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860 - 1880, at 325
(The Free Press 1998) (1935) (noting that the South was willing to use “black codes” to
restore the capital it lost with the abolition of slavery); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN,
RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 47 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that enacting “black
codes” was the greatest concern of Southern legislatures in the year following the Civil
War); see also Black Codes, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/black-codes
(last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (listing, for example, a “black code” which required blacks
to sign yearly labor contracts or risk being arrested and forced into labor).
134. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3341-50 (1864) (objecting to Freedmen’s
Bureau Bill on grounds that Jefferson Davis claimed that blacks are inferior and bill
overlooks white man’s rights).
135. E.g., Adrienne Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1993-97 (2010) (arguing that
binary same-sex marriage is more consistent with modern trends of equality in family
law than polygamy and that the latter runs contrary to that trend with frequently
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significant role that the Supremacy Clause played in federal decisions
relating to polygamy in Utah. The battle over supremacy laid the predicate
for federal action in Utah, and makes Utah a case of not simply mere moral
reproach (although some actors held this view), but also a case of a
vindication of a federal interest in establishing federal power as the
supreme power in accordance with both the U.S. Constitution and the
organic statute that created the territory.
Utah came into the territory of the U.S. through the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico.136 At the time, members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the "Mormons") were already living
there. Facing resistance, they had moved from place to place to find
territory where they could peaceably practice their religious tenets,
including, but not limited to, polygamy.137
In 1850, Congress adopted the organic act that established a territorial
legislature, affording Utah all local governance powers consistent with the
federal Constitution, with a few exceptions. One was that locals had no
power to dispose of the land.138 President James Buchanan appointed
Brigham Young as the territory’s first governor. Buchanan had to know
that Young was the head of the Mormon Church and a polygamist but
apparently did not attach significance to the fact.139 According to one
source, at the time of that appointment Young had fourteen wives. 140
The tensions between Mormon local officials and non-Mormon federal
officials began almost immediately. By December 1851, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Territory, one of the two Associate Justices,
and the Secretary for the Territory had resigned and left the territory.141
changing family structures that heighten vulnerability of family members); see also
Windsor Historians' Amici Brief at 37-39 (Congress' campaign to end polygamy was so
intense because Congress knew it could not affect polygamy once Utah became a
state).
136. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/guadhida.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
137. See 1 HISPANIC AMERICAN RELIGIOUS CULTURES 375 (Miguel de la Torre ed.
2009); see also Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban
on Polygamy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 298 (2010) (discussing the intense
evangelism, and other religious doctrines that prompted the Mormons to seek their own
territory within the United States).
138. An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah, ch. 51, § 1, 9 Stat. 453,
453 (1850).
139. James Buchanan, State of the Union Address, Dec. 8, 1857, in STATE OF THE
UNION
ADDRESSES
BY
JAMES
BUCHANAN
3,
25-26
(2003),
http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/poldocs/uspressu/SUaddressJBuchanan.pdf
(discussing the difficulty of Young’s dual roles).
140. Accord CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 1804 (1873) (noting difficulty that
Young had fourteen wives when appointed Governor, and Congress later allowed
polygamy to stand for some ten to twelve years before doing something about it).
141. CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 91 (1852).
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Upon hearing of the uproar in Utah, the House of Representatives asked the
Executive Branch to deliver a report. In 1852, President Millard Fillmore
relayed to Congress a report from Secretary of State Daniel Webster. That
report was delivered a full ten years before Congress banned polygamy.
The documents that it contained reveal extensive information of, at least,
the U.S. government’s view of what was happening in Utah.
Essentially, in a lengthy letter, the judges claimed that Utah had become
a theocracy and the Mormon Church had usurped the federal government’s
role. They accused the Church of controlling the opinions, actions,
property, and lives of its members; “usurping and exercising the functions
of legislation and judicial business in the Territory” (including conducting
its own trials without a jury); “organizing and commanding the military;
disposing of the public lands, upon its own terms; coining money, stamped,
‘Holiness to the Lord,’ and forcing its circulation at a standard fifteen or
twenty percent above its real value; openly sanctioning and defending
polygamy . . . extracting the tenth part of everything from members, under
the name of tithing, and enormous taxes, from citizens, not members.”142
Of Brigham Young they said that he exacted absolute obedience and “[h]is
opinions and wishes were [the people’s] opinions and wishes.”143
They further accused Young of insisting that only Mormons be
appointed to public office in Utah, of insulting the government of the
United States and government officials in his speeches, and of riling up
citizens to threaten federal officials both generally and in particular, with
physical harm.144 They accused him of using federal funds for purposes
other than those Congress had authorized, of producing a fraudulent
census, and of conducting elections in which aliens were allowed to vote.145
They claimed that Young refused to meet with them and claimed that
Young told them that federal judges would never try a single case in Utah
territory.146 The judges also pointed out that while bigamy was a crime
under common law, it would, in their view, be impossible to find anyone
who would convict, for all of the local judges and jurypersons would also
be Mormon.147 They ended by stating that the Mormons were “living upon

142. Id. at 86.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 86-87; see also id. at 87 (articulating that the officials felt endangered,
but also that they felt insulted; one letter relates Young stating in a public speech that
President Zachery Taylor, then dead, was “in hell,” and that “I prophesy in the name of
Jesus Christ, by the power of the Priesthood that’s upon me, that any President of the
United States who lifts his finger against this people shall die an untimely death and go
to hell”).
145. Id. at 87, 88.
146. Id. at 86-87.
147. CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 89 (1852).
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the soil of the United States and drawing their sustenance from it free of
charge,” and that their officers, including Governor Young, were paid for
with monies provided by the federal government.148 And yet they added,
“[i]t is impossible for any [federal] officer to perform his duty or execute
any law, not in sympathy with their views as the Territory is at present
organized.”149
The federally appointed Secretary of the territory, who had also resigned,
submitted a report as well. It indicated controversy over the handling of
spending and elections. The Secretary accused Young of disregarding
Utah’s Organic Act. He included copies of correspondence that appeared
to indicate that Young had attempted to order the Secretary as to how to
handle federal monies in the territory rather than conceding Utah’s
obligation to follow federal law.150
Utah’s sole Congressional delegate, John Milton Bernhisel, wrote a letter
too. He reported that his community denied that they mistreated federal
officers or insulted the government. Acknowledging that he left the
territory on travel before the events allegedly occurred, he asked for a
committee investigation.151
The sole remaining judge wrote an oddly short letter. He stated that he
had decided to remain and that the others could explain for themselves their
reasons for departure. But he also cryptically pointed out that delegate
Bernhisel (whose letter denied that Utah residents had been discourteous)
was not present in the territory when the events in question occurred.
The report also included a short letter from Governor Brigham Young to
President Fillmore. It simply informed the President that with the
resignations, Young had appointed a new Secretary pro temp and that the
territorial legislature had redistricted the territory into one district and
assigned the cases to the sole remaining judge, all this to fill a void until the
President could act.152 It said nothing about the reasons for the judges’
resignations or Young’s reactions.
The leading Utah Newspaper, The Deseret News, was largely a religious
vehicle, dominated by sermons, speeches, and testimonies. It did not then
148. Id. at 90.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 85, 91.
152. See CONG. GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 86 (1852) (describing Young’s
decision to appoint a new Secretary; it is not clear whether, in doing so, he was filling a
void or taking advantage of an opportunity to arrange affairs more suitable to his
preferences); see also An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah, ch. 51, §§
1-2, 9 Stat. 453, 453 (1850) (appearing to have given Young the authority to redistrict,
though not to appoint federal officials). For other expressed concerns about Young see
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. 31 (1873) (claiming Young had driven from
competition every Gentile company that attempted to build a railroad in Utah).
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address the conflicts, perhaps an indication that the Mormons did not want
to provide fuel for a federal fire.153
Despite resignations that indicated clear signs of trouble in Utah,
Congress did not focus in on banning polygamy in this period. Four years
later, in 1854, the matter of Utah came up again. Congress was considering
a bill relating to the appointment of a Surveyor General for Utah and the
distribution of territorial lands.154 Under the proposed bill, “white” married
men were to receive twice the lot of “white” single men (a total of 640
acres versus 320).155 At the last minute, an Ohio Congressman inserted a
provision that excluded polygamists from allotments.156 Utah’s delegate,
Bernhisel, moved to strike the limitation. That motion set off a furious
debate over polygamy and more directly the power of Congress to affect
religion, marriage, and domestic issues in the territories.
Some
Congressmen expressed surprise at learning of the extent of polygamy in
Utah. But while Utah statutes did not mention it, polygamy prevailed in
Utah and had been an open secret.157
Some of the arguments presented are similar to the arguments in samesex marriage cases. Defenders of Utah's rights to practice polygamy
argued that religion and marriage were local matters outside of Congress’
enumerated powers and consequently, despite Congress' power over
territorial lands, any marriage-based federal condition on the receipt of the
land was void.158 They asked why, if polygamists were to be excluded,
adulterers in other territories were not excluded as well and why any
153. The Deseret News is available digitally online through the University of Utah at
http://digitalnewspapers.org/newspaper/?paper=Deseret+News.
154. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1091-92 (1854) (proposing that the
authority to grant the final disposition of the land rested with the U.S. government).
Compare An Act to Regulate Surveyors and Surveying, 1851-52 Utah Territory Acts
1st Sess. 94, 94-96 (1852) (noting the ability of officials in Utah to appoint surveyors),
with An Act to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah §§ 15-17, 9 Stat. at 457-58
(discussing the boundary of Utah’s territory and emphasizing that the laws of the
Constitution extend over it).
155. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1091-92 (1854) (“[T]he benefits of
this act shall not extend to any person who shall now, or at any time hereafter, be the
husband of more than one wife.”). The statute left ambiguity as to whether Mormon
authorities desired a husband to claim land for each marriage; however, it still appeared
to allow only one lot per male applicant. See also id. at 1092 (noting that when asked
about the damage the restriction would bring, Rep. Bernhisel stated that the more wives
a man has the more land he needs).
156. Id. at 1091-92.
157. See id. at 1091, 1095 (noting that the territorial statutes had no mention of
polygamy or the Mormon Church); see also discussion infra at p. 742 and note 164;
supra note 140 (Congressman arguing that President and Congress had knowledge of
polygamy at time of Utah founding).
158. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1093 (1854) (citing Congressman
Phillips when he states that “Congress has nothing whatever to do with this
transaction” as it is “not necessary or proper” to impose the condition); see also id. at
1092 (noting the comments of Mr. Bernhisel when striking to amend the proposal).
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number of bad acts did not block eligibility for land grants.159 They argued
that the terms for Utah should be the same as the terms for other
territories.160 They argued that Congress had no power to touch moral
issues such as religion and that if “discrimination” against the Mormons
was allowed, other religions would be next.161 They also made a public
safety argument that the Mormons had suffered significant discrimination
in their history, that they would take great offense to this condition, and
that upsetting them would come at a price.162 They argued that the
Mormons were conscientious and hard workers and truly believed that their
faith authorized and encouraged polygamy.163 They argued that Congress
knew about the practice of polygamy when Utah became a territory but did
nothing to prevent it.164 They argued that polygamy was not yet a crime
because it was legal under Utah law, Congress had not outlawed it, and
Congress had no basis for infringing local rights.165 They argued that it
was unfair to exclude Mormons when land grants were given to “‘outcasts
from Europe” and “fugitives from justice.”166
Supporters of the restriction on polygamy had their own arguments: that
Congress had sweeping power to issue any laws deemed necessary with
respect to the territories;167 that marriage between one man and one woman
was ordained by God;168 that states where polygamy was practiced were
“heathen and have not flourished;”169 that allowing polygamists to have
bounty lands would attract to Utah licentious individuals and advance the
degradation of women as married men legally pursued multiple
159. See id. at 1093 (noting where Congressman Phillips asks why adultery or
murder was not excluded).
160. See id. at 1094 (noting the comments of Congressman Stephens of Georgia,
who argued that Congress cannot treat religions differently in these territories).
161. See id. at 1094 (highlighting the comments of Congressman Stephens of
Georgia, who argued that such unequal treatment was unconstitutional).
162. See id. at 1097 (emphasizing the comments of Mr. Walsh noting that “good
precepts, and persuasion, will do more to remove polygamy . . . than all the laws you
can pass here”).
163. Id. at 1092.
164. Id. at 1097; accord CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 1804 (1873)
(documenting Mr. Carpenter’s comments noting knowledge of polygamy when
Brigham Young appointed and that Congress allowed polygamy to stand for some ten
to twelve years before doing something about it).
165. See id. at 1097 (referencing the comments of Mr. Kerr who argued that the way
to deal with the “crime” was to directly outlaw it, not address it indirectly).
166. See id. (highlighting the comments of Mr. Kerr,); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
338 (1789) (referencing import of prison labor or “white slaves” from Europe).
167. See CONG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1101 (1854) (noting the comments of
Mr. Lyon on this issue when he cites the Constitutional authority for Congress’ power).
168. See id. at 1094 (noting the comments of Mr. Smith of Tennessee that this
reference is singular and not plural).
169. Id. at 1101.
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paramours;170 that affording land to polygamists would constitute the
federal government’s approval of the practice and by reward lead to its
increase in the territories;171 that the role of the federal government was to
fit territories to become republican states and that polygamy was
inconsistent with this task;172 that every state in the union banned
polygamy;173 that denying benefits would encourage Mormons to give up
the practice;174 that polygamy broke up the family circle;175 that the matter
was not local at all; that not excluding polygamists would give them a
“bonus” in bounty lands not available to those who adhered to the
dominant common law approach to marriage; that Congress was giving a
federal gift and that it had every right to impose the terms of that gift
consistent with the rules recognized by the states in common.176
At the time of the 1854 debates, at least one person insisted that the
federal government would have no power to hinder polygamy in this way if
Utah territory were in fact a state.177 Of course, were Utah a state,
disposition of federal land or federal supremacy would not have been an
issue—and all the states had outlawed polygamy.
Representatives from slaveholding states were split on the question of
polygamy. One proposed that polygamists should even be required to
forfeit lands that they already held.178 But others saw Congressional
intervention to ban polygamy as a breach of a local jurisdiction’s right to
determine its own domestic relations—a breach that might broaden to lead
the federal government up to the slaveholder’s doorstep. Said Mr. Keitt
from South Carolina:
Now, if Congress has a right to say that no man in the Territories shall
170. See id. at 1100 (noting that such an allowance would disrupt the “virtuous quiet
in the unbroken wilderness of the West”).
171. Id. at 1096; see also id. at 1095 (noting the comments of Mr. Simmons on his
concern about western expansion and the potential for the spread of polygamy when
settlers interact with Mormons).
172. Id. at 1095 (referencing the statement Congressman Simmons made when he
articulated that Congress in the past had determined that “religion and morality” were
“the basis of free republication institutions” in schooling).
173. See id. at 1093 (noting the comments of Congressman Campbell when he stated
that in every state polygamy was “a high offense”).
174. See id. at 1098 (referencing the comments of Mr. Goodrich when he stated that
if it was not possible to reach Mormon’s on this issue through “moral considerations,”
it would become necessary to affect their interests in other ways).
175. See id. at 1095 (noting that Mr. Simmons also stated that it “spoils the domestic
relations”).
176. See id. at 1098 (noting Mr. Campbell and Mr. Taylor’s comments that those
practicing polygamy would receive increased benefits); see also id. at 1101 (identifying
the comments of Mr. Cobb on the power of Congress to condition the grant of federal
lands).
177. Id. at 1092.
178. Id. at 1099.
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have more than one wife, may it not say that no man shall have a wife at
all? If it can prescribe the number of wives, may it not altogether
abrogate the marital relation?179

Mr. Davis of Rhode Island, referring to the limitation of the land to white
men, responded by posing his own question: “I would ask the gentleman
where Congress gets the power to insert the word ‘white’ in this bill?”180
His question emphasized that federal racial restrictions on land grants did
not actually have an obvious constitutional basis, especially since
citizenship was not even a requirement. He also cried hypocrisy against
slaveholders challenging polygamy, saying that at least Mormons
acknowledge their wives and children unlike slaveholders who practice
“unlimited concubinage” and “sell their children.”181
It appears the matter was set aside and for a year, Utah continued
without a federal Surveyor General. Settlers (many of whom were
polygamists) effectively squatted on land.182 In February 1855, over the
objections of a vocal minority, Congress finally passed a statute appointing
the Surveyor General, without any restrictions on polygamists.183 But a
year later, the appointed Surveyor General of Utah abandoned his post. He
alleged hostilities from the Mormons.184 Still, Congress did not act to ban
polygamy.
The tense environment was made incendiary by frequent, often bloody,
skirmishes between Mormon and non-Mormon settlers moving through
Utah territory. A notable one occurred in September 1857, when a band of
armed men murdered more than one hundred Arkansans traveling through
Utah.
The incident became known as the “Mountain Meadows
Massacre.”185 Later that same year, a party of travelers was attacked and

179. Id. at 1099.
180. See id. at 1100 (referencing Mr. Davis’s responsive question about Congress’
authority). Davis did not ask about the exclusion of women. Although married women
could access land through their husbands, or children through their fathers, marriage
remained the key to women’s access. See also id. at 1092 (mentioning Congressman
Giddings’ of Ohio statement that Southerners have denounced all attempts to interfere
with slavery in the territories as a domestic institution but are now in favor of
interfering with the “domestic institution of marriage in Utah, among the Mormons”);
id. at 1093 (recognizing that Congressman Campbell came to a similar conclusion
regarding the Southerners’ discussions about centralization in this context but not
within the context of slavery).
181. Id. at 1092. Of course, employing the word “concubinage” presents the female
slave experience only from the male point of view.
182. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 14 (1857).
183. An Act to Establish the Office of Surveyor-General of Utah, and to Grant Land
for School and University Purposes, ch. 117, § 1, 10 Stat. 611, 611 (1855).
184. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 14 (1857).
185. See RONALD W. WALKER, ET AL., MASSACRE AT MOUNTAIN MEADOWS, at IX,
191 (2008) (stating the emigrants were en route to California).
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Prosecutors could not secure
killed in the “Aiken Massacre.”186
convictions of Mormons alleged to be involved. It was claimed that
Mormons would not vote to convict a fellow Mormon. The first Mountain
Meadows trial resulted in a hung jury.187 The second finally resulted in a
conviction twenty years after the massacre, and after Congress allowed
challenges to strike jurors who were polygamists.188
For his part, President James Buchanan replaced Governor Brigham
Young and sent new federal agents there. In his December 1857 State of
the Union address, he explained his actions, essentially alleging that Utah
was a theocracy that did not respect federal rule and stating that the troops
were necessary for protection of federal officers, as so many had resigned
in fear of their personal safety.189 Ironically, Senator Jefferson Davis—
who would later lead the states of the Confederacy that seceded from the
Union—commented that it was “palpably absurd” that the President could
not call upon the predominantly Mormon Utah militia to defend U.S.
interests in Utah.190 The U.S. military remained in Utah until 1858.191
Mormon newspapers began to strike back in their own defense.192
186. See The Judiciary vs. the Administration—Mormon Complicity in Recent
Massacres, DAILY EVENING BULL., Sept. 17, 1859 (reporting attempts to collect
evidence regarding Massacres for trials and request for military aid).
187. See The Second Trial of John D. Lee, the Mormon Elder, for the Massacre of
Emigrants, Known as the “Mountain Meadow Massacre,” Has Just Begun at Beaver,
Utah, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN, Sept. 18 1876, at col. A (stating the three or four
Mormons on the jury refused to return a guilty verdict).
188. See John D. Lee, the Mormon Who Was Found Guilty of Complicity in the
Mountain Meadows Massacre, and Condemned to Be Shot Last Month, Is Still Alive,
with Some Prospect of Escaping Punishment Altogether, Through Technicalities,
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Feb. 8, 1877, at 4; Execution of John D. Lee, the Mormon
Leader in the Mountain Meadows Massacre, FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED
NEWSPAPER, Apr. 7, 1877, at 79. For trial transcripts and other papers related to the
Massacre see the website at the University of Missouri, Kansas City available at
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mountainmeadows/leetrial.html.
189. Buchanan, supra note 139, at 25-26 (noting Brigham Young was head both of
Church and state and in a conflict, the people of Utah would side with Young and the
Church; stating Young desires the conflict; noting all the federal officers except for two
Indian agents found it necessary to withdraw from the territory to protect their personal
safety; the only government in Utah was the despotism of Brigham Young). See also
Report of the Secretary of War, CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1857)
(reporting to the Joint Session that the people of Utah had established a theocracy and
rejected the laws of United States; discussing alleged incitement of Brigham Young,
blaming Mormons for nearby American Indian unrest against United States; expressing
attempts to negotiate with the Mormons discussing provisions for expedition).
190. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 408 (1858) (Sen. Jefferson Davis (MI))
(calling the notion that the state militia of Utah could not be called upon to enforce
United States law against the Mormons a “palpably absurd” situation).
191. End of the Mormon Rebellion, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, May 24, 1858
(reporting the end of the “rebellion” without bloodshed).
192. Mormon reactions in newspapers tended to be encased in larger sermons. See,
e.g., Discourse By Pres. Brigham Young, Oct. 7, 1857, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857,
at 340 (stating “hell cannot overthrow us, even with the United States to help them,”

CARTER 5/17/2013

2013]

8/10/2013 2:38:40 PM

THE FEDERAL LAW OF MARRIAGE

745

In 1858, President Buchanan also used the Utah turmoil and Mormon
resistance to federal power to call for more funding for a larger Army.193
Congressional debates focused primarily on whether a larger army was
needed and the question of respect for federal power in Utah, not on
polygamy.194 Some accused the President of levying war upon the
Mormons or using their situation as an excuse to get money for an Army.195
The debates indicate just how strongly some Congressmen of that era felt
about federal respect for local powers, even in the territories.
By the mid-1800s, an invigorated Women’s Movement had provided a
new argument against polygamy: that it was harmful to women and
families.196 The debates over slavery also provided fuel for those opposing
and telling U.S. Captain Stewart Van Vliet that Young does not care how many troops
the government has because “before they get through they will want to let the job to
sub-contractors”); Expedition Against Utah, id. at 244-45 (speaking of past religious
discrimination over decades and stating Mormons respect federal government but will
resist attempts to supplant territorial local control or end polygamy); Discourse of
Elder O. Hyde, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857 at 342-43 (accusing others of inciting
violence against Mormons, accusing the U.S. government and Buchanan of antiMormon behavior and inciting conflicts); Discourse By Elder Geo. A. Smith, Nov. 29,
DESERET NEWS, Dec. 30, 1857, at 343 (arguing that the United States never extended
protection to Mormons); id. at 341 (referring to the “vile and illegal” crusade of
Buchanan and the U.S. against Utah). Some argue that the Mormons failed to
acknowledge any responsibility for tensions or for the Mountain Meadow murders.
Accord Kristine W. Fredrickson, Scholars Discuss Massacre at Mountain Meadows,
DESERET NEWS (June 9, 2010, 3:00 PM), www.deseretnews.com/article
/705384706/Scholars-discuss-Massacre-At-Mountain-Meadows.html
(discussing
scholars who note that Mormons at that time refused to take responsibility and
considered it an individual problem). In 2007, the Mormon Church acknowledged that
some of its former leaders played a role in recruiting Paiute Indians for the massacre
and it publicly apologized. Jessica Ravitz, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Sept, 11, 2007, at
1.
193. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 406-07 (1858) (discussing the request).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 407 (Statement of Mr. Toombs (GA)) (articulating that the President has
no power to make war and some Congressmen “may believe it unnecessary to carry
vast bodies of troops over the Rocky Mountains, in order to murder those people who
are called Mormons”); id. at 407-08 (Statement of Jefferson Davis) (denying the sole
reason for troop request was Mormon War, agreeing no War exists, and saying
President was not levying War upon the Mormons); id. at 412-13 (Statement of Mr.
Seward) (asserting that Congress is not taking threat in Utah seriously enough; “Utah
stands out entirely distinct from the whole line of our past experience;” Mormons
unlike others who have settled territories who are “men trained up under our own
Constitution . . . accustomed to the principles and habits of the American republican
society . . . educated to govern themselves, and maintain their rights and liberties; and
men also accustomed by habit to submit with loyalty to the Federal Government in
exercise of its proper jurisdiction over them . . . .”).
196. Hamilton Ward (NY) argued the alleged plight of women and noted that
Women’s Rights Activist, Anna Dickenson, visited Utah’s Mormon women. CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2144-45 (1870). Ironically, the Mormons gave women the
vote before the United States did, but Congressmen argued that the action was merely
an attempt to increase Mormon voting power and that the women were controlled by
their men and the Church. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. 31 (1873). Not
surprisingly, women’s groups argued that the vote should be kept secure for Utah’s
women. 2 CONG. REC. 522 (1874) (Memorial from New York Woman Suffrage
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polygamy. Even before Utah was formed, abolitionists had tied together
toleration of slavery and polygamy in foreign affiliated churches.197
Hearkening to this link, the Republican Party, in 1856, branded polygamy
and slavery, the “twin relics of barbarism.”198
Those whose primary concern was the supremacy of federal law began
to lose patience with Utah. They allowed morality objections and antiMormon animus to grow to full bloom. On February 23, 1857, Republican
J.S. Morrill made an extended speech in the House of Representatives
attacking the Mormon Church and polygamy as morally repugnant.199 It
did not help that after leaving the Mormon Church, one of Brigham
Young’s ex-wives wrote a book attacking Young and polygamy.200
The debates over “The Morrill Act” began in 1860. The Act was passed
in 1862.201 Although the Act applied to all U.S. territories, the target was
known widely to be Utah. The Act dismantled the Territorial legislature of
the state of Utah and revoked a certificate of incorporation that the
territorial legislature had issued to the Mormon Church. Congress seized
those lands.202 The Act stated that it was not intended to prevent anyone
from worshipping God according to conscience, but rather only to “annul
all acts and laws which establish, maintain, protect or countenance the
practice of polygamy, evasively called spiritual marriage, however

Society) (asking Congress not to take away Utah women’s vote).
197. See Polygamy, EMANCIPATOR, July 29, 1846, at col. D (discussing arguments to
justify polygamy similar to those to justify slavery and attacking American Board of
Foreign Missionaries for tolerating polygamy, slavery, and caste systems in churches
abroad); The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions—Polygamy,
LIBERATOR, Nov. 13, 1846, at col. E (criticizing the Board’s tolerant stance on
polygamy and slavery).
198. See Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Note, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon
Polygamy in the Congressional Imagination, 1862-1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 438
(2009).
199. J.S. Morrill, Address to the House of Representatives: Utah Territory and Its
Laws—Polygamy and Its License (Feb. 23, 1857), reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 34th
Cong., 3d Sess. App. 284, 284-90 (1857).
200. ANN ELIZA YOUNG, WIFE NO. 19, at 574 (1876), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=0ngFAAAAQAAJ. Young also testified before
Congress. See also Martha M. Ertman, The Story of Reynolds v. United States:
Federal “Hell Hounds” Punishing Mormon Treason, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 51, 51
(Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
201. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501; see also
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 9 (1890). For another history on the federal government’s approach to
polygamy see Hasday, supra note 47, at 1357-65; Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peays
Horses: The Federal Response to Polygamy, 1854-1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29
(2001).
202. The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862, § 1, 12 Stat. at 501 (“An act to punish
and prevent the Practice of Polygamy in the Territories of the United States and other
Places, and disapproving and annulling certain Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory of Utah”).
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disguised . . . .”203 The Act made polygamy a felony in all U.S. territories
and other places over which the U.S. has exclusive jurisdiction. Polygamy
was already prohibited in every other state and territory. The Act also
provided that bigamists convicted as felons could not vote.204
In 1872, Congressman Blair of Missouri unsuccessfully argued for a bill
to legalize all polygamous marriages in Utah and to cease all polygamy
prosecutions. He argued that such legalization was consistent with
“principles of republican government.”205
In 1873, Utah sought admission to the Union.206 Once again, polygamy
became a subject of discussion. Despite the 1862 Act banning it, and even
subsequent Acts, the Mormons, including Utah’s Congressional delegates,
had continued to practice it.207 Challengers to Utah’s admission charged
the Mormons with placing tolls on public roads, charging exorbitant fees to
travelers, and impeding travel.208 They claimed that Governor Young had
driven out of competition all “Gentile” railroad companies hoping to build
there.209
Utah’s delegate, W.H. Hooper, denied that Utah had impeded others’
rights and said any actions taken were consistent with local rights exercised
by other states and the freedoms exercised by other religions.210 He argued
that Mormons were the victims of bias and misrepresentations.211
In 1874, Congress passed the Poland Act.212 The Act drew back the
expansive jurisdiction that the Mormons had given to their Probate
Courts.213 It also provided rules for women seeking to divorce on the
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. § 2, 12 Stat. at 501.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1096-1100 (1872).
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 944 (1873).
See, e.g., 1 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 491-500 (1907) (discussing various
challenges over several years to seating Utah House delegates on the grounds, inter
alia, that they practiced polygamy in violation of U.S. laws). These challenges were
usually not successful unless other actions contrary to U.S. interests were also proven.
208. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 947 (1873).
209. Id. at 948.
210. Id. at 945-46; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 29-31
(1873) (rebutting various allegations).
211. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 945 (1873) (noting bias in
newspapers and comparing Mormon approaches to others that invoke no concern);
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. App. at 31 (1873) (calling attacks on Mormons
“slander” and noting that they evoke applause on the floor); id. at 29 (alleging that
those seeking to attack Mormons were forced to go back six to sixteen years and
“grope in the twilight of fable for causes of complaint”).
212. The Poland Act of 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat 253.
213. Id. § 3, 18 Stat. at 254 (defining probate court jurisdiction as not including civil
chancery or criminal jurisdiction); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3rd Sess. 946 (1873)
(noting expensive chancery and common law jurisdiction was given to probate courts).
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ground that they were in plural marriages. It appointed the U.S. Marshall
of the territory to attend all court sessions in the territory, the U.S. Attorney
to prosecute all actions, and afforded three juror challenges in criminal
trials: adultery, bigamy, and polygamy.214 The passage of the Poland Act
and its predecessors laid the groundwork for the successful conviction in
the Mountain Meadows case.
The early statutes banning polygamy prevented a married person from
marrying a subsequent time without divorce. But technically the language
of the statute still allowed multiple marriages if they occurred all at one
time. In 1882, Congress passed the Edmunds Act, amending the earlier
statute to close that loophole.215 It also reached back to legitimize the then
living children of polygamous marriages that with their mothers had been
rudely tossed out of inheritance and support lines. The local laws of the
Utah territorial legislature had protected the children of polygamous
marriages, but that body was now disassembled.
In 1887, the Edmunds-Tucker Act allowed a willing wife to waive the
marital testimonial privilege in bigamy cases to testify against her husband,
except as to marital confidences.216 This privilege alteration was contrary
to the common law, which allowed a spouse to prevent even a willing
spouse from testifying against him.217 It also defined adultery as applicable
to both married women and married men, banned sexual relationships with
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity, punished fornication,
and required marriage licenses. 218
Court challenges to restrictions on the Mormons would fall on deaf ears.
In rejecting the claims, federal courts not only relied upon Supremacy, but
also adopted the moralistic view of Mormonism and the “twin relics of
barbarism” mantra.219
Utah was ultimately admitted to the union as a state in 1896. As a
condition, it was required to ban the recognition of polygamy “forever” in
its state constitution. Even today, the prohibition can only be changed by
the consent of the United States.220 After Congress suppressed the
214. Id. §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. at 253.
215. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30.
216. The Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887, ch. 397, § 2, 24 Stat. 635, 635.
217. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). Trammel subsequently
reversed the common law rule in federal courts allowing a willing spouse to testify
except as to communications covered by the marital communications privilege. By that
time, many other states had already abandoned the common law rule. Id. at 48.
218. The Edmunds Anti-Polygamy Act of 1882 § 2, 22 Stat. at 30; The EdmundsTucker Act of 1887 § 4, 24 Stat. at 636.
219. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (equating polygamy
with barbarism); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890) (to the same effect).
220. UTAH CONST. art. III.

CARTER 5/17/2013

2013]

8/10/2013 2:38:40 PM

THE FEDERAL LAW OF MARRIAGE

749

Mormons, outlawed polygamy, and disbanded the territorial legislature, the
federal government resumed the approach of looking to the local law of the
Utah Territory, to the extent not inconsistent with U.S. law.221
In banning polygamy, Congress rejected a category of marriages
recognized under local law, a category that it had in fact previously
expressly embraced when it accepted that polygamous marriages could be
the basis of land claims and implicitly embraced when it did not act to
eliminate polygamy for more than a decade.
Utah polygamy cases involved federal territory and plenary power. But
plenary power was not the reason the federal government invaded
traditional provinces of local law there. Instead, the reasons were
perceived federal interests that made some believe that polygamy was
incompatible with the American system.
2. Immigration Based Rejections
Congress has plenary power to prescribe the rules for immigration.222
Numerous marital benefits are attached to immigration.223 While the
rejection of immigration benefits might be seen as the denial of an incident
of marriage, because the rejection essentially means that the individual
cannot remain in the country, the rejection of marriages benefits based on
immigration rules is essentially a rejection of the marriage’s validity
overall.
i. Declining to Recognize Polygamous Marriages in Immigration
Congress refused to allow immigration benefits to flow from
polygamous marriages though such marriages were sanctioned in other
countries where the marriages took place.224 The immigration ban differs
from the Utah situation because it lacks the context of an immediate threat
to federal authority or anti-Mormon animus. But there was a different kind
of animus present. Polygamy was often cited as one reason to bar the
Chinese as a class from immigrating to the U.S., whether or not they
individually practiced it.225
221. Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1891) (finding that the Utah territorial
law allowing child of polygamous marriage to inherit should be followed). In 1890,
the Court held that despite a polygamous marriage, the marital privilege banned a wife
from testifying against her husband in a state polygamy prosecution.
222. Congress has the power to adopt uniform laws on naturalization. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012)
(noting federal government’s broad power over immigration).
223. Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in
U.S. Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382, 382-83 (2009); see, e.g., Kerry
Abrams, Immigration and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007).
224. Smearman, supra note 223, at 382-83.
225. An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, 22 U.S. Stat
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Still, the ban on polygamy was not a new ban. Bigamy had long been
banned under the common law and repudiated in the states.226 In
recognizing the marriages of ex slaves, Congress and the states insisted that
if they had multiple spouses either due to separation by sales or otherwise,
they had to choose which spouse they desired.227 Arguably, in the
polygamy cases involving immigrants, the moral objection to polygamy
was often an excuse for racism, but racism was not the sole reason for the
objection to polygamy.
ii. Rejecting “Fraudulent” Marriages in Immigration
The federal government has refused to acknowledge marriages entered
into solely for the purpose of gaining access to the United States.228 On the
other hand, in a variety of contexts, some states have refused to annul
“sham marriages,” on the theory that to ignore the marriage vows that
individuals enter would do violence to the essence of what it means to be
“married.”229
Congress’ power to prosecute marriages undertaken solely to gain

58 (May 6, 1882) (limiting the number of Chinese citizens coming into the country).
The Act stated that the “the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the
good order of certain localities.” The order authorized the suspension of Chinese
immigration for ten years. See also Ertman, supra note 137, at 306; Ming-sung Kuo,
The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building: Two Strains of Chinese Immigration Cases
Revisited, 67 ALB. L. REV. 27, 28 (2003); Smearman, supra note 223, at 391-95.
226. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *56.
227. See supra note 136-37 and accompanying text.
228. See Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1184, 1186a (1994)); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-906, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
Marriage fraud has been prosecuted, inter alia, under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (prohibiting
marriage fraud) and 18 U.S.C. §1546(a) (outlawing fraud and misuse of visas and other
permanent documents). An “individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the
purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws” faces a penalty of five years
imprisonment and/or a $250,000 fine. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (2006).
229. Hanson v. Hanson, 191 N.E. 673, 674 (Mass. 1934); see also Schibi v. Schibi,
69 A.2d 831, 834 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only to give
a name to a prospective child); De Vries v. De Vries, 195 Ill. App. 4 (Ill. App. Ct.
1915) (denying annulment where parties entered into marriage to prevent nullification
of husband’s employment contract); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998, 998 (Sup.
Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944) (holding
similarly to Schibi); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942)
(denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to protect the girl’s name and there
was an understanding that the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v.
Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159, 164 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1942); Campbell v. Moore, 1 S.E.2d
784, 790 (S.C. 1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the
purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL
1129721, at * 2 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married
husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband
knew that was the purpose of the marriage). See generally Kerry Abrams, Marriage
Fraud, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (2012) (discussing when misrepresentations between
parties would lead to annulment).
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immigration benefits was recognized in Lutwak v. United States. Congress
had passed the War Brides Act in 1945 in order to allow service members
who had married alien brides to bring their spouses to the U.S. with
them.230 Several persons were prosecuted for entering into marriages solely
to obtain, or helping others to obtain, the benefit of immigration. At the
time of the decision there was no specific federal statute barring marriage
fraud. All plaintiffs had satisfied the technical requirements of the state
laws for marriage. Still, the federal government balked at providing
immigration benefits based upon these marriages. The Supreme Court
agreed, stating that to hold otherwise would undercut the statutory purposes
behind the War Brides Act:
Congress intended to make it possible for veterans who had married
aliens to have their families join them in this country without the long
delay involved in qualifying under the proper immigration quota.
Congress did not intend to provide aliens with an easy means of
circumventing the quota system by fake marriages in which neither of
the parties ever intended to enter into the marital relationship[.]231

The Lutwak Court asserted that in making its determination, Congress
could rely upon a “common understanding” of the term “marriage.”232 For
the Court, under federal law, this meant “the two parties have undertaken to
establish a life together and assume certain duties and obligations.”233
The Supreme Court rejected the view that it or Congress was infringing
upon state authority. The Court expressly acknowledged “the general
American rule of conflict of laws that a marriage valid where celebrated is
valid everywhere unless it is incestuous, polygamous, or otherwise declared
void by statute.”234 However, it declared that denying immigration benefits
did not in fact involve the validity of a marriage, but rather involved
vindication of the laws of the United States.
We do not believe that the validity of the marriages is material. No one
is being prosecuted for an offense against the marital relation. We
consider the marriage ceremonies only as a part of the conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit offenses against the United
States. In the circumstances of this case, the ceremonies were only a
step in the fraudulent scheme and actions taken by the parties to the
conspiracy.235

230. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1953).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. Under current regulations, parties may prove a valid marriage under federal
law by providing proof of integrated finances, shared domicile, intimacy and publicly
holding oneself out to others as married. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5) (2009).
234. Id.
235. Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 611; see also United States v. Yum, 776 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.
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The Lutwak case is consistent with the conflict of laws notion that a
forum has greater flexibility when the question is affording the “incidents”
of a marriage. However, the practical effect of Congress’ decision not to
recognize a marriage in immigration is to completely bar the marriage from
recognition within the United States. The Court did not cite plenary power
as the basis for its rejection of the marriage. Instead, it relied upon the need
to vindicate the policies of a federal statute.
It is worth noting, however, that these cases likely pose very few
problems by way of federalism concerns. While states might refuse to
annul such marriages based on local policy,236 they are not likely unhappy
when the federal government determines that those who did not take the
vows of marriage seriously should not be allowed into the country as
“married” persons.
C. Deviating From the Incidents of Local Marriage Policy, Though Still
Recognizing the Marriage as Valid Overall
In the overwhelming number of cases, Congress’ deviation from local
marriage law is not complete. That is, Congress recognizes the marriage,
but overlooks some incidents of state law with respect to the marriage. I
would argue that these examples are but differences in degree from broader
deviations, tailored to meet the perceived federal interest at stake.
1. The Oregon Donation Law’s Provision for Separate Property Rights for
Married Women in Oregon Territory
A historical example of this narrower approach is found in Oregon
Donation law.237 Congress and the states regularly used a system of free or
very cheap land grants to encourage white settlers to move beyond the
original colonies and ultimately from sea to shining sea. It was common to
limit those who could take such grants to white males.238 Typically, the
1985); Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174 (9th Cir. 1966); Chin Bick Wah v. United
States, 245 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1957). But see United States v. Lozano, 511 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963). Cf. United States v.
Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972). Nor does it matter that the subversion of federal
purposes was unintentional in DOMA cases. Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)
For income tax purposes, the government would not recognize the couple’s contract to
recharacterize community property as joint property even though it was not done many
years prior because the husband was ill and in the event of death, the couple wanted
property to pass outside of probate.
236. See discussion supra p. 751; supra note 229.
237. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496 (Oregon land); see infra
note 344.
238. Regardless of parentage, those considered black were expressly excluded from
the Oregon land grants discussed herein, as were American Indians unless they had
white fathers. Oregon passed its own married women’s property act in 1866. See
BLUE
BOOK,
Oregon
History:
Minorities,
OR.
http://bluebook.state.or.us/cultural/history/history18.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
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grants also provided that if the applicant were married, he would receive an
extra portion to support his family. The “Oregon Donation Law” was
unique because it provided that a wife would receive that extra portion as
her own separate legal share, subject, of course, to her husband's control.239
The reason for deviating from the common law seems obvious. Congress
wanted to attract female mates for the men who would settle there (or
encourage existing wives to take the trip), thus encouraging procreation and
populating the land with white settlers.240
In Maynard v. Hill,241 the Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether a husband could apply as a married man for a double portion,
obtain a divorce from the local legislature in his wife's absence, remarry,
and then perfect title through a new bride, thus depriving the first wife of
her share under the statute. David Maynard did just that. Promising his
wife he would later send for their family, he left Ohio for California but
ended up in Oregon where he met a new love and high-powered friends.
He used his influence to obtain a decree of divorce from the territorial
legislature and then married his new girlfriend. His wife was not entitled to
be served with notice because, under the common law, a wife's domicile
was wherever her husband's was, but Lydia Maynard found out somehow
and sued. The Court followed Oregon Law to a point, accepting that David
Maynard was “divorced” for purposes of federal law. But that's where the
deference ended. Although he was also "married" under local law, the
Court declined to consider him “married” within the meaning of the federal
statute. For purposes of federal law, the Maynard was treated as a single,
divorced man. By the time of the Court's decision, Maynard and his first
wife had died. His new wife secured his portion; his children by his first
wife, then adults, got nothing. The short shrift given to Maynard's first
wife and her descendants establishes that the goal of the Oregon Donation
statute's spousal provisions was increasing the population of Oregon
through white families, not recognizing women’s rights or protecting all
children.242

See also note 344.
239. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, 9 Stat. 496.
240. Id.
241. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
242. See Fields v. Squires, 9 F. Cas. 29, 33 (C.C. Or. 1868) (No. 4,776) (“The
evident policy of the law was to give to husband and wife an equal quantity of
land . . . . The settlement of a married man is intended for the benefit of his wife as
well as himself—to enable her to obtain her equal share of the bounty of the grantor.”).
For an article considering the logic of this provision, see Steven H. Hobbs, Love on the
Oregon Trail: What the Story of Maynard v. Hill Teaches Us About Marriage and
Democratic Self-Governance, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 117 (2003) (providing more of
the backstory for Maynard v. Hill and surmising that population growth was the intent
of the statute).
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2. Adoption of a Unique Marital Property Characterization for Fair
Income Tax Treatment of Community Property and Separate Property
States
Another example of deviation as to incidents appears in Congress’
efforts to settle differences in income tax treatment between citizens in
community property states compared with those in separate property
states.243 Before 1947, taxpayer couples in community property states with
only one spouse working outside of the home had a financial advantage
over married couples in separate property states. Couples in the
community property states were able to split the income between the
paycheck and stay-at-home spouses in filing their taxes. Consequently,
under a progressive tax system, the community property state couple ended
up in a lower tax bracket than a similarly situated couple in a separate
property state. The latter was forced to attribute all income to only the
spouse who received a paycheck. This result occurred because federal law
followed state law on the definition of marital property. The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in Poe v. Seaborn that community property couples could seize
their advantage in the absence of contrary federal law.244
This issue was more complex than merely “good” community property
states that respected women versus “bad” separate property states that
didn’t. Despite celebrating the “fairness” and wisdom of their system to
women,245 most community property states had divested the wife of a key
aspect of ownership by placing control of the community property with the
husband. And while claiming that the community property system was a
sham to avoid taxes, men in separate property states were using the Married
Women’s Property Acts to shift property to their spouses, thus claiming
lower taxes on the theory that the property or income earned from that
property was not and never was theirs.246 Whatever rule Congress came up
243. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. at 786 (grant of petition for writ of
certiorari) (In creating the marital deduction, Congress assumed a couple made up of a
man and a woman.); Brief On The Merits Of Amici Curiae United States Senators
Orrin G. Hatch, et al, at 14-15.
244. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930).
245. See Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 37 (1934) (statement of Sen. Henry
F. Ashurst) (praising his state of Arizona’s system as “chivalry” and “gentlemanly”).
246. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110 (dismissing the idea
that control undercut community property rule); Community Property Income:
Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd
Cong. 61, 64 (1934) (statement of Helen Carloss, Department of Justice); Community
Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 73rd Cong., 184-92 (1934) (statement of Sen. Tom Connally); see
also Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of the
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 38-40 (1934) (statement of Benjamin H.
Bartholow, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter Bartholow
Statement] (noting that in some states, a husband could alienate property without the

CARTER 5/17/2013

2013]

8/10/2013 2:38:40 PM

THE FEDERAL LAW OF MARRIAGE

755

with, states were adjusting their laws to try to ensure that their citizens
received at least as much advantage as citizens in other states.247
Around 1934, Rep. Allen Treadway of Massachusetts, a separate
property state, proposed a bill to attribute the income to the spouse who
controlled it under state law. The 1934 congressional hearings on the
subject turned into a debate about the federal government’s power to affect
marriage laws.248 The Chief of Staff to the Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation noted that among lawyers everywhere there was a “great
deal of controversy” over the question of whether the federal government
could ignore state definitions and tax community property income.249
The concern that federal officials expressed was the need for uniform
treatment among similarly situated groups. General Counsel for the IRS,
E. Barrett Prettyman, wrote a letter underscoring the role that marriage
laws played in this outcome. Looking to who controlled the property was
fair, he said, because the local laws “make it possible for the taxpayer to
surrender title to another and to keep dominion for himself, or if not
technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment.”250 Of course,
Prettyman’s view depended upon a rejection of the “marital partnership”
theory of the community property system. Treasury’s Bartholow stated,
“[a]s time went on, it was felt that the right of husband and wife in these
community-property states to divide, the income which, in the usual case,
is earned by the husband as the breadwinner, ran counter to the principle of
imposing graduated rates on large incomes.”251
Eventually, Congress decided that it was impractical to force what was
in effect a common law rule upon community property states, but it did not
adopt a partnership theory of marriage nor did it continue to allow each
state to go its own way. Instead, to accomplish the goal of uniform
treatment, Congress adopted language that allowed any couple the option
of income splitting, essentially affording to all the choice of treating
property as community property for income taxation purposes.252 This new
wife’s consent although he had to use the income for her benefit).
247. See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahan, To Save State Residents: States’
Use of Community Property for Federal Tax Reduction, 1939-1947, 27 LAW & HIST.
REV. 585 (2009).
248. See generally Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. (1934).
249. Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 10-11 (1934) (statement of Lovell H.
Parker, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation).
250. Community Property Income: Hearings on H.R. 8396 Before a Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73rd Cong. 24 (1934) (letter from E. Barrett
Prettyman, General Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue).
251. Bartholow Statement, supra note 246, at 31.
252. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 303, 62 Stat. 110, 111-14 (1948).
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rule deviated from the past practice of looking to state law.
There are numerous other examples of partial deviation involving marital
property rules. In 1979, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court
held that benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 were not
subject to community property rules.253 In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, the Court
determined that Congress had preempted state community property rules to
define retirement rights under ERISA.254
D. The Unique Case of American Indian Tribal Marriages
The final case of federal intervention into local marriage laws that this
article considers is the federal handling of American Indian tribal
marriages. The relationship between the Indians and the federal
government was and is far different than the relationship between the
federal government and its states or territories. First, Indians were not
parties to the Constitutional compact; instead they were objects of it for the
Constitution gave Congress plenary power over matters concerning Indian
tribes.255 Second, in earlier history, tribal members were not deemed
American citizens.256 Third, Indian sovereignty, though asserted, was not
consistently respected. As early as 1830 the Supreme Court rejected the
Indians’ claims that they should be treated like “foreign nations” vis a vis
the states. 257 Instead, the Court said they were “in a state of pupilage,” and
“their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian.”258 And, while Congress’ oversight of U.S. territories often
involved fitting these territories to become states, Congress’ early
intentions were far less clear with respect to how the American Indian
peoples' would fit into the populace. Congress eventually allowed
individual citizenship but only after the Indians had been forced to cede a

253. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979).
254. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151-52 (2001); see also Boggs v. Boggs,
520 U.S. 833, 853 (1997) (stating that preemption of state law is required to avoid
diversion of retirement benefits).
255. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (the “Commerce
Clause”).
256. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, Pub. L. No. 175 codified as amended as 8
USC § 1401(b) (1982) (authorizing Indians to become citizens). Some Indians became
citizens pursuant to other laws. For example, the Act of 1890, which applied Arkansas
to Indian Territory, allowed tribal members to apply to become American citizens but
retain their Indian citizenship. See Act of May 9, 1890, (Oklahoma Organic Act), ch.
182, §§ 1, 29, 26 Stat. 81, 93 (1890).
257. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,17-18 (1831). Indians could not
sue in federal court under diversity statute because they were neither citizens of the
United States nor foreign states despite their claims of the latter.
258. Id. For a thorough discussion of federal treatment of their status see Judith
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 671 (1989).
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great deal of their lands and culture.259
Still, despite the fact that the Indians were not treated as full sovereigns,
courts did see the Indians as distinct political communities entitled to local
governance under traditional conflict of law rules.260 Congress generally
treated tribal marriage as a local issue, unless a federal interest compelled a
contrary result.261
States also sometimes had occasion to interpret tribal marriage issues.
They too applied conflict of law principles to their decisions.262 Polygamy
was one notable exception.263 However, sometimes even in polygamous
259. The government made numerous attempts to force assimilation of the Indian
tribes into American western culture. These efforts, which were primarily a response
to desires of white settlers for more lands then occupied by Indians, tended to have
disastrous consequences. See e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706-09 (1987)
(discussing disastrous federal policies intended to force American Indians to adopt
farming and private land ownership approaches of whites in order to speed assimilation
and to free land for white use). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
officials also encouraged Indians to send their children away from reservations and to
educate them in government sponsored boarding schools that stressed white and
Eurocentric culture. See The Broken Crucible of Assimilation: Forest Grove Indian
School and the Origins of Off-Reservation Boarding-School Education in the West, 101
OREGON HIST. QUARTERLY, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), pp. 466-507. It is clear,
however, that early on Indians valued their sovereignty and did not want either
citizenship or assimilation. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.
260. Worscester v. Georgia, 31 U.S 515 (1832) (entitling Indians to local
governance authority as in Law of Nations); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18.
261. A 1909 Governmental report explained federal approaches tried to summarize
federal approaches to Indian marriage law between 1867-1906. It describes the
approach as treating Indian statutes like the marriage statutes of states, if that custom
could be proved by congressional standards and was not in conflict with federal law or
policy. If local custom could not be proved to satisfaction, then the court followed the
common law. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Special
Report, Marriage and Divorce 1867-1906, Summary Laws, Foreign Statistics (1909).
262. E.g., Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48, 1845 (1845) (showing that customary
marriage contracted among tribe in own territory should have been considered valid
under Alabama law); Weatherford v. Weatherford, 20 Ala. 548 (1852) (declining to
recognize marriage where no proof conducted according to custom); Compo v. Jackson
Iron Co., 50 Mich. 578 (1883) (stating at the time in question in lawsuit, Indian tribes
were sovereigns and absent US law to the contrary, “they have as complete power to
determine their own domestic relations as any other organized community would
have”); Buck v. Branson, 34 Okla. 807 (1912) (recognizing a long tradition of states
abiding by Indian marriage laws both between the Indians and in cases of
intermarriage); McBean v. McBean, 37 Ore. 195 (1900) (declaring that a marriage
valid in the place contracted is valid everywhere). There was also the view that the
matter was a federal, not state matter; e.g., Boyer v. Diveley, 58 Mo. 510 (1875)
(noting that an Indian marriage and inheritance subject to federal not state jurisdiction).
263. Regarding public policy see Boyer v. Diveley, 58 Mo. 510 (1875) (referencing
marriages as between “opposite sex” although that issue not specifically raised).
Despite the rule of local deference, “when an alleged marriage does not contain the
essential elements of a marriage as known to our laws, it ought not to be enforced as it
is “no marriage.” Wall, 8 Ala. at 48 (excepting incestuous or polygamous marriages
despite the rule of comity); Tower v. Towie, 368 P.2d 488 (Okla. 1961) (recognizing
marriage according to Cherokee custom, and noting strong policy in favor of
presuming legitimacy from the cohabitation); Henson v. Johnson, 246 P. 868 (Okla.
1926) (recognizing Arkansas law applicable by Act of Congress and that the same
would look to Indian law but refusing to recognize polygamous marriage as contrary to
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marriages, courts would find a way to accept the marriage if the context
involved the inheritance of or legitimacy of an Indian child.264
The federal treatment of Indian marriage (and even the Indians' own
treatment of intermarriage with whites) also became intricately tied up with
white settlers’ quest for land and Indian attempts to preserve their unique
culture. Marriage to an Indian woman often conferred tribal membership
and property rights upon a white husband.265 To prevent the hemorrhaging
of land and culture and to discourage temporary marriages to Indian
women merely for the sake of obtaining land, the Indians themselves began
to seek limits on marriages between white men and Indian women. Some
of these restrictions came in the form of limitations on tribal rights flowing
from female marriage to one outside of the tribe.266 In 1897, the federal
government reversed this trend by declaring that Indian women who
married “white” men would have the same rights to property as any other
member of the tribe.267 They did not consistently offer the same rights to
Indian women who married black men.268
In 1890, as part of the Oklahoma Organic Act, an act to establish a
temporary American government for what was to become the state of
Oklahoma, Congress specifically declared that all marriages then existing
pursuant to Indian custom were valid.269 It recognized as legitimate the
federal law and denying attendant inheritance rights); see also, James v. Adams, 155 P.
1121, 1122 (Okla 1915); Cyr v. Walker, 116 P. 931, 934 (Okla. 1911).
264. Earl v. Godley, 44 N.W. 254 (Minn. 1890) (focusing on Indians separate and
capable of managing own domestic relations and children are not illegitimate); Ortley
v. Ross, 110 N.W. 982 (Neb. 1907) (declaring that children of polygamous marriage
treated as legitimate); Kobogum v. The Jackson Iron Company, 43 N.W. 602 (Mich.
1889) (noting that absent federal law, Indian laws control their domestic relations).
265. Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 23 Stat. 392 and June 7, 1897, reprinted in 1 INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 38 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1902) (referencing tribal and
land rights gained through marriage).
266. See Compiled Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Article XV, §70 in 1 JOHN L.
ADAIR, COMPILED LAWS OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 246, 276 (1881) (noting the
importance of tribal cohesion and requiring a white man desiring to marry a Cherokee
bride to pay a fee, show evidence that he was not previously married, and be supported
by a group of other Cherokees); see also Act of Aug. 9, 1888, 23 Stat. 392 and June 7,
1897, reprinted in 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 38 (Charles J. Kappler ed.,
1902) (discussing a white man who married an American Indian woman outside of
“five civilized tribes” and who did not gain property rights of tribal members or rights
to her land; an American Indian woman who properly married a white man gained U.S.
citizenship and also the status of a married woman, but reserved her title in tribal
property).
267. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 90l; see also FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4 (1942) (discussing the Act and effects upon children of mixed
marriages with whites or blacks).
268. COHEN at 4 (noting mixed precedents on effect of Indian woman marrying
black man).
269. Act of May 9, 1890, (Oklahoma Organic Act), ch. 182, §§ 1, 29, 26 Stat. 81, 93
(1890); see also Sperry Oil & Gas v. Chisolm, 264 U.S. 488 (1924) (discussing the
Oklahoma Organic Act which made Oklahoma territory); Bartlett v. Okla. Oil Co., 218
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children of prior marriages, however constituted, thus securing inheritance
and other rights for them under U.S. law. But at the same time, Congress,
for the future, adopted the state substantive law of Arkansas as the law for
“Indian Territory, insofar as those laws did not conflict with Congressional
intent.” The Act exempted that portion of land actually occupied by the
“Five Civilized Tribes” and certain others of the Indians.270 The Indians
retained power to punish Indians for violations of Indian laws. The laws
also required that U.S. citizens desiring to marry an Indian woman had to
attend to the customary preliminaries of such marriages as prescribed by
the relevant tribe.271 The Act purported not to change Indian rights;
however, some argued that it did alter existing treaties but that the tribes
had little power to prevent it.272 In the Curtis Act of 1898, Congress
determined that state law should govern Indians with respect to all matters,
including marriage.273 But sometimes, courts held these statutes to not
apply when the cases only involved Indians.274
In a modern era, the United States has given greater respect to the
Indians’ right to determine their own domestic relations.275 That deference
F. 380 (1914).
270. Oklahoma Organic Act, supra, note 269. “Five Civilized Tribes” was the name
whites used for Indians who joined in early treaties with Americans. See Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 282 (2001) (Souter, J. Concurring) (noting the Treaty with the
Cherokees, (1835), U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478. Treaty with the Choctaws and
Chickasaws, Art. 7, 11 Stat. 612 (1855), and Treaty with the Creeks and Seminoles,
Art. 15, 11 Stat. 703 (1856)). Under these treaties the Indians often ceded land and
local governance rights for peace; see, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 9, 1835,
U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478.
271. Act of May 2, 1890, § 38, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81, 98; see, e.g, Johnson v. Slate, 60
Ark. 308 (1895). Prior to 1890, Indian law applied. For a general discussion of
treatment of Indian marriage laws see DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORT, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 1867-1906,
SUMMARY LAWS, FOREIGN STATISTICS, 215-17 (1909) [hereinafter COMMERCE
MARRIAGE REPORT] (discussing application of Arkansas law to Indian territory); 1-4
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, §4.01 (Inherent Indian Sovereignty).
272. 21 CONG. REC. 3712, 3715 (1889) (statement by Mr. Butler) (arguing
Oklahoma Organic bill breaches treaty, referencing mild letter from Cherokee
delegation that asked for only two changes though it also noted surprise that offer is not
worse and saying that the Indians are in the position of “powerless and helpless” people
and “are simply constrained from force of circumstances to accept this as a choice of
evils”).
273. Act of June 28, 1898; see also Marlin v. Lawallen, 276 U.S. 58 (1928).
274. See COMMERCE MARRIAGE REPORT, supra note 271, at 215-17 (discussing
federal control of Indian Territory, acknowledgement of customs
and application of
state law); see also Barnett v. Prarie Oil & Gas, 19 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1927) recognizing
applicability of Oklahoma law but applying “exclusive and mandatory” local ordinance
of Creek Indians as well to determine inheritance).
275. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“Indian tribes retain
their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations
among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (“Although no longer possessed of the
full attributes of sovereignty, they remain a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations and laws restricting rights of children born
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is now being tested for shortly before it issued the Windsor opinion, the
Supreme Court issued a narrow interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare
Act.276
While Congress had plenary power over the Indians, when Congress
deviated the reason was not the plenary power itself. The reason was a
determination that respecting Indian local rule conflicted with a perceived
federal interest. Very often that federal interest was the desire for land and
expansion. Deference to local custom with respect to Indian customary
marriages was also made easier by the fact that there was no fear that
recognition of Indian local customs would lead to alteration of state or
federal marriage customs.
As with the history of other minority groups that have faced broad scale
racial or cultural discrimination, an analysis of marriage that focuses solely
on the narrow lens of “marriage rights,” sells American Indian history far
short, dismissing racial and cultural discrimination as unrelated to
marriage. Actions that weakened the community as a whole—such as
forcibly removing Indians from lands they occupied and or requiring that
they adhere to majority cultural norms including marriage norms—likely
posed as much or even more difficulties for the security of Indian
marriages, families, and communities, than rules determining whether or
not a particular marriage was valid or not.277 Such actions magnify the
impact of unfair marriage rules and restrict the ability of a targeted
minority community to resist, modify or adjust to them. It also must not be
forgotten that those we call in retrospect the “Indians” were in fact many
tribes with distinctive domestic relations traditions and cultures.
IV. SUMMARIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO
to female tribal member when the mothers marry outside the tribe are valid.”); US v.
Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that marriage is consistent with
Navajo customs and therefore marital privilege shields a wife from testifying in a child
abuse case against the husband even though exception might apply in non-Indian case).
But see Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Evolving Indigenous Law: Navajo MarriageCultural Traditions and Modern Challenges, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 283, 292
(2000) (criticizing the government approaches to cultural norms in particular
polygamy).
276. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 12-399 (U.S. June 25, 2013) (holding that the
Act did not apply to bar a white couple’s adoption of a part Cherokee child when the
Cherokee father had declined to support the child, had not exercised parental rights
before adoption, and had never had custody of the child). In this case, the baby’s
mother requested that the father waive his parental rights to avoid child support but did
not inform the father of plans to put the child up for adoption to any willing couple.
Only the child’s father is a member of the Cherokee Nation.
277. See, e.g., The Indian Removal Act of 1830, 4 Stat 411 (1830) (authorizing
removal of Indians from lands in the Southeastern United States into Western US
territories). See generally John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Values In Transition: The Chiricahua
Apache From 1886-1914, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 39, 46-82 (2010) (discussing the
Removal Act and other actions that drove Indians off of lands).
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MARRIAGE
A. Deference to Local Rule as the General Approach
The federal government has historically looked to local laws to
determine the validity of a marriage (not merely to state laws). It has done
so even when acting pursuant to its enumerated Constitutional powers and
even when its power was plenary. Of course, deference in the case of
states does involve unique questions of federalism, but federalism is not the
sole reason for deference. It should be noted that deference also might
have resulted from a kind of "practical federalism," that is a concession that
given the circumstances and despite federal authority, it is simply easier to
follow state law. That law is already well developed; those who it would
affect are familiar with it; adopting state law may encourage the states to
buy what the federal government is peddling that week; and often there is
simply no conflict with federal interests even if deference results in
variation in application of local laws among the several states. The same
practicalities can restrict federal action even when there is a need for it.
Such was the case, I would argue, in the early termination of the
Freedman's Bureau work and the failed promises of Reconstruction.
When acting pursuant to its enumerated powers, the federal government
has deviated from local deference when deference would conflict with an
important federal policy. In some cases, it has rejected the validity of the
marriage completely for all purposes, such as Utah polygamy laws and
immigration law barring entry of immigrant "spouses" engaged in
fraudulent marriages. These two instances involved assertions of plenary
power, although the matter of power over the local actions of territories
was then debated.
Congress has also accepted marriages completely for all purposes,
contrary to state law. The ex-slave marriages conducted under the
oversight of the Freedmen’s Bureau and U.S. military are examples.278
That case involved War Powers and, at the appropriate times, the authority
of amendments to the Constitution with respect to the ex-slaves.
When federal interests so dictated, Congress has also granted a narrow
set of incidental rights to marriages even when the state deemed those
marriages invalid. The recognition of “slave custom” marriages solely for
pension purposes when rebel states would not recognize them is such a
case. In that situation, the federal interest was recruiting for the U.S.
military in the context of the Civil War.279
278. See discussion supra pp. 751-53.
279. This construction does not negate the possibility that some Congressmen voted
for the policy because they wanted to end slavery.
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Finally, Congress has also adopted different incidents for marriage than
state or local law would normally suggest, while still recognizing the
marriages’ validity. Such was the case with Oregon Donation law and the
settlement of conflict over the income taxation of marital property.280
It appears that Congress has deviated only to the extent necessary to
vindicate the perceived federal interest. History thus advises caution in
federal determinations relating to marriage and family. It also suggests that
the central question that Courts should consider in reviewing federal
deviations from state law is whether a legitimate federal purpose is served
by the deviation, a question that presumes an appropriate federal power.
B. Three Historical Justifications for Deviation
I would argue that we can classify the justifications for deviation that
emerge from history into three categories. In some cases, more than one
has applied to a given case.
1. Fulfilling a Constitutional Duty
Deviation has occurred when the federal government claimed that
following local law would conflict with a perceived constitutional duty.
Here we can place both instances of recognizing slave marriages, to the
extent that they vindicated a “duty” to save the union or were an execution
of the promises of the Civil War amendments.281 We can also place here
the attack on polygamy in Utah, but only to the extent that it was triggered
by Supremacy Clause concerns or Congress’ constitutional obligations to
prepare the territories for statehood. A third example is the rejection of
state marital property rules for income taxation, to the extent that Congress
felt the deviation fulfilled a constitutional duty to treat the states uniformly
as part of its charge to protect the general welfare. It is doubtful that
DOMA is needed to fulfill a constitutional duty.
2. Preserving a Purpose or Scheme in Existing Statutes, Rules, or Treaties
The second justification of deviation is that following local law would
undercut an existing statutory purpose or scheme, federal rule, or treaty.
Here we can place the decision to reject “fraudulent marriages” for
immigration purposes in vindication of the immigration statute.282 Here
one can place the deviation from local marital property rules in taxation, on
the theory that following local law would undercut the predetermined
progressive taxation scheme or run counter to the implicit statutory
280. See supra p. 753 (Oregon); supra p. 754 (taxes).
281. See discussion supra pp. 721-37.
282. See discussion supra pp. 750-51.
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assumption in then-existing income tax laws that only those who received a
paycheck earned the marital income.283 Here, too, belongs the Supreme
Court’s rejection of David Maynard's second marriage in Maynard v. Hill,
on the ground that Congress did not intend a husband to apply for land
while married to one wife, divorce and marry a second wife, and still claim,
as a "married" man, a double portion of territorial land.284 Those who
argue that DOMA supports procreation are essentially arguing that DOMA
was intended to preserve a purpose or scheme in existing statutes, rules, or
treaties. As I will explain later, there is some merit to the argument that
procreation is linked to federal statutes affecting marriage, although the
broadest DOMA went beyond that which is required to preserve that link.
3. Preserving a Federal Policy That is Neither Already Rooted in an
Existing Statute, Rule, or Treaty Nor Constitutionally Compelled
The third justification for deviation is that following local law would
jeopardize a federal policy that stands apart from any specific statute, rule,
or treaty and is not constitutionally compelled, but is argued to be
authorized and appropriate.285 This justification contains the potential for
the most mischief because the policies, by definition, have not been vetted
by public processes, as have Constitutional provisions or statutes. Specific
historical examples in this category include the attacks on polygamy, but
only to the extent that they were based upon an antipathy toward
Mormonism or polygamy. We can place here rejection of state community
property characterizations, if based upon conclusions that separate property
regimes are better for society or even that women, by gender, should not be
afforded equal ownership in marital property. In DOMA cases, Plaintiffs
would claim that the federal policy is anti-homosexual animus. Defendants
would argue that DOMA was designed to preserve the institution of
traditional marriage. Claims that question the appropriateness of same-sex
parenting also belong here.
C. The Role of the “Majority of States,” Uniformity and of the Common
Law
In times of interstate conflict that affected desired federal outcomes, the
federal government has tended to follow the approach of the majority of
states and/or the common law. At the start of the union, slaveholding states

283. See discussion supra pp. 754-57.
284. See discussion supra pp. 753-54.
285. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“[U]nless restricted by
some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil
government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social
life under its dominion.”).
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were in the majority, but by the time that the federal government
recognized slave marriages during the Civil War,286 slaveholding states
were in the minority.287 Courts have approved of the approach and have
taken it themselves.288 Thus, while the Supreme Court made history in
Loving v. Virginia by striking down such laws criminalizing the act of
interracial marriage, by the time it did so, as the Court specifically noted,
“only” sixteen of the fifty states continued to have such bans.289 At press
time, thirteen states and the District of Columbia license same-sex
marriages.290
286. See discussion supra p. 721-33.
287. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 230 (1860) (lamenting change in
union and noting slave states were seceding to “check” the “evil of overgrowth of the
free states.”). It is well known that until the decade prior to the Civil War, Congress
had taken pains through a number of compromises to keep the number of slave and free
states exactly equal as a measure to preserve the union. In 1852, slaveholding states
argued that the “general government” had abdicated its role as the “common agent.”
Confederate States of America – Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce
and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
288. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (with reference to claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding that the fact that all fifty States and the District of Columbia
have recognized some form of psychotherapist privilege is relevant to the
appropriateness of federal embrace of that privilege); id. (policy decisions of the states
bear on the question whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend
the coverage of an existing one); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 644 (1953)
(noting that Congress was entitled to rely upon the “common” definition of marriage in
rejecting fraudulent marriages intended to procure immigration benefits); Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (deciding whether to recognize a legislative divorce for
federal purposes, by looking at the common law and the approaches of several common
law states); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-65 (affirming Congressional rejection of
polygamy and noting that English common law and the laws of the several states found
polygamy “odious”). But see Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1, 30-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the notion of looking to the majority of states when the psychotherapistprivilege had no common law origins). In early DOMA cases, when it was defending
the statute rather than attacking it, the Justice Department made the argument that
DOMA followed the majority of states and was a fair and was a constitutionally
defensible approach until a national consensus developed. See Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389-90 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
See also, supra p. 105, note 8 (Justice Department abandonment of defense of DOMA.)
289. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (noting by contrast that in
1955, a majority of states had such restrictions); Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 753
(Va. 1955) (noting [m]ore than half of the States of the Union have miscegenation
statutes” and that “[w]ith only one exception they have been upheld in an unbroken line
of decisions in every State in which it has been charged that they violate the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
290. At press time, the licensing jurisdictions are California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington state, and the District of Columbia. See D.C.
CODE § 46-401 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit.19-A §§ 650-A, 650-B (2013), available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-Ach23.pdf; MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. L. § 2-201 (West Supp. 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West
2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 415 (Conn. 2008); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). The California story is complex and may not be over.
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This approach of looking to the majority and to the common law seems
consistent with the founders’ vision of federal power. Alexander Hamilton
suggested a federal government was needed in times of conflict among the
states, to be an “umpire or common judge to interpose between the
contending parties.”291 Madison defended constitutional emphasis on
federal sovereignty by noting that states act as “partisans of their respective
States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest . . . .”292 This
constitutional obligation to “umpire” for the whole seems to be found in the
obligation of Congress to “provide for the general welfare” and the
“common defense” of the United States,293 and in specific obligations to
create uniform laws.294 It seems inherent in the obligation to “regulate
commerce . . . among the several states.”295 It is indicated in the very
nature of a national or “general” government in a federalist system.
At the same time, the powers reserved to the states in the Tenth
Amendment are local powers; it clearly is not the case that a given state's
California recognized them for a time but then amended its Constitution by voter’s
referendum to define marriage as between one man and one woman with respect to
future couples. A California state court upheld the referendum as valid under the
state’s constitution. See Srauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (2009) (rejecting the
challenge solely under California constitution). Plaintiffs then filed in federal court
challenging the referendum change under the federal constitution. In the district court,
California’s governor and Attorney General at first defended the Constitutional change,
but later they reversed course and argued against it. Others intervened to defend the
referendum change. The district court hel the change unconstitutional. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and the case was
argued on March 26, 2013, the same day Windsor was heard. On June 26, 2013, the
same day that Windsor was decided, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction
to address the California question given that key authorities with responsibility to
defend the state’s Constution had refused to do so. Hollingsworth v. Perry, slip op. No.
12-144 (June 26, 2013).
See also 19-A § 650-A B (2013) available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19-Ach23.pdf; 19-A MAINE
REV. STAT., DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 19-A §650-A & B (2013); available at
mainelegislature.orghttp://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/19-a/title19Ach23.pdf; MD. D FAM. L. § 2-201 (2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney
2011); N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:1-a (2010); D.C. § 46-401 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 8 (2009). See also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 415 (Conn. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn.
2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). At
press time, Delaware, Rhode Island and Minnesota had recently approved of same-sex
marriages. Katharine Seelye, Rhode Island Joins States That Allow Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at 15; Delaware, Continuing a Trend, Becomes Eleventh
State to Allow Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2013, at 14; Minnesota Clears
Way for Same-sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at 12.
291. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
292. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
293. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also id. pmbl.
294. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”).
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
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authority to decide what marriage is within its boundaries must be subject
to a majority vote of the other states. By its breadth, the “first” of the three
DOMAs places tension on these two types of powers over marriage, the
power of the federal government to decide policies incidentally affecting
marriage for the good of the country and the power of the states (and the
people of a given state) to determine what marriage means at the local
level.
V. DOMA’S PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
UNDERLYING STATUTES
Despite the fact that same-sex marriage plaintiffs, including Windsor,
challenged DOMA on an “as applied” basis, courts have not considered the
underlying statutes at issue in each DOMA case.296 The notion that the
underlying statutes might be relevant to DOMA's analysis was first
referenced at oral argument in Windsor—after this writer circulated an
earlier draft of this article to counsel for the parties and certain amici.297
There are in fact three DOMAs. One DOMA bundles all marriage statutes

296. E.g., Edith Schlaine Windsor, Amended Complaint, Prayer for Relief, ¶1
(“Declare DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, Edith
Schlain Windsor.”); ¶85, p. 21 (supporting that DOMA “as applied by the IRS”
requires disparity of treatment of plaintiff and singles out her valid marriage); Gill
Complaint, ¶10, p. 5 (“It seeks a determination that DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7, as applied to
plaintiffs, violates the United States Constitution.”); Golinsky v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975-76, 980, 1002-03 (discussing “as applied to plaintiff”
circumstances and involving spousal health coverage).
297. The discussion is in the following colloquy:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But what gives the Federal Government the right to be
concerned at all at what the definition of marriage is?
MR. CLEMENT: Well, at least two—two responses to that, Justice Sotomayor. First is
that one interest that supports the Federal Government’s definition of this term is
whatever Federal interest justifies the underlying statute in which it appears. So, in
every one of these statutes that affected, by assumption, there’s some Article I Section
8 authority.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So they can create a class they don’t like—here,
homosexuals—or a class that they consider is suspect in the marriage category, and
they can create that class and decide benefits on that basis when they themselves have
no interest in the actual institution of marriage as married. The states control that.
MR. CLEMENT:—the Federal Government has sort of two sets of authorities that give
it sort of a legitimate interest to wade into this debate. Now, one is whatever authority
gives rise to the underlying statute.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 67-69, Windsor v. United States (No. 12-307) (U.S.
filed
March
27,
2012)
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307. See also supra note 10. In Massachusetts v. HHS, the state of Massachusetts
has made a general Spending Clause argument that DOMA is not germane to the
spending programs to which it applied.
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee
Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 56-59, Mass, 682 F.3d at 1 (explaining that
DOMA is not germane to spending and Congress has made no attempt to investigate
application to each federal statute).
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together making them impervious to same-sex couples. Another DOMA
collapses into the underlying statutes that it defines and thus must be
judged in the context of each statute. And a third DOMA is merely an
exercise of Congress' undisputed right to issue definitions for its own
statutes and, I would argue, affirm the status quo. Under this DOMA, that
status quo is the constitutional concern. I address the validity of these three
DOMAs in Part VII. In this Part, I look more closely at the second
incarnation of DOMA—the one that collapses into its underlying statutes—
to explain how the underlying statutes provide DOMA's authority if any
and state its purposes, if any. In particular, I show that some, though not all
of these underlying statutes do indeed provide evidence that procreation
support is a key part of federal marriage policy.
A. DOMA’s Underlying Statutes as Evidence of Authority
One interpretation of DOMA is that it draws its authority, if any, from
every statute to which it applies. One must then ask whether or not DOMA
was within the authority supporting the original legislation and its purpose.
That question brings us back to the question of the purposes of DOMA's
underlying statutes. Assuming those purposes to be valid, as we must,
DOMA must be tied to those purposes.298
B. DOMA’s Underlying Statutes as Evidence of Marital Procreation
Support Through Economic Policy
The argument that DOMA supports procreation has been variously
stated: that the federal government has an interest in children being raised
by their biological parents, that it wants to discourage out-of-wedlock
pregnancies, that the government has an interest in ensuring that children
are raised by their biological parents etc.299 Plaintiffs and supporting amici
in same-sex marriage cases have challenged the notion that procreation has
any relationship to federal statutes relating to marriage.300 As noted, the
298. It may also be necessary to go further, however. For example, as to statutes
passed pursuant under an enumerated power plus the necessary and proper clause, a
challenge might be that DOMA was not a necessary and proper part of the statute.
Compare Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 Sup. Ct. 2566, 2591-2601 (2012)
(while noting the permissive nature of necessary and proper clause in rejecting the
argument that individual mandate is an integral part of a comprehensive scheme of
economic legislation that is the Affordable Care Act, but concluding individual
mandate can be defended as a tax). That inquiry brings us back to ascertaining
DOMA’s purpose and the purposes of federal statutes affecting marriage.
299. BLAG Windsor Merits Brief at 43-49.
300. See Brief of Amici Curiae Family and Child Welfare Law Professors
Addressing the Merits in Support of Respondents, 4-7 (asserting procreation not an
essential part of marriage); id. at 8-11 (maintaining that the right to marry and the right
to procreate are distinct); id. at 11- 16 (arguing that marriage serves other purposes, the
majority of which are not related to procreation, and the majority of which foster a
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Obama Administration has abandoned the argument that DOMA advances
a federal interest in encouraging responsible procreation.301 Courts have
also rejected the theory sometimes reducing the argument to a claim that
same-sex couples are not acceptable parents.302 The Second Circuit
conceded that procreation support could, properly framed, be an acceptable
reason for the government’s support of traditional marriage but concluded
that the parties had not shown that DOMA advances it.303
In this section, I want to couch the procreation argument a bit differently.
I will argue that the statutes evidence an understanding that the
heterosexual couple is unique because of the biological imbalance between
them and because of a history of gender discrimination through marriage.
Challenges to DOMA have largely been treated as facial challenges. No
one has put before the courts evidence that procreation is a theme present in

relationship between the couple); id. 16-25 (contending government does not favor
biological over other parenthood); id. at 25-29 (stating that the government favors all
families).
301. See supra pp. 709-10, notes 8 & 9 (abandoning the of defense of DOMA); see
also Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that
the government, for this litigation, has disavowed the House Report’s stated
justifications for DOMA including (1) encouraging responsible procreation and childbearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,
(3) defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources); see
also The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on H. 3396 Before the House of Rep.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1996 WL 256695 (May 15, 1996) (offering justifications).
302. See Mass., 682 F.3d at 15 (noting controversy over whether same-sex couples
would make best parents, stating “DOMA cannot preclude same-sex couples in
Massachusetts from adopting children or prevent a woman partner from giving birth to
a child to be raised by both partners” and minimizing broader potential procreation
concerns); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 183, 185 (2d. Cir. 2012) (noting
that defenders of DOMA virtually conceded that the responsible procreation argument
“may not withstand intermediate scrutiny” but urge that “same-sex couples have a
diminished ability to discharge family roles in procreation and the raising of children”
and dismissing the notion that argument is broader).
Although all sides’ arguments underwent evolution, the BLAG defendants provided the
following justifications: (1) that DOMA was a placeholder and that Congress Acted
Cautiously in Facing the Unknown Consequences of a Novel redefinition of a
foundational social institution; (2) that Congress was protecting the public fisc and
preserving the balances struck by earlier Congresses; (3) that Congress was seeking to
maintain uniformity in eligibility for federal marital benefits; (4) that DOMA furthers
the government’s interest in encouraging responsible procreation; (5) that Congress
rationally desired to preserve the social link between marriage and children; (6) that
Congress rationally desired to encourage childrearing by parents of both sexes. See
Brief For Intervenor-Appellant The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives at 39-58, Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 102204/102207/10-2214). In Windsor, BLAG
added that Congress can rationally retain the definition of marriage for the same
reasons the states can. See Brief on the Merits for Respondent The Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the United States of Representatives at 25-49, Windsor v. United
States, 133 U.S. at 786, available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/windsorv-united-states/windsor-blag-brief-1-22-13.pdf.
303. E.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188 (noting the “promotion of procreation can be an
important governmental objective”).
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the design of DOMA’s underlying statutes. I contend that if one looks at
the underlying statutes, for which DOMA supplies the definition, one does
indeed see persistent themes regarding procreation. On the other hand,
these themes are not prevalent in all of the statutes that DOMA affects. To
illustrate the procreation point, I discuss a few examples here: ERISA,
Social Security spousal provisions, marital income taxation, and the marital
deduction at issue in Windsor. These examples show that both procreation
and historical gender discrimination play significant roles in our federal
statutes relating to marriage.
1. ERISA
Initially, ERISA had no spousal provisions and considered only a model
of employment uninterrupted by births and childcare. It took ten years of
lobbying for supporters of women to have the statute amended through the
Retirement Equity Act (“REA”). The REA added provisions that
considered women’s work, pregnancy and caretaking patterns, and the need
for spousal protections.304 The legislative history of those provisions is full
of discussions of (1) the effect of procreation and caretaking on women’s
ability to qualify for retirement benefits; (2) the imbalance between men
and women (in heterosexual relationships) that allow a husband to continue
working and obtain promotions, throughout his wife’s pregnancy and
childcare while the wife must defer some part of the same; and (3) a
husband’s resulting ability to control retirement assets, to the wife’s
detriment. That legislative history offers little doubt that the procreation
concerns (and in particular, the procreative imbalance existing in the
heterosexual couple) played a significant role in the design of the REA.305
The concern was not unwed pregnancies but rather, if marriage was to be a
primary means of procreation, the unique imbalance in the heterosexual
304. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 26 U.S.C. § 402, 98 Stat.
1448.
305. Retirement Equity Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 19 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong. 6 (1983); S. REP.
NO. 98-575 (1984). See 129 CONG. REC. 28,458-59 (1983) (statement of Sen. Robert
Dole) (observing that while men can do childcare, women bear a disproportionate
burden; a woman devoting time to childcare may find herself unable to access
husband’s retirement plan); 129 CONG. REC. 17,039 (1983) (statement of Sen. Peter
Domenici) (noticing that childbirth and childcare hinder women’s retirement access,
creating inequities); 129 CONG. REC. 30,369-70 (1983) (statement of Rep. Marge
Roukema) (“The jobs of childrearing and homemaking are now recognized as being of
equal importance to those jobs which require a woman to leave the home.” However
women are disproportionately at risk of old age poverty.); 129 CONG. REC. 34,359
(1983) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd); see also 129 CONG. REC. 28,465 (1983)
(statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan) (stating that existing pension, tax, and
retirement laws do not accommodate the special needs of women and homemakers);
129 CONG. REC. 28,467-68 (1983) (statement of Sen. Lincoln Chafee) (“Women often
have shorter job tenure than men, and they are more likely to leave their jobs to raise
children or take on other traditional family responsibilities.”).

CARTER 5/17/2013

770

8/10/2013 2:38:40 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

couple had to finally be addressed in a modern time.
While ERISA gave women more protections, scholars have criticized the
ERISA structure as promoting sexism because the statute gave spouses
only a beneficiary right and rejected the notion of equal partnership with
respect to the earnings, even when state law did. As a result, before
retirement or death arrives, the wage earner (disproportionately the
husband) has the right to control retirement assets completely.306
ERISA's provisions signal how carefully Congress has to be if it wishes
to maintain a procreation-through-marriage policy. ERISA is not merely a
benefit; it also poses a significant burden upon the higher wage-earning
spouse, one that some couples have sought to avoid through waivers and
prenuptial agreements. Congress has to be careful that it does not create a
regime that allows easier and cheaper cherry-picking of benefits such that
an overall scheme designed to offset the costs of child bearers and child
rearers ends up in fact placing them lower on the economic totem pole and
even risks a loss of protections because persons who have no need for it are
positioned to lobby against it.
2. Social Security
As with ERISA, spousal benefits were not a part of the original
legislation we now know as Social Security. They were added in 1939
along with benefits for spouses, spouses with minor children, dependent
single children, and dependent single parents of a wage earner.307 The
reasons for these amendments were set forth in a memorandum from the
Director of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance to Regional
Directors and Field Office Personnel:
Against what are we trying to make our society secure? We are trying to
make it secure against at least two tangible, concrete things; namely,
1. A large proportion of the members of that society becoming dependent
on society for its support—without resources of its own;
2. Loss of the purchasing power of this same large proportion of the
306. E.g., Paula A. Monopoli, Marriage, Property and [In]Equality: Remedying
ERISA’s Disparate Impact on Spousal Wealth, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 61, 63 (2009),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2009/11/4/monopoli.html (describing ways that ERISA
discriminates against women as childbearers, childrearers, and caretakers). Some gay
marriage advocates have argued that denial of same-sex marriage is, or is tied to,
gender discrimination but they have largely focused only on how heterosexual marriage
generally promotes male hegemony and on gender stereotyping. E.g., Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 249 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality
and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 231; see also Nancy
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage
Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L.
REV. 1535, 1549 (1993).
307. Social Security Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 37, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1634-36
(stating spousal, widow, and children’s benefits).
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American people.308

Who were the people who would not have resources of their own about
which the Director spoke? They were understood to be overwhelmingly
women and children. Under the original law, a man could accrue Social
Security benefits, then draw them and use them for his family. But if he
died prematurely, his wife and children, and dependent parents were left
with nothing. At the same time, in 1939, married women were discouraged
from working outside the home, pregnant women even more so. When
women worked outside the home, as many did, they were not entitled to the
same pay as men.309 This discrimination hurt not only women, but also
men and families that needed two earners for economic stability. The Act
reflects both the fact that women were in fact the nation's child bearers and
child rearers and the national government's stamp on discrimination to
ensure that women's careers remained disproportionately centered around
children compared to men and their economic futures remained tied to
marriage.
Although the statute is now interpreted to apply to both male and female
spouses, the basic design of Social Security is still the same that was
adopted in 1939. Biology also has not changed. The spousal benefits
design still assumes that one person in a marriage will not have worked
enough in a paying job to have earned Social Security in his or her own
right and thus must rely upon a spousal work record. A spouse must be
married to her eligible spouse for ten years before she becomes eligible for
spousal benefits. A widow receiving Social Security benefits upon her
deceased husband’s record (or vice versa) loses those benefits if she
remarries before age 60.310 In Bowen v. Owens, the Supreme Court,
applying a rational basis test, held that such refusals to grant benefits to
divorced spouses when they remarry do not constitute gender
discrimination.311 Indeed it stated that, “Congress was using marital status
as a general guide to dependency on the wage earner.” And it drew the
same conclusion with respect to the discontinuance of benefits upon
308. John J. Corson, Bureau of Old Age and Survivor’s Insurance, Director’s
Bulletin No. 35, Reasons for the 1939 Amendments to the Social Security Act,
available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/reports/1939no3.html (reflecting
that Corson’s views “are a significant expression of the viewpoint of the Social Security
Board on the ‘39 law and his remarks should be understood as reflecting the views of
the top administrative officials of his day”).
309. Not until 1965 was the right of a married couple to use birth control assured.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 485-86 (1965) (finding that preventing
married couples from accessing birth control violates Fourteenth Amendment).
Griswold, a director of a Planned Parenthood clinic, was criminally prosecuted for
providing birth control advice as an accessory.
310. 42 U.S.C. §402(e)(1)(A); id. (g). 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(H),
(c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(H) (2006).
311. Bowen v. Owens, 106 S. Ct. 1881 (1986).
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remarriage stating that the remarriage rule was based on the assumption
that remarriage altered the status of dependency on the wage earner.312
Also applying a rational basis test, the Court has held that it does not
violate Equal Protection or Due Process for Social Security to deny an
unmarried mother separate mother's or parental benefits based on the work
record of her minor child’s undisputed deceased father.313 In so holding, it
stated that the relevant provision was “intended to permit women to elect
not to work and to devote themselves to care of children.”314
If her work record is insufficient in her own right, a spouse does not
draw exactly what her husband draws. Nor does she receive what she
would have made had she not taken the economic hit of childbearing or, for
older women still living today, suffered extensive gender discrimination.
Her benefits are limited to not more than half of what her husband draws
based on his record. If she is a widow with minor children, she receives the
independent parental benefit but only so long as she has children who
under the age of sixteen. The remarriage provision and the child age
limitation for widow’s benefits both reflect a pattern found in the early
Civil War military pension provisions discussed in Part III(A)(1).315 Race
also played a role historically in this benefit because if her husband
suffered job discrimination, a wife received less or nothing.
It is true that, except for older women, Social Security cannot today be
justified as a remedy for the effects of past broad-scale discrimination that
threatened to put women on the streets when their husbands died and
threatened to deny a heterosexually headed family of modest means a
decent quality of life. But it can still be explained as tied to procreation by
its other leg: that Congress wishes to make it possible for one parent
(today, male or female) to stay at home and that childbearing and childcare
may affect the ability of the female in the heterosexual family to earn
sufficiently in her own right. The first of these theories argues strongly in
favor of giving same-sex couples with children the right to receive spousal
benefits, assuming parenthood is established. The second is not generally
applicable to same-sex couples, although those with children could
potentially face a similar situation by mutual choice. They too could suffer
disproportionate childcare responsibilities within the couple as so called
gendered childcare models reflect the reality of caretaking economics in
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
314. Id. at 288 (“The animating concern was the economic dislocation that occurs
when the wage earner dies and the surviving parent is left with the choice to stay home
and care for the children or to go to work, a hardship often exacerbated by years
outside the labor force. ‘Mother’s insurance benefits’ were intended to make the choice
to stay home easier.”).
315. See discussion supra p. 732.
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our American system.
3. Marital Income Taxation
A federal interest in supporting procreation also plays a role in the
income taxation of marriages. Much has been made of the fact that some
married couples, if they file jointly, can receive a lower tax rate than
singles. But this so-called “marriage bonus” comes only to those spouses
whose incomes are disproportionate. Why would Congress structure
benefits so? Such a structure makes sense if one assumes that childbearing
and childrearing will interrupt one of the partner’s work patterns.316 It also
makes sense in a context of gender discrimination that inhibits women's
economic opportunities.
4. The Estate/Gift Tax Marital Deduction in Windsor
The argument that procreation support lies at the heart of the marital
deduction is a harder sell. Our modern deduction arises directly out of the
debate between separate property and community property states discussed
earlier.317 Separate property states attribute all earnings to the spouse who
receives the paycheck. Under the theory, the nonpaid spouse is entitled to
"support" from the paid one, and during marriage does not own any part of
the income the paid spouse brings home. By contrast, community property
states consider the couple to be partners and attribute half of the marital
property ownership to each, no matter which received a paycheck.
Consequently, in community property states, only half of the marital
property passes upon the death of one spouse and thus, only half is subject
to estate taxation at that death. The other spouse controls the other half.
But in separate property states, when the spouses have disproportionate
income, the higher paid spouse owns the higher share of marital property.
That person is usually the husband, who is also likely to die first.318
Because of the drastically progressive nature of estate and gift taxation,
married men in separate property states tended to pay more taxes at death,
while those in community property states had, in effect, the benefit of
316. Couples with middle to lower incomes are least likely to benefit from the
“bonus” because they are more likely to need two spouses working outside the home.
Disproportionately, these couples are black, another fact demonstrating the link
between racial prejudice which suppressed the ability of black males to support their
families in such a patriarchial system and marital benefits. Dorothy Brown, Racial
Equality In The Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax Policy Got To Do With It?, 21 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 759, 760-61 (1999).
317. E.g., Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings on S. 395, S. 404, S. 574, and
S. 858 Before the Subcomm. on Estate and Gift Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance,
97th Cong., pt. 1, at 11 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept.]; see
discussion supra p. 754-57.
318. 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept., supra note 317, at 11.
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income splitting that placed them in lower tax brackets. This held true
even though many community property states that split ownership of
marital property still gave the husband the right to control all marital
property. While some men in separate property states gave property to
their wives, they risked that she might not give it back when desired, might
not concede control, or even worse that after death another man might
ultimately become its owner or controller.
Congress tried to remedy this perceived unfairness but it never adopted
the community property system of taxation. For example, in 1942,
Congress tried to attribute all of community property to the husband at his
death, unless it could be proven the wife earned it. This posed a “tracing”
problem.319 Moreover, men in separate property states adopted the practice
of giving the wife only a life estate and then passing the remainder to
children or others. Because a life estate expired at death, there was no
transfer tax on property passing upon the wife’s demise. On the other
hand, in community property states a husband could not control the entire
estate in this way at death because he technically only owned half of it,
even if he was the only wage earner.320
To address these concerns, at the same time that Congress allowed
married couples to elect to file jointly, Congress created the marital
deduction at issue in Windsor.321 In 1981, it removed all limits.322 Now
spouses can leave an unlimited amount to each other free of estate and gift
taxes. But in the instance of a couple of biologically imbalanced
procreators, the law offers many opportunities for the man, who, again, is
likely to die first, to exercise power over the entire marital assets.323
One could theorize that the purpose for not taxing property passing at
death between spouses is that the man will likely die first and the woman
will need support for herself and, more importantly from Congress’
viewpoint, their children. Indeed, when Congress made the marital
deduction unlimited in 1981, the rules required one to give an outright gift
to a spouse in order to qualify for the marital deduction. The surviving
spouse had the right to use the property as she wished. But that theory of
leaving the spouse a nest egg for children was shot to pieces when
319. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 111 (1948).
320. Id. at 27-28.
321. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1515, at 609 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (increasing
marital deduction amount for lower income couples).
322. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)-(b), 95
Stat. 172, 301; see also 1981 Sen. Marital Ded. Rept., supra note 317, at 11.
323. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, at 510-11 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the “widow’s
election” whereby one spouse can force the other to place her assets in a joint trust by
denying her access to his half of the community property at his death).
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Congress decided to amend the terminable gift restriction and adopt
Qualified Terminable Interest Property (“QTIP”) treatment. Under QTIP
treatment, a husband can give a wife a life estate only and still have the
estate qualify for the marital deduction.324 Thus, a husband could control
property from the grave, passing it after his wife’s death to children or
others. While theoretically the QTIP approach is gender neutral, in context
it is far from it. As mentioned above, the use of spousal life estate gifts for
tax avoidance and retention of control dated back to before 1948.
The justification for allowing the QTIP approach was expressly stated to
be children. It was argued that without the QTIP, a man had to choose
between leaving property directly to his wife to get the deduction or
leaving it to his children but lose it.325 It was pointed out the arrangement
helps persons who may be in second marriages and want to ensure that
children from a prior marriage or relationship receive a legacy but still
want to leave support for a present spouse.326 But others argued that an
overwhelmingly male Congress had offered men a legal way to strip their
wives of control over devises under the guise of doing what is best for the
children. Indeed, some have criticized the QTIP arrangements as sexist and
a return to “dower.”327
For better or worse, in fashioning the estate tax marital deduction and
related provisions, Congress was aware of the unique imbalance existing in
a great many heterosexual married couples. That imbalance was imposed
both by biology but also by a history of government supported employment
discrimination and gender stereotyping in work and family life. The
marital deduction does not seem to be rooted in any modern sense in the
federal government’s interest in supporting “procreation.” First, it kicks in
only at death, but when the large majority of parents die, their children are
already grown up. Indeed, in the case of the QTIP, the property only
passes after the surviving spouse’s death, further ensuring that the children

324. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (2006). See Major Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings on
S. 23, S. 395, S. 404, S. 557, S. 574, S. 858, and S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Estate
and Gift Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., pt. 2, at 179 (1981)
[hereinafter 1981 Sen. QTIP Rpt.]. For a discussion of the evolution of the QTIP see
Irene A. Vlissides, Estate of Clack v. Commissioner: An End to the Conflict Over
Contingent QTIP Elections?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 163 (1997) (discussing history
and subsequent efforts of taxpayers to diminish even further the control holders of the
life estate would have in QTIP Trust property).
325. 1981 Sen. QTIP Rpt., supra note 324, at 179.
326. Id.
327. Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited
Marital Deduction, 76 N.C.L. REV. 1729 (1988); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital
Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S
L.J. 301, 305-06 (1995); Mary Moers Wenig, “Taxing Marriage,” 6 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 561, 572-74 (1997) (arguing that the law of dower was reborn via
QTIP).

CARTER 5/17/2013

776

8/10/2013 2:38:40 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:4

will be well into adulthood. Second, it cannot be said to offset childrearing
costs because the person who would allegedly have paid the costs is
already dead when the benefit is awarded. Third, the QTIP provisions do
not restrict the passage of the property only to children. Fourth, the byproduct of the arrangement is not procreation support but rather that a wife
and mother who has assumed a traditional family role at the government's
urging is then denied any control over marital assets (and thus of the
valuable opportunity to favor those beneficiaries who she prefers), save by
her husband's consent. All of this under the guise of saving taxes. Thus,
the deduction cannot be said to be designed to offset the effects of the
unique history of gender discrimination against women. And fifth, it
benefits only a small amount of people, those with estates of greater than
the amount of the federal exemption, roughly five million dollars.328
Finally, there is little evidence that well-off men benefitting from it would
not marry or financially support the children they create or the mothers
they impregnate without such a deduction.
C. Summarizing Federal Procreation Support Through Federal Marriage
Policy
It is possible then to see in federal policies and benefits related to
marriage, a pattern of federal support for procreation. That these benefits
or burdens are not afforded to parents who do not marry indicates a
preference for procreation within marriage, the so-called "responsible
procreation" position. Congress does not ignore unmarried parents but
provides benefits to children born to them in a different way. Marriage
statutes go beyond merely giving awards (and indeed even the benefits
have been grossly overstated). They also regulate the relationship between
uniquely biologically imbalanced heterosexual couple. It is rarely
recognized that the combination of biology and family economic needs
may drive what some refer to as gendered caretaking patterns. Families
may be deciding that it makes no sense to have both parents lose valuable
opportunities for advancement and promotion, which could help the entire
family. Moreover, if one has already taken time off, purely financially
speaking, that one is likely to be the best candidate to take even more time
off, except in rare cases in which the woman actually out earns the man.
Many couples may simply be making choices that answer to their own
economic realities.
Using marriage for supporting procreation, even within the context of
discrimination, dates back to the common law. It makes sense that, in an
earlier time, government required a married man to have fathered a child in
328. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, § 302(a), Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010).
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order to receive courtesy (the right to a life estate in his deceased wife's
property). If he didn’t have a child to support and who could inherit her
assets, then he did not need that financial resource which presumably could
be returned to the man who provided it, her father.329
It is not through bouts of forgetfulness that the U.S. government has not
imposed a national system of paid maternity leave and has resisted the
broad social welfare systems found in European nations. Witness the cries
of "socialism" when the Affordable Health Care Act, a step toward a
national health care program, was being debated.330 By contrast, the
countries that led the way in adopting a legally recognized status for
committed same-sex couples are also characterized by extensive social
welfare systems that do not rely heavily upon “marriage” for supporting
procreation but do rely on very high taxation. I would contend that the
unvarnished truth is that governmental support of marriage has long been
used—and still is used—as a regime for the private (rather than public)
financing of childbearing and childrearing, so that one man’s dependents
do not end up being paid for by other men. That the regime has not been
totally successful given the number of failed marriages and unmarried
procreators does not make it unconstitutional with respect to same-sex
couples.
At home, it is noteworthy that the first U.S. state to adopt same-sex
marriage for gays and lesbians, Massachusetts, also thereafter became the
first in the nation to require health insurance for all of its citizens. In
rejecting bans on same-sex marriage, Massachusetts' high court opined that
supporting procreation was not the purpose of marriage in that state.331
That choice reflects a local perspective that is different from perspectives in
other parts of the country. Yet, the irony is that despite the embrace of
"marriage equality" for same-sex couples, Massachusetts continues to
maintain a separate property regime for marriage, it does not have a system
of paid maternity leave for pregnant employees, and does not offset the
costs of pregnancy not covered by insurance, except in the form of social
services for the very poor. All this leads one to conclude that it must intend
329. Under state law, “Curtesy” gave a man a life estate in all of his wife’s property,
real or personal, but only if he had a child. Grimball V. Patton, 70 Ala. 626 (Sup. Ct.
Ala 1881) (finding that the husband was not a tenant in curtesy because he had no
children, thus could not claim any part of wife’s estate covered by trust established by
her father’s will).
330. See, e.g., Affordable Care Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(5) (2006); Michael
McAuliff & Sara Kenigsberg, Obamacare Is Socialism: Reps. Louie Gohmert, Steve
King Attack, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (March 27, 2012, 7:54 PM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/27/obamacare-socialism-louie-gohmert-steveking_n_1383973.html. See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 Sup. Ct. at 2566
(upholding provisions of Affordable Care Act against Constitutional challenge).
331. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003)
(rejecting notion that in Massachusetts, marriage is for supporting procreation).
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that husbands support their wives during the inefficiency of pregnancy, and
that unmarried women eat the costs or go on public assistance, since child
support is not compensation for a mother's lost earning and earning
power.332 The point is not that Massachusetts must now become Europe,
but rather that governmental support of marriage is often an attempt
(however successful or ill conceived) to ensure that procreation burdens
remain on identifiable, private shoulders. It is a way government seeks to
hold people accountable for their own. That this is not a good model for
community in some people's eyes does not make the model
unconstitutional. And same-sex couples are not the only group that has
been excluded by the design of marriage. Working parents who need two
incomes also find that the design of many of marriages' benefits filtered
through the tax system are available only to those who can afford to have
one partner in the couple stay at home, as in the case of spousal income tax
treatment discussed in Part III(C)(2).
In 2003, the General Accountability Office (“GAO”) identified “some
1100 laws in the United States Code in which marital status is a factor.333
What GAO did not consider was the extent to which procreation in
marriage—though encouraged and supported by the government through
these benefits—contributes to the baseline costs of the parties receiving
those benefits or whether Congress was trying to offset that cost. Nor was
GAO asked to consider how other benefits available to those who are not
married measure against those given to the married. Consider, for
example, that no one compensates a birth mother (or her partner if she is
part of a couple) for her forbearance from economic opportunities in
pursuit of having a healthy baby. Stillbirths and miscarriages carry a huge
cost as well, despite the tragic end. Those who bring home a bundle of joy
from a hospital often also bring home a hefty portion of their bill that is not
covered by insurance. On the other hand, if one adopts there is a $13,000
332. See Website of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination,
available at http://www.mass.gov/mcad/maternity1.html (last visited May 16, 2013)
(guaranteeing eight weeks of maternity leave to women for adoption or birth, but not
requiring paid leave; suggesting Massachusetts law may require men to receive
identical leave regardless of birth status of parents); see also Global NAPs, Inc. v.
Awiszus, 930 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 2010) (interpreting Massachusetts pregnancy leave
statute to find that a woman not covered by federal leave act who took leave more than
eight weeks could be terminated).
333. In 1997 the General Accountability Office identified “all those laws in the
United States Code in which marital status is a factor, even though some of these laws
may not directly create benefits, rights, or privileges.” U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
Defense of Marriage Act, GAO/OGC-97-16 at 1-2 (1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. The number of instances was 1049.
Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to Hon. Henry Hyde, Chairman S.
Judiciary Comm., Jan. 31, 1997. In a followup memorandum it updated that number to
1138 as of 2003. Letter from Danya K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel to Hon. Bill Frist,
Maj. Leader, U.S. Senate, Jan. 23, 2004.
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federal tax credit to offset the expenses of procuring the child (a credit
available to same-sex couples who adopt).334 There may be good reasons to
distinguish between heterosexual couples and adoptive couples in funding
the costs of procuring a child, but the point remains that GAO was asked to
consider marriage's benefits in a vacuum. Congress does not have that
privilege. It must consider the benefits of the married and unmarried, of
those with children and those without, of the single and the coupled and
cohabitating with no children, and of single parents. Its failure has not
been that it has failed to establish marriage equality for gays and lesbian
couples, but rather that it has largely failed to consider the rights of samesex couples in marriage and family policy at all.
VI. USING CONFLICT OF LAWS THEORY TO RECONCILE A PROCREATIONBASED MARITAL BENEFITS REGIME AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
I have argued that procreation support is a key factor in the federal
government's support of marriage. The broad scale attack on procreation
that has been launched in the same-sex marriage cases seems to assume
that procreation and same-sex marriage cannot exist in the same system. In
this section, I argue that courts should use conflicts of laws doctrines to
reconcile Congress' authorized choice to use procreation as a key
component of marriage policy and the legal rights of same-sex couples.
From the start, it should be noted that this is not a proposal that seeks to
accomplish "marriage equality," that is, all married persons receive exactly
the same rights. It is better described as a proposal for "marriage for all."
That is, everyone should have the right to be married, but Congress has the
right to decide that marriages should receive different taxpayer funded
economic support based on rational criteria. This writer agrees with those
who opine that the only reason that the state should be involved in marriage
policy is to support procreation and its effects on earning power for the
couple. If children could be plucked from trees and came with buds
attached to their bellybuttons that bloomed into twenty-five-year "your
baby only" support trust funds, no woman or married couple would have to
experience the economic inefficiency of pregnancy, and heterosexual
couples could have sex without worrying about birth control and accidental
pregnancies. Government would then have no need to be involved in
marriage support because only people who want and are ready for children
would have them, and parents would have more than enough money to
raise them. People don't need government to form family relationships.
But children are part of the nation's economic juggling act and procreation
(bearing and raising) is both inefficient and expensive. Marriage is one
334. 26 U.S.C. § 23.
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major way that the government ensures that the larger portion of
procreation's costs—birthing and raising—are borne by identifiable private
parties. While the government provides some initial carrots to sweeten the
pot, the truth is that, from the public's point of view, marriage without a
national plan for maternity care is a relatively cheap way to finance the
necessary work of procreation as a capitalist system moves forward. And
the government uses heterosexuality as a marker because that marker
identifies all of the people it wishes to reach and pregnancy, even today,
remains unpredictable. It's an unromantic system for sure.
The American model has funneled access to legal recognition of family
largely through marriage. Our repeated historical error has been that access
to those family rights often has been made to depend upon who was being
married, what kind of children they might produce or indeed whether they
would produce at all. Blacks procreated the wrong type of children;
women were too inefficient at procreation; the poor and the ummarried
procreated at the wrong time (when they were not rich or when they were
not married); and same-sex couples did not procreate at all. Thus, no
legally recognized family rights for you! All the while government
continued to attach benefits for those who were entitled by law to the legal
recognition that is marriage. Thus, same-sex marriage advocates are right
that because marriage centered on procreation and the right kind, marriage
became the key to access to many incidents that bore very little relationship
to procreation.
Conflict of law rules help to resolve the dilemma over when a
procreation standard can be legitimate public policy and when it must bow
to the rights of individuals to form families as they choose.335 As discussed
in Part II, under state conflict of law rules, the law of the place where the
marriage was celebrated governed the validity of a marriage. On the other
hand, the incidents that flowed from that marriage were often governed by
the state where the couple lived. The logic makes sense. The incidents,
especially if they are economic in nature, are far more likely to affect the
home jurisdiction’s policy interests and coffers. If the marriage fails, it is
the forum state that must deal with the financial failures that may follow as
well. Similarly, considering federal conflict of law rules, it makes sense
that while recognizing marriages, Congress has, as discussed in Part
III(C)(2), declined to apply state community property rules to some federal
benefits. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that reasonable
restrictions may be imposed as to the incidents of marriage.336
335. While my focus is marriage, with adaptations, the proposal I offer here could
apply to state recognitions of marriages and also to government's treatment of nonmarital family benefits.
336. While declaring unconstitutional a restriction on marriage by persons who are
behind in child support payments, the court stated “[W]e do not mean to suggest that
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I suggest then that we categorize the federal rights related to state
sanctioned marriage along conflict of laws lines into two categories: the
validity of the marriage on the one hand, the incidents on the other. 337
Marriage confers the legal right to call an unrelated other one's most
intimate family. The marital bundle includes the right to be treated like
spouses by government both in private relations and in public ones, and for
a whole host of reasons including social, medical, and legal. I will call this
bundle of rights that marriage confers simply “family” rights. I suggest
that we place the other benefits that government attaches to marriage in the
category of "incidents" or branch rights. These branch rights are not core
to the family relationship—indeed, some are quite new—and they largely
comprise economic benefits from the public purse. Congress could take
these rights away from all couples without altering the traditional notions
that a person is "married" to another.
A. “Family” Rights
Through the incidents that it attaches to marriage and family life, the
federal government can burden or facilitate family life. Think of granting
one couple a government-subsidized right to bring one’s spouse on an
overseas trip while denying another, granting one the right to live in a
government-subsidized home but not another, granting one a right to be
buried next to each other in a government-funded cemetery but not another,
granting one federal marital privilege but not another. Such denials burden
the right to be a family, elevating one party's access to family rights granted
by government over another party's rights.

every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for
marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed.” Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87
(1978).
337. Other scholars have proposed using incidents theory in the context of interstate
recognition of same-sex marriages. These theories generally propose that a marriage
would be deemed valid but only with respect to certain incidents. The downside of
such an approach of course is that the validity status of a marriage constantly changes,
tested as each incident arises. I propose to conceptually separate the notions of validity
and incidents, as a conflicts of law policy has traditionally done. E.g., Barbara J. Cox,
Using an Incidents of Marriage Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of
Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WID. L.J.
699, 718-58 (2003-2004); Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriage And Choice-Of-Law: If
We Marry In Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 1033 (1995). Yet another approach would provide all couples the economic
benefits of marriage but allow differences with respect to rights that could be replicated
by contract. See ERIN O’HARA & LARRY RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 164-65 (2009).
Domestic partnership statutes also reflect a different “incidents” approach. While those
statutes do not use the term "marriage" for committed same-sex relationships, they
provide a legal status to such relationships and some or all of the incidents traditionally
associated with marriage.
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1. State Law Should Control Who is “Married” for Purposes of Federal
Incidents that Affect a Couple's Right To Be a Family.
State law should govern the question of whether a marriage is valid and
who is marital family. The approach is consistent with longstanding
federal conflicts of law policy. Some would argue it is constitutionally
mandated. Whatever its source, as I have shown, deviation from state or
local custom is an extraordinary path for Congress to take.
Courts must determine when Congress' asserted reasons for deviating
from local law are valid and when they are not. In the context of same-sex
marriages, the holdings of Lawrence v. Texas and Windsor confirm that the
mere fact that a couple is of the same-sex should not alone constitute
sufficient public policy to reject marital family status at the federal level
when states recognize it.338 Moreover, though unnoticed by other legal
scholars and litigants, the several states now expressly recognize at a
minimum the right of intimate same-sex couples to contract with respect to
family life: to enter into cohabitation agreements, to designate each other
as personal agents for making health care decisions over otherwise legal
next of kin and the like. That move is huge. In an earlier era, a resounding
majority would have considered such relationships an abomination, so
immoral that the state considered any agreements to secure them void.339
Add those states to the thirteen that have adopted same-sex marriage and
the seven or so that have adopted domestic partnerships or civil unions, and
one finds a firm majority of states that have embraced some form of legally
cognizable way to allow individuals to choose relationships and families
that they wish. This writer believes it likely that many other states would

338. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence the court struck down a
Texas state sodomy statute criminalizing intimate relations between consenting adults
as unconstitutional. The sexual relationship that was at the heart of the felony charge in
Lawrence—and rejected as a basis for criminal sanctions—is also at the heart of
historical objections to marriage.
339. The states expressly stating that such contracts are valid are Georgia, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Indiana, Ohio, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. See, e.g.,
Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (upholding the contract); Posik v. Layton,
695 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the contract); Swails v. Haberer,
No. 02-7095, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17727 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (upholding the contract
applying state law); Boyle v. King, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty, No. GD07-021569, Dec.
LEXIS 313 (2010) (agreeing the contract would be enforceable but finding none and
applying other state law instead of divorce code to lesbian couple for property
separation on breakup of relationship); Cherkis v. Curzi, No. 1989-CE-6173 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. Aug. 30, 1991) (upholding the contract); Anderson v. Anderson, No. 43CO1-9105CP-269 (Kosciusko Cir. Cr., Indiana, 1992) (upholding the contract); Seward v.
Mentrup, 622 N.E.2d 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (finding that mere cohabitation would
not give rise to any benefits, but a written agreement might do so); N.C. CONST. ART.
XIV, §6 (banning same-sex marriage while upholding the contract); SC CONST. ART.
XVII, §15 (banning same-sex marriage while upholding the contract); Ross v.
Goldstein, 203 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App. 2006) (banning same-sex marriage while
upholding the contract).
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also recognize same-sex cohabitation agreements and other documents
solidifying the relationship between same-sex couples. Cohabitation
agreements are not marriage, but the moral objections to the underlying
relationship in both cases are the same.
Consequently, there is no reason in the cases of same-sex marriage for
the federal government not to follow state or local law with respect to who
is in a marital family. These marital family relationships exist independent
of procreation. From state designations, the government can then decide
how to allocate the benefits it chooses to attach to those relationships.
2. For Equal Protection Purposes, Courts Should Apply Intermediate
Scrutiny to Denials of Federal Benefits that Affect Family Rights.
In the case of same-sex couples, courts should review refusals to provide
benefits that affect family rights under intermediate scrutiny. The reason is
that, as to these types of rights, same-sex couples constitute a quasi-suspect
class. They satisfy the traditional concerns that compel heightened
scrutiny: (1) they have historically endured persecution and discrimination
in pursuing their family rights both within and outside of marriage; (2)
homosexuality has no relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society;
(3) with respect to these rights, the class remains a politically weakened
minority; and (4) when they exercise the right to form families they
become visible and identifiable.340
B.“Branch” Rights
1. Federal Law Should Control Who Receives the Federal Branch Rights
That Flow From State-Designated Marriages.
Branch rights are the benefits and burdens that government attaches to
marriage in order to effect specific governmental public policy objectives.
Most of them will be economic. Because of their significant impact upon
the federal purse and the state’s lack of power with respect to federal
expenditures, who receives branch rights in the federal context should be
governed by federal law.
2. For Equal Protection Purposes, Courts Should Apply Rational Basis

340. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting
Supreme Court has applied these factors in determining whether heightened scrutiny is
needed and citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); id. at 440-41; id. at 442 n.10, 472 n.24.
By contrast, under Loving v. Virginia, heterosexual blacks are “suspect” with respect to
both family rights and incidents. Indeed, as a heterosexual couple, the Lovings met the
presumed ability to procreation requirement and were still denied access to marriage,
precisely because of their presumed ability to procreate.
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Scrutiny to Federal Denials of Branch Rights.
Generally, the denial of branch rights to same-sex married couples
should be subject to a rational basis level of scrutiny in an Equal Protection
challenge. The key inquiry will be whether or not the statute was intended
to advance a legitimate interest in supporting natural procreation through
marriage or address the unique imbalance in the married heterosexual
couple with respect to it. I submit that rational bases other than these will
be few or nonexistant.
The rational basis test makes sense for branch rights. These rights have
never been considered at the core of the right to be married and conflict of
laws policy has never dictated that one sovereign should follow another
sovereign’s policies on them. Second, gay and lesbian Americans as a
group are not a suspect or a quasi-suspect class with respect to the branch
rights that are attached to marriage. Instead, regarding these rights, they
are like many others who are excluded from marriage's economic benefits
by Congressional priorities. Third, such a standard allows the government
the needed flexibility to make the policy choices it has a right to make in
spending federal tax dollars. Fourth many of these incidents involve
economic legislation as to which the courts have long extended deference
to Congress’ decisions.341 Fifth, branch rights by definition do not involve
state power over the family or other significant federalism issues. Sixth, a
rational basis standard recognizes that in making funding decisions
Congress considers far more interests than merely those of same-sex
couples versus opposite sex couples.
An example using the Oregon Donation law discussed in Part III(C)(1)
will explain why suspect or quasi-suspect status for same-sex couples
should not apply to branch rights and why a rational basis standard makes
sense. The Oregon law allowed only white men, Indians who had white
fathers and white women married to white men to take a share of Oregon
land.342 Despite the fact that the law was linked to procreation and
marriage, it did not economically disadvantage gay white men; indeed,
white males of all orientations were economically favored under law. They
could get the essentially free land grant and, unlike women, had the power
to apply for it in their own right. The “incidents” of marriage in that day
which Justice Story identified as discussed in Part II(A)(3)—the disability
of the wife, the rights of the husband—were of no aid to gay men because
those disabilities hobbled one of the parties economically without the
offsetting responsibility or benefit of procreation.343 Two (white) men
341. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
342. See discussion supra at p. 753, notes 237-38.
343. Thus, Justice Story noted the incidents of marriage were the disabilities of a
wife and the rights of husband. See discussion supra p. 719. As the Oregon statute
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could work and travel far more widely than other groups. Each member of
a gay white male couple could take a lot of land with each partner
controlling his share. They could live together and farm it together. If
“economic benefits” is the concern as has been emphasized in media, why
trade the economic situation of two white males for the economic rights of
a white heterosexual married man holding all power within his home but
aided by a legally hobbled wife and facing repeated accidental and
expensive pregnancies? Indeed, this sole option for marital arrangements
in earlier centuries—coupled with the fact that gay men could only have
and legally claim biological children through marriage and intimacy with
women—was likely a key reason we have so little evidence that gay men
tried legally to marry other gay men in that era. Even if there were no
barriers on same-sex relationships, legal marriage would have made no
economic sense for gay men in prior centuries because it was riddled with
sexism that economically crippled one of the partners. But marriage law
did significantly disadvantage gay men in terms of family rights. They
could not publicly proclaim themselves as in love, or “married” or as an
intimate family. Consequently, they could not secure their connection into
old age and beyond. Even publicly pursuing the relationship outside of
marriage could, in some communities, bring serious criminal penalty.
Women in contrast had no right to land, unless they were married to a
white man or, after 1853, unless they were once married to one and
widowed.344 This requirement—to marry a white man—denied lesbian
women family rights. If they married white men (which only white women
could do) they got the economic benefit and likely children, but they lost
out on the family benefit that they very much desired. Black women in
most jurisdictions, regardless of orientation, could either not marry at all
(due to slavery) or, if free, could often not legally marry white men.
Two groups had no chance of getting Oregon land under any
circumstances. One was women of any orientation who never married,
straight or lesbian. The second was blacks. Male, female, straight, or gay,
married or unmarried—all blacks, not merely slaves—were disqualified
from getting Oregon land by statute on the basis of race.345 Poor people's
demonstrates, marriage based economic benefits at the federal level essentially
followed this model. Indeed, arguably one goal of such a structure was to place the
married man on par with the single one and thus encourage marriage in a regime that
crippled the wife from making significant economic contributions.
344. In 1853, Congress allowed widows to claim through husbands who had applied
for the land, but died. Donation Land Claim Act of 1853, 10 Stat. 158, §8.
345. Donation Land Claim Act of 1850, ch. 76, §4, 9 Stat. at 496 (1850) (defining
racial and gender restrictions). At that time, blacks were, by far, the largest group of
those classified as non-whites. Given how many Spaniards and Mexicans occupied
these areas, many Latinos were considered “white” and, thereby, would have qualified
for land. Those considered non-white would not have qualified. This writer has found
no evidence yet of other groups being denied land or applying for it probably because
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right to the land depended largely upon their race and their gender, not
upon their class or economic status.
Some land grant statutes did later allow white women to apply for less
desirable land,346 and the end of slavery helped ease racial restrictions and
improve black access. But the Oregon design (which, remember, was
novel for its time in allowing married women to have even a share of land)
demonstrates why the strictest standard of scrutiny should not be applied to
the denial of branch benefits relating to marriage of same-sex couples. The
example demonstrates the need to have standards of review that reflect and
remedy the discriminatory history in question. The outcome I suggest is
also consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Loving. To discuss
Loving as merely about the right to marry is, to mix a metaphor, to
whitewash the case and then to neuter it. Loving was a case about the
freedom to marry and form a family as one chooses, but it was also a case
about race discrimination and about race procreational discrimination.347
Any approach that ignores this history reduces the “marriage-equality”
battle to a simple uncomfortable question: Which white men have the most
economic rights? Is it those who prefer the company of women? Or is it
those who prefer the company of men?348
their numbers in the U.S. were quite small in 1850. On gays and lesbians, I do not
deny the possibility that they suffered discrimination uniquely as gays and as well as
whatever else they were (e.g., race, gender etc.). The notion is called intersectionality.
See, e.g, Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991) (introducing
notion of intersectionality); Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure
of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83 (1994) (applying the
intersectionality theory to gay and lesbian experiences). Indeed, intersectionality
advances my argument that one needs to be careful in assuming that all experiences fit
into the same box.
346. The Advantage of Having an Administration that is Posted on Whisky—
Married Women May Now Buy Land, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 19, 1887, at 5. The
Secretary of Interior decided that women, including married women, may purchase
timber and stone lands in states of Mississippi, Louisiana, California, Oregon, Nevada,
and Washington Territory, provided that land is not suitable for agriculture.
347. The Virginia Supreme Court in Loving relied primarily upon its earlier holding
in Naim v. Naim. That case held that the policy behind the anti-miscegenation statute
was to prevent interracial procreation and the creation of a “mongrel breed of citizens.”
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), overruled by Loving, 388 U.S. at 1. See
also Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966) (stating that Naim is controlling and
there is no need to reconsider it), rev’d by Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (referring to state’s
desire not to create a “mongrel breed of citizens” to and to preserve white supremacy).
Loving was but one brick in a large complex of race discrimination and indeed, but
considered out of context, the right to marry white people was among the least of black
people's historical racial hurdles. The case did not, of course, open marriages' doors for
either black or interracial same-sex couples.
348. Lesbian scholars have criticized the battle for “marriage” arguing that a
marriage-based regime for social support will not protect all families or meet the needs
of all gay and lesbian couples. See Paula L. Ettlebrick, Domestic Partnership, Civil
Unions, or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 905 (2001) (noting
same-sex parenting always requires three people and arguing for recognition of broader
relationships other than marriage and questioning attempt to mainstream gay and
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One could argue that same-sex couples who are parents under state law
should have the benefit of intermediate scrutiny when procreation is the
claimed reason for the benefit. Under this view the denials of ERISA,
Social Security benefits and income tax benefits mentioned in Part V(B)
should be subject to the intermediate review standard for married same-sex
couples who are parents under state law. The issue requires more attention
than this article can provide. However, brief treatment can outline some of
the issues. Arguments in favor are that the federal government has
traditionally incorporated state law on parenting definitions, the federal
government does benefit when two parties rather than one commit to
supporting a child as parents. Moreover the economics of a family unit
might still dictate that one parent will need to disproportionately tend to the
child's needs for the entire unit to move forward most efficiently, rather
than each taking the economic hit of parenting equally. Some same-sex
parents do have natural births although always involving third parties.
Notably, benefits allegedly targeted for procreation go to opposite sex
parents who adopt and use reproductive technologies toward parenthood as
well as those who never have procreated and cannot procreate. And
finally, gays and lesbians have faced opposition as parenting couples, not
merely as individuals, even when they have taken the traditional path of
being adoptive parents.
On the other hand, there are also arguments against intermediate scrutiny
as the standard of review for marriage-related branch benefits relating to
parenting. Traditionally, married parents under law commit to supporting
not only the child but also each other. It might be argued that the presence
of the biological tie and the biological imbalance that normally exists in the
heterosexual couple—and even past gender discrimination within
heterosexual marriage—are key assumptions in statutes that provide or
impose marital obligations or benefits tied to parenting through marriage
(as opposed to providing the benefits outside of marriage). Moreover,
when the issue is procreation-related benefits based on a Congressional
assumption that having biological children within a marriage is preferred,
with respect to branch benefits same-sex couples do not stand much
differently than committed unmarried couples or single parents. On the
lesbian families); Paula L. Ettlebrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1997); NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND STRAIGHT AND GAY MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (arguing gay and lesbian couples are
no more disadvantaged by a marital regime for benefits than other non-married
groups).
Other authors have similarly criticized using marriage and "intimacy" as a basis for
affording family benefits. See e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTURED MOTHER: THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (asking why
marriage or intimacy should be the gateway to providing benefits).
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question of over-inclusion, some heterosexuals who use surrogates or other
reproductive technologies also have children or might have them
biologically. Notably, we are speaking here of the standard of scrutiny, not
of the ultimate decision on whether or not same-sex couples should be
treated exactly like opposite sex ones. I conclude that the rational basis
standard should be considered sufficient – for now.
Moreover, as I have discussed in Part V, even modern statutes appear to
be designed to cover the negative economic effects of a pregnancy as to
which both parties played a central biological role. When the biological
imbalance assumed by the statutes is not present, the parties have greater
bargaining power vis á vis each other with respect to procreation. With
lesbians, if birth is their choice, either can have the child. With gay men,
because neither forgoes economic activity to give birth, they have greater
economic freedom to choose who among them will be the primary
caretaker. Moreover, as discussed in Part V(B)(2), rational basis scrutiny
has been applied to denials of benefits to unmarried heterosexual biological
parents under state law who without question are biologically unbalanced
vis á vis each other, may even be cohabitating, and who may be committed
to parenting. In those cases, the man does not legally commit to financially
supporting the mother though one pregnancy or several that he may well
have consented to. Courts generally enforce a father's commitment to
supporting the child, not the mother. Surely, using heterosexuality as a
marker is over-inclusive. The over inclusion however, could be said to be a
function of a legal assumption as to the unpredictability of procreation, a
legal indulgence of the fertile octogenarian fiction, the impracticality of
testing for procreation given privacy interests, and possibly a recognition of
the long term financial impact of procreation. It is not a conclusion that
how one procreates or whether one procreates does not matter.
It can reasonably be argued, especially given the newness of the issue,
that the federal government has a right to weigh in on how the federal tax
dollars it confers affect the third party rights that are regularly at issue in
reproductive technology cases for both same-sex couples and for
heterosexual ones, the trends in reproductive technologies themselves,
and as on how federal funding will affect the rights of the children or
potential children at issue. Finally, one could argue that parenting
discrimination is a matter not specific to same-sex couples or to marriage,
and responses should, therefore, be handled outside of it.
It is true that sexism has long been and continues to be perpetrated
through marriage policy. However, there is zero evidence that including
same-sex couples who did not suffer that history of marriage as a vehicle
for gender discrimination as same-sex couples will alleviate gender
discrimination within and through marriage. Indeed, one could argue that
policies that make the gender discrimination imbalance less invisible also
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make it easier to accomplish discrimination.
The author does not dispute that same-sex couples have been
discriminated against in parenting or that they can make wonderful parents.
But other couples excluded from procreation-related benefits (the
unmarried, in particular) and their children have also faced unique
historical discrimination with respect to asserting their parental rights. A
rational basis standard for dispensing of benefits through marriage would
give Congress more freedom to consider the rights of all couples excluded
from marriage’s non-familial benefits. Moreover the standard would not
preclude a challenge that Congress should have provided certain
procreation-based benefits outside of marriage. So long as the United
States continues to use marriage as a primary means of supporting natural
procreation, I believe that Congress is entitled to use heterosexual
procreation as a lane marker for for procreation-related benefits, subject to
a rational basis test.. Indeed, the founders likely did not have in mind many
of the reproductive technologies that can result in parenthood under some
state laws.
C. The Plenary Power Exception
If the Constitution places exclusive or plenary power in the federal
government to make the relevant decision, even if the restriction directly
affects family rights, the test must, of course, be rational basis. Courts are
clear that in such cases a finger should be placed on the scale in favor of
federal decision-making even when suspect classes are otherwise
involved.349 Three obvious instances of plenary power come to mind:
immigration, the U.S. military, and Congress’ power over American Indian
Affairs.
D. The Difficulty of Line Drawing
Surely some cases of line drawing to identify whether the denied right
affects a marital family right or is a merely a branch right may be harder
than in others. Every federal marital benefit in some way affects the
family. In close cases, courts should employ a balancing test to decide the
primary operation of the right. A court could also decide that some rights
should be treated as affecting family rights for some purposes but not
others, or that government may not block all benefits, but it may offer a
different level of economic benefit based upon constitutionally defensible

349. E.g., U.S. v. Mirza, 454 Fed. Appx. 249 (5th Cir. 2011), 132 S. Ct. 1725 (2012)
(discussing immigration); United States v. Llamas-Gonzalez, 414 F. Appx. 936 (9th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3047 (2011) (discussing immigration); Delaware
Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 470 U.S. 73 (1977) (discussing Indian affairs);
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (discussing Indian affairs).
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public priorities.
Another case of line drawing difficulty may arise in determining whether
or not a statute advances procreation—and how. This determination will
often be the tipping point on rational basis review. It may lead to exclusion
of same-sex couples that do not have children or the inclusion of those who
do. The question of who is a parent will also likely be one that will invite
controversy, especially in the case of reproductive technologies in which
third party rights are involved. Congress and the Courts will have to sort
out when a statute is merely advancing male hegemony and/or sexual
orientation discrimination and when it advances procreation or another
legitimate state interest.
E. Is the Federal Government Required to Use The Word “Marriage?”
This analysis does not require that the government use the term
marriage. The federal government obviously has the right to define the
terms to be used in its own statutes. DOMA actually does not prevent the
government from using a neutral term for all intimate relationships simply
for the purpose of designating who gets federal benefits. Take for example,
a term like “federally recognized intimate partnerships.”350 However, if
Congress used a single term, if it wished to preserve a procreation-based
regime, it would still have to create subclasses. That could be done on a
basis other than sexual orientation, but I cannot see that the division with
respect to branch rights is compelled. Moreover, it is a fact that marriage is
uniquely a state-created notion. Employing that name at the federal level
may help states that embrace same-sex marriage, but it could also
negatively affect the rights of those states that have declined to do so,
including those that use alternative names for the relationships.
In fact, not being wed to the term "marriage" for same-sex couples will
also allow government to expand some benefits that are currently marriage
related to those couples in jurisdictions that do not recognize marriage.
The general principle of following state law in making federal policy on
family matters, could justify the federal government recognizing marriage
substitutes that some states have adopted in lieu of same-sex marriage such

350. At oral argument in Windsor, Justice Alito raised a similar question adding to
his hypothetical that the government defines the word to include same-sex couples.
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let me get to the question I asked Mr. Clement. It just
gets rid of the word “marriage,” takes it out of the U.S. Code completely.
Substitutes something else, and defines it as same-sex—to include same-sex
couples. Surely it could do that.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 99, Windsor v. United States (No. 12-307) (U.S. filed
Mar.
27,
2012)
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=
12-307.
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as civil unions and domestic partnerships. Domestic partnerships run the
gamut in the degree of rights they allow, but they generally allow at least
some rights that mirror family rights, even if they deny branch incidents.
The federal government might even be able to base family-related benefits
upon contracts creating ties that states have agreed to recognize in lieu of
marriage if such contracts are designed to create the types of legal
relationships that are consistent with the federal statutory purposes
establishing the benefit.
VII. APPLYING THE STANDARDS TO THE THREE DOMAS
How does this scheme relate to the three DOMAs? One DOMA bundles
all marriage rights together, making them impervious to same-sex couples.
This is the DOMA that has dominated attention in same-sex marriage
litigation. The argument supporting this DOMA, if any, is that DOMA is
an integral part of a comprehensive legislative scheme supporting
procreation by heterosexual couples. The problem is that, as I have shown,
not all federal statutes vindicate the procreation goal, and this DOMA also
burdens rights traditionally reserved to the states while denying same-sex
couples fundamental rights affecting the family. Because it bundles family
rights with other rights, this DOMA should be subjected to heightened
scrutiny and should fall under Equal Protection, as it did in Windsor.
The second DOMA is a statute that collapses into each underlying statute
that it defines. The argument supporting this DOMA is that it is authorized
by and it is integral to each of those underlying statutes. More likely, this
DOMA would survive in some cases, but fail in others. Whether or not the
second DOMA stands—the one that collapses into the underlying
statutes—depends upon which federal policy is at issue.
Then there is the third DOMA. This DOMA is definitional. This
DOMA does not tell Congress how to allocate marital benefits. It simply
limits how Congress can use the term "marriage.” As applied to all
statutes this DOMA, should also fail because the definition cannot be
sustained in all cases, especially without an alternative regime. However,
this DOMA may be valid in some circumstances where Congress intended
to uniquely addresses historical gender discrimination through marriage or
the procreational situation of the heterosexual couple.
VIII. APPLYING THE STANDARDS TO THE WINDSOR CASE
How does the Windsor case come out under this proposal? The plaintiff
sought a refund of federal estate taxes paid because she was denied the
estate tax marital deduction after the death of her spouse. The Windsor
case is complicated by several facts. First, she was married in Canada and
at the time of her spouse's death, her domicile of New York did not
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recognize same-sex marriages either directly or under its conflict of law
rules. Second, opinions indicate that neither litigants nor the federal courts
focused upon whether she had already applied for a refund of state estate
taxes or whether New York had already determined that it would
retroactively apply its own same-sex marriage laws and grant the tax
refund. The Second Circuit simply assumed that New York law would
control whether or not she was "married" and predicted New York would
conclude that she was based on New York precedent recognizing foreign
same-sex marriages for inheritance purposes. It may not be that easy.351
351. Below, BLAG challenged Windsor's Article III standing and lost, but seemed
to concede that state law controlled the question of whether her marriage was valid at
the relevant time. See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d. 394, 398 (2012),
aff'd 699 F.3d. 169, 176, 177-78, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); Brief in
Opposition at 18-19, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 786 (opposing the petition
to writ of certiorari before judgment and discussing state law as controlling). The
Second Circuit looked to New York law to determine whether or not New York would
retroactively consider them married at the time of the spouse's death, and it decided that
New York would. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176, 177-78 (2012). It did
not mention whether or not Windsor had filed an original claim or refund with respect
to her New York state estate taxes as “married” under New York law. Neither the
district court nor the Second Circuit considered that federal law might well determine
retroactivity e.g., the time as to which a requirement to be satisfied under state law is to
be met for purposes of federal law, even if state law would govern whether a same-sex
marriage is cognizable.
Windsor's complaint stated that New York "recognizes [the couple's] marriage" and
that it "provided them with the same status, responsibilities and protections, as other
married people.” Windsor Complt. at ¶4, p. 2. In her brief to the Supreme Court,
Windsor stated that the IRS denied her claim because both spouses were women and
the deduction did not apply due to DOMA. Brief on the Jurisdictional Questions for
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, at 5, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 786. The brief also
asserted that New York denied her the state marital deduction because that "[a]t the
time, New York State for purposes of imposing its own estate, calculated the value of a
decedent's estate by reference to the estate's federal tax liablility" and that "[t]hus the
IRS's decision meant" that Windsor owed New York state estate taxes. Id. at 5, n.2. It
said that Windsor has filed a "protective" claim in New York. It did not indicate that a
copy of the claim was a part of the Appendix filed with the Supreme Court or part of
the record below and this author does not have access to all of those records.
While many states do choose look to federal law with reference to their own estate
taxes, at the time, New York also still had the right to calculate her liability with
reference to whether New York considered her married or not. New York was not
required to follow federal law on that marriage determination. Thus it is important to
know whether New York denied the request to treat her as married when she filed her
return, or whether Windsor only asserted it at a later point. The question of
retroactivity for state estate tax purposes is a New York question. If state law governs
retroactivity, as the parties suggested to the Second Circuit and as it then opined, then
New York’s decision governs in both cases. Moreover, a state determination should
arguably be a prerequisite to a federal determination. Otherwise, a state could later say
“no retroactivity for purposes of state law” and then the very basis for a filer's win on
the merits would be ripped from under her—but the filer might already have been paid
the federal refund. A federal court has the means to certify the question to the state's
highest court or to require that a taxpayer ask the state tax authorities to rule. To
predict state law in that circumstance in such a political context, affects the ability of a
state to determine to the contrary later as it has a right to do. If federal law governs
retroactivity then the question is whether even if DOMA is unconstitutional, that ruling
should be retroactively applied in the tax context to a marriage that even a state itself
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Nevertheless, assuming one can validly reach the merits, claims
likeWindsor's Equal Protection claim should likely be reviewed under a
rational basis test. I concede some good arguments that taxation of
inheritances presents a "hybrid" case and should have the favor of a
heightened standard. Descent and distribution are traditionally state areas
of interest. While the actual passing of property is not hindered, the tax
reduces the amount of property that can pass at death and the government
taxes some property that is normally within the power of the state to
control. Thus, a higher tax on inheritances between same-sex spouses
straddles the line between denying family rights and denying economic
rights. Moreover the tie to procreation appears distant, at least as the
deduction is presently designed. On the other hand, the federal government
has always had broad power to determine taxation. It needs that flexibility;
and, despite claims of some that the rational basis standard is too watered
down to be meaningful, absent a procreational interest, a rational basis test
should be sufficient to determine a case like Windsor's in her favor with
respect to both state and federal property.
As I have argued, in Part V(B)(4), there is no demonstrable link between
the modern marital deduction and procreation and, I would argue, no
rational basis for denying the claim. Awarding the deduction is also
otherwise not contrary to federal public policy. Indeed, while the impact of
the deduction for Windsor is quite large, the impact on the federal purse
will be relatively small because so few married couples of any orientation
did not recognize at the relevant time. The timing of Windsor's claim with New York
state—how she filed at first and when she filed for a refund—may also matter to
standing.
The impact of a decision on retroactivity relates to more couples than those like
Windsor who went ahead and married despite law. It is reasonable to ask why
retroactivity should not also be applied to those couples who wanted desperately to
marry but concluded the act of legal marriage would be legally fruitless or who could
not afford to travel to abroad or to another state to be married, or who entered into civil
unions or domestic partnerships, some prior to their state later adopting marriage in
fact. What of those who still cannot marry under state law? How far back should
retroactivity go? Both state and federal governments must also consider whether the
retroactivity principle is limited to estate taxes (and if so, why?) or whether it applies
more broadly to other areas of taxation.
Another approach to the question, considering conflict of laws theory and the
Constitution, is to consider whether the U.S. is required to retroactively recognize a
Canadian same-sex marriage—which is the place that recognized the marriage as a
valid marriage ceremony at the relevant time. If the answer is that the federal
government should have recognized the Canadian marriage as qualifying at the time of
death (e.g., the application of DOMA should be seen as violating Equal Protection at
the time), the retroactivity problem disappears because the marriage was current at time
of the spouse's death. But this case has the wrinkle that the state of domicile would not
have recognized the marriage at the time, federal tax laws do normally look to the state
of domicile for defining marriage in the tax context, and so the argument exists that the
federal government should recognize it for the purpose of branch rights only if the
several states would or if the state of domicile would have at the relevant time—unless,
of course, following state law would be deemed to be violating the federal Constitution.
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have estates large enough to qualify for it. Finally, while the deduction
does not restrain the ability of the couple to be a family, it touches upon
inheritances within families, thereby burdening the state's attempt to have
Windsor treated just like other families within the state. Consequently, on
the merits, if the home state would grant a marital deduction refund based
on retroactive recognition of a marriage, Windsor and those like her should
get the federal refund.
IX. CONCLUSION
The battle over same-sex marriage is, broadly viewed, not merely a
battle over marriage but a battle over families: Who can form them?
Whose will be most financially and socially successful? Whose receives
the most publicly funded benefits? But it is also a theoretical battle over
what burdens we in the United States believe should be publicly supported
and which ones we think should be privately borne. At the center of that
latter battle is procreation. Many different groups are competing for
financial benefits out of the public purse. Same-sex couples comprise only
one such group. Beyond the treatment of same-sex couples one can
criticize our current procreation centered approach for biases against the
middle and lower classes, biases against women, and biases against
minority groups. Not all of these biases are illegal under current law.
As I have argued, support of procreation has long been a part of federal
marriage policy. It remains so today. If a procreation policy is to survive,
Congress must be able to reserve lanes of legal space for the funding of
differently situated families within that regime. Heterosexual married
couples are marked generally by the risk of accidental pregnancies, a
history of gender discrimination through marriage, and an imbalance in
procreational position between them. The more that parties who do not
share the same interests or concerns are added to the procreation lane, the
more rapidly legal precedent will erase or dramatically transform any
protection or benefits intended to deal with that unique situation. While
current federal marriage policy continues to discriminate against
procreating women, abandoning a procreation based marriage regime will
not resolve those problems. Indeed, it may make the situation worse.
So long as the United States continues to use marriage as a primary
means of supporting natural procreation, I believe that Congress is entitled
to use heterosexuality as a lane marker for procreation-related benefits,
subject to a rational basis test. Congress has a right to design a scheme
that does not make heterosexual marriage less favored by those it wishes to
encourage to undertake because the financial benefits measured against the
financial costs of procreation within marriage are not compelling in a larger
market. Congress is also entitled to address gender inequality in
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heterosexual marriage uniquely given the long history of the same and its
distinction from sexual orientation discrimination. It is constitutionally
defensible, if not wise, for Congress to create zones of interest in family
policy in order to give voice to the different interest groups, remedy the ills
of concern, and in order to give voice the very procreation-related concerns
that are, this writer believes, the only legitimate reason for state or federal
governments to be involved in financing marriage. Overinclusiveness of
heterosexual couples who do not procreate or have not shown they can is
not desirable, but may be unavoidable. The issue here is not who will
receive financial benefits (which may be dispersed within or without
marriage), but rather who will receive those benefits through financial
policies that are tied to marriage. The arrangement disadvantages the
children of same-sex couples, but no more so than the children of
unmarried heterosexual couples, the latter of whom definitely procreate
naturally but do not receive for their children benefits related to marital
procreation.
It is not correct to suggest, as some have, that adding new couples to an
economic benefit does not diminish the rights of those already enjoying the
benefit.352 Economic benefits operate in a larger marketplace, and a benefit
given to one group repositions the actors in that marketplace vis-à-vis
others. Indeed, that repositioning in the economic marketplace is the very
point of the benefit.
The history of marriage in the United States has been both a history of
using marriage to support procreation and using marriage to promote
discrimination. Both strands are present in DOMA and the Court wisely
struck its broadest variation down. But as discussion of what Congress can
do now moves forward, the courts should strive hard to respect Congress'
right to set the priorities for public funding that "the people" favor, while
still requiring Congress to adhere to the principles of federalism and Equal
Protection in the Constitution. Congress' failure is not that it has not given
exactly the same benefits to same-sex couples and opposite sex couples but
rather, that in marital and family funding policy, it has not considered the
rights of same-sex couples at all. The courts should require it to do so, but
also give Congress the leeway to consider not just the narrow theater of
litigation where those with time and resources contend, but also the entire
landscape of families and individuals, all of whom should be considered as
Congress makes family funding decisions.

352. See, e.g., Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 2012) (suggesting that DOMA does not increase benefits for heterosexual couples
nor do its defenders show how denying same-sex couples benefits would encourage
heterosexual ones to marry).

